Judge: Martha K. Gooding, Case: 2017-00910991, Date: 2022-09-26 Tentative Ruling

Motion for Determination of Good Faith Settlement

The Court GRANTS the Motion by Defendants Jeff Hanson and Andrea Biller (“Defendants”) for Determination of Good Faith Settlement.

The identical continued Motion set for 10/10/22 is moot and is taken off calendar; it appears Defendants intended this new motion to supplant the earlier-filed one.

The ADR review hearing and OSC re dismissal remain on calendar for 10/10/22, but are moved to 9:00 a.m.

A.   Legal Standard

CCP § 877.6 applies only to a “settlement entered into by the plaintiff or other claimant and one or more alleged tortfeasors or co-obligors …” [CCP § 877.6(a)(1).] 

“It is essential, however, that the action involve two or more parties who are at least alleged to be joint tortfeasors or co-obligors, and that some, but not all, of the parties, have settled.” [Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Sup.Ct. (Whitecliff Co.) (1995) 37 CA4th 1174, 1179; see Dell'Oca v. Bank of New York Trust Co., N.A. (2008) 159 CA4th 531, 561—CCP § 877 defines the “rights of all persons jointly responsible for the same wrong or the same loss”].

By indicating that the good faith settlement applies to the “vicariously or derivatively liable tortfeasor” and to “multiple tortfeasors,” the Supreme Court has suggested that the term joint tortfeasor as used in section 877.6 has a broad meaning. “Joint tortfeasors” have been referred to as “two or more persons who are liable to the same person for the same harm. It is not necessary that they act in concert or in pursuance of a common design, nor is it necessary that they be joined as defendants. (Gackstetter v. Frawley (2006) 135 Cal. App. 4th 1257, 1272–1273; and see Bob Parrett Construction, Inc. v. Superior Court (2006) 140 Cal. App. 4th 1180, 1187–1188; but see KAOM, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 35 Cal. App. 4th 549, 555.)

Two procedures are available to obtain a court determination of the “good faith” issue: either an application, which may be followed by a motion contesting the application; or a regular motion filed by the party seeking approval. Here, Defendant has filed its own Motion.

Normal notice and hearing rules apply, i.e., at least 16 court days before the hearing, extended for service by mail. [CCP §§ 877.6(a)(1), 1005(a)(5) & (b). 

The notice of motion must list each party and each pleading or portion thereof affected by the settlement, including the date on which the affected pleading was filed. [CRC 3.1382].  

If the nonsettling defendants do not oppose the motion on the good faith issue, a “barebones motion which sets forth the ground of good faith, accompanied by a declaration which sets forth a brief background of the case, is sufficient.” [City of Grand Terrace v. Sup.Ct. (Boyter) (1987) 192 CA3d 1251, 1261]

B.   Merits

Due process requires that a nonparty, whose potential liability was known or should have been known at the time of the good faith of the settlement, be given an opportunity to be heard on the good faith of a settlement. (CCP § 877.6; Singer Co. v. Superior Court (1986) 179 Cal. App. 3d 875, 889–891.) If sections 877 and 877.6 were not so interpreted, they would deprive the nonparty of a significant property right without due process of law. (Singer Co. v. Superior Court, supra, at pp. 881, 890–891; accord, Rankin v. Curtis (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 939, 950.) [a nonparticipating, uninvited, unserved defendant or cross-defendant is not barred from seeking indemnity from the settling parties].)

Nothing in section 877 requires that the court have jurisdiction over all “the tortfeasors claimed to be liable for the same tort” in order for the manufacturers’ good faith settlement to discharge them from indemnity liability from those tortfeasors. (Britz, Inc. v. Dow Chemical Co. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 177, 182, 184 “When the court determined the settlement was made in good faith, section 877.6, subdivision (c) barred Britz's claims for indemnity against the manufacturers. That Britz was not a party at the time of the determination is irrelevant so long as it was given notice and an opportunity to challenge the determination.”)

Thus, the due process right to be heard is satisfied when a party is informed the matter is pending so he or she can choose whether or not to contest it. (Britz, Inc., supra, at p. 183 citing Bradshaw v. Park (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1267, 1278.)

Here, Moving Defendants have now served arbitrating Co-Defendants with this Motion.

Moving to the merits, the Court finds that Moving Defendants have met their minimal burden to show that the settlement is in good faith. (See City of Grand Terrace v. Sup.Ct. (Boyter) (1987) 192 CA3d 1251, 1261.)

Thus, the Motion is granted.

Moving Defendants are ordered to serve notice of this ruling to all parties, including Plaintiff and Co-Defendants.