Judge: Martha K. Gooding, Case: 2019-01090739, Date: 2022-10-10 Tentative Ruling
Motion to Enforce Settlement
The unopposed Motion to Enforce Settlement brought by Plaintiff Richard Salinas (“Plaintiff”) is DENIED without prejudice for the reasons set forth below.
Initially, the relevant Settlement Agreement (“Agreement”) between Plaintiff and Defendants Vu Truong and Christian Williams (collectively, “Defendants”) includes language expressly stating the Agreement may be enforced pursuant to section 664.6 of the Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”). (Declaration of Richard Salinas [“Salinas Decl.”] Exh. A [Settlement Agreement] at §5).
In addition, the parties expressly stipulated the Court retains jurisdiction pursuant to CCP section 664.6, “even after dismissal of the action.” (Stipulation dated September 11, 2020 [ROA No. 76]). The Court issued an order consistent with that stipulation on January 29, 2021. (ROA No. 102).
Thus, based on the above, the Court concludes it has jurisdiction to hear this motion. (Wackeen v. Malis (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 429, 433).
There appears to be no dispute that Plaintiff and Defendants entered into a Settlement Agreement, in which Defendants agreed to pay Plaintiff $15,000. (Salinas Decl. ¶3 and Exh. A at §2). The Agreement provides for an initial payment of $5,000, followed by monthly payments in the amount of $333.00. (Id.). The Agreement provides that a 10% late fee applies to any payment not paid within 5 days of the due date. (Id.) Finally, the Agreement includes a provision that “[a]ny Party that is the prevailing Party in enforcing this Agreement shall be entitled to attorney fees and costs of the enforcement.” (Id. at §5).
In support of this Motion, Plaintiff offers a Declaration, in which he states that he received the initial $5,000.00 payment contemplated by the Agreement and also received the required monthly payments through September 2021; however, Defendants defaulted in October 2021. (Salinas Decl. ¶¶4-5). Plaintiff further declares: “As of the date of this Motion, Defendants have failed to pay for ten months. Defendants owe $3,330.00 for unpaid payments and $330.00 in late fees for a total of $3,663.00.” (Id. ¶7).
Based on the above, Plaintiff has demonstrated that at least $3,663.00 is currently owed under the Settlement Agreement; however, Plaintiff declares that he “anticipate[s] Defendants will not make any payment due after July 2022 and they will continue to incur additional late fees of $33.30” on each unpaid monthly amount due. (Salinas Decl. ¶8).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion asks the Court to enter an order requiring payment of $3,663.00, “plus any additional sums that become due and owing, plus an award of attorney’s fees and costs in the total amount of $2,095.00.” (Notice of Motion: 2:4-7). Plaintiff’s Motion acknowledges that by the time of the hearing, “Plaintiff anticipates that additional payments will become due and owing.” (Motion: 2:19-20).
Pursuant to the terms of the Settlement Agreement, monthly payments are due through March 1, 2023. (Salinas Decl. ¶3 and Exh. A at §2), with the final payment due on March 1, 2023. But the Agreement does not appear to provide that, in event of a default, the entire amount owed immediately becomes due.
Thus, it is apparent that the amount owed by Defendants under the Settlement Agreement is not final. There are some payments not yet due, as to which Defendants are not in default.
The Court cannot enter Judgment for the full amount of damages that Plaintiff “anticipates” might become due in the future.
Given all of the above, entry of Judgment at this time would be premature.
Additionally, although Plaintiff requests a Judgment for “any additional sums that become due and owing,” this language is not sufficiently clear and definite to be enforceable. As noted by the Court in Kittle v. Lang (1951) 107 Cal.App.2d 604, “a judgment for money must be stated with certainty and should specify the amount.” (Id. at 612). Similarly, “[b]efore an execution may properly issue the judgment must be for money and the amount due and the persons to whom payable must be determined with exactness.” (McKay v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Santa Barbara (1952) 110 Cal.App.2d 672, 677).
Although it is true that “it is sufficient if the amount may be definitely ascertained by an inspection of the record,” (Foust v. Foust (1956) 47 Cal.2d 121, 124), it is currently unknown whether Defendants will incur further late fees and, consequently, the amount of any final judgment cannot be ascertained at this time.
“The power of the trial court under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6…is extremely limited.” (Hernandez v. Board of Education (2004) 126 Cal.App.4th 1161, 1176). “The statute expressly provides for the court to ‘enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.” (Hines v. Lukes (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1182).
For the foregoing reasons, the motion is DENIED without prejudice.
Plaintiff is ordered to give notice.