Judge Martha K. Gooding, Case 2019-01115511 2022-10-17 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Martha K. Gooding, Case: 2019-01115511, Date: 2022-10-17 Tentative Ruling

1) Motion for Bifurcation

2) Motion for Leave to Amend

Motion for Leave to Amend

The Motion for Leave to Amend brought by Defendant Brenda Reyes (“Defendant”) is GRANTED, pursuant to C.C.P. §473(a). Defendant shall separately file and serve the proposed First Amended Answer, in the form attached to the Motion, within 10 days of this order.

Defendant seeks leave to amend her Answer to add a single affirmative defense, asserting Defendant was released of liability through a settlement. (Motion: 3:22-4:2; See also ¶4 of Potter Declaration and Exhibit A thereto).

In response, Plaintiff correctly points out that Defendant has delayed in seeking this amendment. The Court denied a Motion to Enforce Settlement brought by Defendant on February 1, 2021, noting at that time that the Answer lacked an affirmative defense referencing a settlement. (ROA No. 36). Defendant does not address her delay in seeking leave to amend. However, the Court finds there is no prejudice to Plaintiff in allowing amendment, and consequently the motion is GRANTED. (Fair v. Bakhtiari (2011) 195 Cal.App.4^th 1135, 1147).

Trial is set for January 9, 2023, which allows Plaintiff time to prepare a response to this defense.

Finally, Plaintiff’s argument that the proposed defense is barred by collateral estoppel is without merit. The sole determination by the Court in its February 1, 2021, order was that Defendant’s “Motion to Enforce Settlement” was improperly brought and unsupported. (ROA No. 36). As noted by Plaintiff, “[c]ollateral estoppel precludes relitigation of issues argued and decided in prior proceedings,” (Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341). Because the Court did not conclusively adjudicate the existence of a settlement between the parties, collateral estoppel does not apply.

Motion to Bifurcate

Defendant’s Motion to Bifurcate is DENIED without prejudice.

“An action may be severed…in the discretion of the court, whenever it can be done without prejudice to a substantial right.” (Jud Whitehead Heater Co. v. Obler (1952) 111 Cal.App.2d 861, 867).

Defendant asks the Court to bifurcate trial so that the jury will decide whether the claims asserted by Plaintiff were the subject of a settlement agreement before it is asked to determine liability and damages. Because the settlement was handled through Defendant’s insurer, Defendant cites Evidence Code §1155 and asserts bifurcation is necessary to avoid informing the jury of Defendant’s insurance and policy limits.

Per Evidence Code §1155, “[e]vidence that a person was, at the time a harm was suffered by another, insured wholly or partially against loss arising from liability for that harm is inadmissible to prove negligence or other wrongdoing.”

As noted in Carr v. Progressive Casualty Ins. Co. (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 881, references to insurance “suggest to a jury that the insured tortfeasor has admitted responsibility for the injury suffered by the claimant” and “the jury knowing the tortfeasor is insured, may be more apt to find for the plaintiff, believing the judgment will be paid by the insurer.” (Id. at 889, fn. 5).

The Court concludes bifurcation is not necessary here to serve the purpose of Evidence Code §1155.

First, to the extent the jury learns of the existence of insurance in the course of determining whether there was a settlement agreement and whether it terms and conditions were performed, it would not be for the purpose of proving negligence or other wrongdoing.

Moreover, as explained by the Court in Bell v. Bayerische Motoren Werke Atktiengesellschaft (2010) 181 Cal.App.4^th 1108, “[i]t is common knowledge today that most drivers in California carry automobile insurance protecting them from liability.” (Id. at 1123). Moreover, a trial court’s admonitions for the jury not to consider a plaintiff’s insurance “ordinarily are effective except in cases of extreme misconduct.” (Id. at 1123). Additionally, the court “presume[s] that the jury followed the instructions absent some indication to the contrary.” (Id.) Indeed, Defendant concedes that this issue is addressed by CACI Jury Instruction 5001. (Reply: 2:20-22).

Further, it is by no means clear that bifurcation would promote judicial efficiency or economy. Defendant specifically proposes a court trial, asserting “an evaluation as to whether a series of documents amounts to a settlement is particularly within the capability of the trial court, more than the jury.” (Motion: 4:4-6). Although it is true that “the interpretation of a written instrument is essentially a judicial function,” (Equitable Life Assurance society v. Berry (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 832, 836), the Defendant’s Motion suggests that it is not the meaning of the instrument in dispute, but rather the fact of its performance. (Motion: 3:9-14). It is not clear that issue could be tried by the court absent agreement by all parties.

Plaintiff appears to believe the issue of settlement will require a jury, as Plaintiff asserts that bifurcation will require “two sets of jury instructions” and “two sets of deliberations.” (Opposition: 3:12-15).

Plaintiff is ordered to give notice.