Judge: Martha K. Gooding, Case: 202-01248452, Date: 2022-09-26 Tentative Ruling
1) Demurrer to Amended Complaint
2) Joinder
3) Case Management Conference
The general and special demurrers of Defendant St. Joseph Hospital of Orange (“Defendant”) to the Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) of Plaintiffs Byung H. Kwon and Hwa J. Kwon (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) are sustained with 15 days leave to amend.
Defendant Joon Choi, M.D.’s joinder to the demurrer is granted.
General demurrer
A demurrer presents an issue of law regarding the sufficiency of the allegations set forth in the complaint. (Lambert v. Carneghi (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1120, 1126.) The challenge is limited to the “four corners” of the pleading (which includes exhibits attached and incorporated therein) and to matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable under Evidence Code sections 451 or 452. Although California courts take a liberal view of inartfully drawn complaints, it remains essential that a complaint set forth the actionable facts relied upon with sufficient precision to inform the defendant of what plaintiff is complaining, and what remedies are being sought. (Leek v. Cooper (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 399, 413.)
On demurrer, a complaint must be liberally construed. (CCP § 452; Stevens v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 594, 601.) All material facts properly pleaded, and reasonable inferences drawn from them, must be accepted as true. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-67.)
In the SAC, Plaintiffs allege causes of action for Negligence of Hospital Duty, Medical Negligence, and Loss of Consortium.
Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants were negligent in the treatment of Plaintiff Hwa J. Kwon’s coccyx wound injury in July and August of 2018.
Plaintiff’s claims, as alleged, are barred by the statute of limitations for professional negligence.
Section 340.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure states:
In an action for injury or death against a health care provider based upon such person's alleged professional negligence, the time for the commencement of action shall be three years after the date of injury or one year after the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury, whichever occurs first. In no event shall the time for commencement of legal action exceed three years unless tolled for any of the following: (1) upon proof of fraud, (2) intentional concealment, or (3) the presence of a foreign body, which has no therapeutic or diagnostic purpose or effect, in the person of the injured person.
Civ.Proc. Code § 340.5 (emphasis added).
The initial Complaint in this matter was filed in Riverside Superior Court on September 3, 2021.
Plaintiffs allege in the SAC that “M.D. surgeon was opening the coccyx wound, neither obtaining consent of patient nor notifying patient and then was refusing to treating patient Kwon as being scheduled and planned surgical operation on her coccyx wound.” (SAC, ¶ 11.) Plaintiffs then allege “Ms. Kwon was hospitalized in Riverside Community Hospital Emergency Unit from September 17, 2018 to September 25, 2018 due to blood infection relating to coccyx wound infection and/or inflammation including its complex effects and she was hospitalized again in Riverside Community Hospital Emergency Unit from December 08, 2018 to December 20, 2018 due to coccyx wound inflammation and/or infection including its complex effects for the surgical operation of the coccyx wound.” (SAC, ¶ 12.)
Thereafter, Plaintiff alleges that “A tortious injury to the plaintiff's husband caused by defendant’s insufferable atrocity of sudden refusal of surgery or treatment results in consequence on September 17, 2018, and December 08, 2018…” (SAC, ¶ 17.)
Based on these allegations, the statute of limitations would have started to run in September of 2018, or at the latest in December of 2018. Plaintiff would have known of the injury to her wound at this time. At the very latest, pursuant to section 340.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the action should have been filed by December of 2019.
Although the Plaintiff’s opposition refers to “M.D. M.C. Spaeth” and references a “misdiagnosis” by “M.D.J.Y. Choi” (Opposition at 5, 6) the Complaint does not make clear who “M.D.M.C. Spaeth” is or what the purported “misdiagnosis” is.
Further, it appears Plaintiff may be attempting to rely on the delayed discovery rule to explain why the Complaint was not filed within one year of the events that are alleged to have occurred in 2018; however, that is not clearly set forth in the pleading.
Special demurrer
A special demurrer for uncertainty may lie if the failure to label the parties and claims renders the complaint so confusing the defendant cannot tell what he or she is supposed to respond to. (See Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139.)
Defendant argues the SAC is uncertain because there are no specific allegations stated against St. Joseph Hospital of Orange. Indeed, the SAC does not identify which causes of action are asserted against which Defendants.
Pursuant to section 430.10(f) of the Code of Civil Procedure, grounds for a demurrer lie when the pleading is “uncertain,” which includes ambiguous and unintelligible.
Rule 2.112 of the California Rules of Court requires that each separately stated cause of action in a Complaint specifically state “(1) Its number (e.g., “first cause of action”); (2) Its nature (e.g., “for fraud”); (3) The party asserting it if more than one party is represented on the pleading (e.g., “by plaintiff Jones”); and (4) The party or parties to whom it is directed (e.g., “against defendant Smith”).” (Emphasis added.) “Failure to comply with rule 2.112 presumably renders a complaint subject to a motion to strike (Code of Civ. Proc., § 436), or a special demurrer for uncertainty.” (Grappo v. McMills (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 996, 1014.)
Accordingly, based on the foregoing, both the general and special demurrer are sustained with leave to amend.
Defendant St. Joseph Hospital of Orange is ordered to give notice of this order.