Judge: Martha K. Gooding, Case: 2020-01148405, Date: 2022-10-17 Tentative Ruling
1) Motion to Compel Further Responses to Special Interrogatories
2) Motion to Compel Production
A. Interrogatories Motion
The Court denies Defendant Coleen Spalsbury’s Motion to compel further responses to her Special Interrogatories, Set Two, Nos. 62-65 from Plaintiff Monique Galvan.
Legal Standard
A party may move to compel further responses to interrogatories on the grounds that the answer is evasive or incomplete, an exercise of the option to produce documents under Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.230 is unwarranted or the required specification of those documents is inadequate, and/or an objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (a).)
If a timely motion to compel has been filed, the burden is on the responding party to justify any objection or failure to fully answer the interrogatories. (Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255; Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 541 [“While the party propounding interrogatories may have the burden of filing a motion to compel if it finds the answers it receives unsatisfactory, the burden of justifying any objection and failure to respond remains at all times with the party resisting an interrogatory.”].)
Merits
Here, according to the FAC, Plaintiff seeks the following damages:
-Economic damages: past and future financial contributions, gifts, benefits, household and personal services, and funeral/burial expenses;
--Noneconomic damages: loss of love, society, companionship, comfort, care, assistance, protection, affection, society, moral support, training, guidance, and enjoyment of sexual relations.
(FAC, ¶12.)
Interrogatories Nos. 62-65 all ask for the identity of Plaintiff’s psychiatrists and therapists since 2015, three years before the accident that resulted in the death of Plaintiff’s husband. Defendant argues that these facts are relevant to Plaintiff’s damages because she alleges the above-referenced noneconomic damages.
Loss of love, companionship, comfort, affection, society, solace or moral support are compensable damages. [See Krouse v. Graham (1977) 19 C3d 59, 67; Fagerquist v. Western Sun Aviation, Inc. (1987) 191 CA3d 709, 728—placing pecuniary value on “intangible losses” lies within province of jury.)
Wrongful death damages, however, cannot include recovery for the claimant's “grief, sorrow or mental suffering” that normally follows the loss of a loved one. [Krouse v. Graham, supra, 19 C3d at 72; and see Budavari v. Barry (1986) 176 CA3d 849, 854, fn. 7—claimant cannot get around this barrier by suing for negligent infliction of emotional distress, unless they otherwise qualifies as a “direct victim” of the third-party negligence or as a “percipient witness” of the event resulting in death].
The Court finds that the information sought is not relevant, and that Plaintiff has met her burden to show that the information is protected by privacy.
The constitutional right of privacy applies to a party's medical records and treatment. [John B. v. Sup.Ct. (Bridget B.) (2006) 38 C4th 1177, 1198.]
Here, Defendant would have to show a compelling need for these records, the content of which is a serious invasion. Defendant has not done so. Even highly relevant, nonprivileged information may be shielded from discovery if its disclosure would impair a person's “inalienable right of privacy” provided by Calif. Const. Art. 1, § 1. (Britt v. Sup.Ct. (San Diego Unified Port Dist.) (1978) 20 C3d 844, 855-856; Pioneer Electronics (USA), Inc. v. Sup.Ct. (Olmstead) (2007) 40 C4th 360, 370—right of privacy “protects the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy against a serious invasion”; County of Los Angeles v. Sup.Ct. (Johnson & Johnson) (2021) 65 CA5th 621, 639 (quoting text); Williams v. Sup.Ct. (Marshalls of CA, LLC) (2017) 3 C5th 531, 557, fn. 8)—witness' deposition testimony admitting she was under psychiatric care may have waived psychotherapist-patient privilege but did not waive her right to privacy of her psychiatric records.)
The Motion is DENIED.
B. Documents Motion
The Court DENIES Defendant Coleen Spalsbury’s Motion to compel further responses and production of documents to her Requests for Production of Documents, Set Two, Nos. 24 through 34, and 39 through 40, from Plaintiff Monique Galvan.
Legal Standard
In moving to compel further responses to document demands, Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310, subdivision (b)(1) requires the moving papers to set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the inspection demand. To establish “good cause,” the burden is on the moving party to show both: (1) relevance to the subject matter (e.g., how the information in the document would tend to prove or disprove some issue in the case); and (2) specific facts justifying discovery (e.g., why such information is necessary for trial preparation or to prevent surprise at trial). (Glenfed Develop. Corp. v. Superior Court (National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa.) (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117; Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2016) ¶ 8:1495.6.) Declarations are generally used to show good cause, and they must contain specific facts and not mere conclusions. (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2016) ¶ 8:1495.7.) If the moving party demonstrates good cause, then the opposing party must justify any objections. (Kirkland v. Superior Court (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98.)
Merits
The Requests at issue ask for all documents relating to Plaintiff’s mental health / psychiatric treatment that she received after the accident including all documents that reference changes in her medication.
As discussed above with respect to the Interrogatories Motion, wrongful death damages cannot include recovery for the claimant's “grief, sorrow or mental suffering” that normally follows the loss of a loved one. (Krouse v. Graham, supra, 19 C3d at 72; and see Budavari v. Barry (1986) 176 CA3d 849, 854, fn. 7—claimant cannot get around this barrier by suing for negligent infliction of emotional distress, unless they otherwise qualify as a “direct victim” of the third-party negligence or as a “percipient witness” of the event resulting in death).
Moreover, Plaintiff does not allege that she is seeking such damages in her FAC.
Thus, Defendant has not shown good cause for these documents.
Moreover, the Court sustains Plaintiff’s privacy objections, as set forth above.
The Motion is DENIED.
Defendant is ordered to serve notice.