Judge: Martha K. Gooding, Case: 2020-01156221, Date: 2022-10-10 Tentative Ruling
1) Motion for Summary Judgment and/or Adjudication
2) Motion for Summary Judgment and/or Adjudication
Before the Court are two dispositive motions.
MOTION BY DEFENDANT SANTA ANA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT
The Motion by Defendant Santa Ana Unified School District (“SAUSD”) for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication, on the Complaint by Plaintiff Jane G.R. Doe (“Plaintiff”) is DENIED.
Plaintiff is a minor student suing defendants Santa Ana Unified School District (“SAUSD”) and Rancho Santiago Community College District (“RSCCD”; together with SAUSD, the “Defendants”) for an alleged sexual assault that occurred on or about 2/14/19 on one of RSCCD’s campuses, Middle College High School (“MCHS”), which is on the campus of Santa Ana College (“SAC”). One of the community college students, Cross-Defendant Kenji Kina, allegedly sexually assaulted Plaintiff.
Evidentiary Objections
The Court declines to consider Plaintiff’s evidentiary objections (ROA 422), because they neither provide the information required by Rule 3.1354 nor are properly formatted in one of the two mandatory formats specified in the rule. (Hodjat v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1, 8.)
SAUSD’s objections to Plaintiff’s evidence – specifically, the Stephens Declaration – are sustained to the extent the declarant purports to testify to whether SAUSD owed a duty to Plaintiff, to whether there was proximate causation, or to any other legal conclusions. (Thompson v. Sacramento City Unified School Dist. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1373.)
Legal Standard
“[F]rom commencement to conclusion, the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.)
A “party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact. . . .” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) “A prima facie showing is one that is sufficient to support the position of the party in question.” (Id. at p. 851.)
A defendant moving for summary judgment satisfies his or her initial burden by showing that one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) The scope of this burden is determined by the allegations of the plaintiff's complaint. (FPI Development v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382 [pleadings serve as the outer measure of materiality in a summary judgment motion]; 580 Folsom Associates v. Prometheus Development Co. (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1, 18-19 [defendant only required to defeat allegations reasonably contained in the complaint].)
Once a defendant meets its prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show by reference to specific facts the existence of a triable issue as to that affirmative defense or cause of action. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.) To meet this burden, the plaintiff must present substantial and admissible evidence creating a triable issue. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 163.) Theoretical, imaginative, or speculative submissions are insufficient to stave off summary judgment. (Doe v. Salesian Society (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 474, 481; Bushling v. Fremont Med. Center (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 493, 510.)
The Court may grant a motion for summary adjudication “only if it completely disposes” of “a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(f)(1).)
Merits
Plaintiff asserts claims against SAUSD for (1) negligence and (2) breach of mandatory duty (Gov’t Code § 815.6).
The elements of a negligence claim are “breach, causation, and damages.” (Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 618.) Unlike the elements of breach, causation, and injury – all of which are fact-specific issues for the trier of fact – the existence and scope of a duty are questions of law. (Staats v. Vintner's Golf Club, LLC (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 826, 832.)
Foreseeability is relevant in determining whether the “particular defendant’s conduct was negligent in the first place,” and “may be relevant to the jury's determination of whether the defendant's negligence was a proximate or legal cause of the plaintiff's injury.” (Staats v. Vintner's Golf Club, LLC (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 826, 837, citation omitted.)
“Although a school district is not an insurer of its pupils' safety (Citation), our cases have long established that a school district bears a legal duty to exercise reasonable care in supervising students in its charge and may be held liable for injuries proximately caused by the failure to exercise such care.” (Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City Sch. Dist. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 508, 513; see also M. W. v. Panama Buena Vista Union School Dist. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 508, 524–525 [“School districts are subject to well-established statutory duties mandating adequate supervision for the protection of the students. These affirmative duties arise from the compulsory nature of school attendance, the expectation and reliance of parents and students on schools for safe buildings and grounds, and the importance to society of the learning activity that takes place in schools”.]
SAUSD contends it is entitled to summary judgment for several reasons.
SAUSD’s primary argument is that it is entitled to immunity under Education Code section 44808. SAUSD contends that the “incident involving plaintiff DOE did not occur on MCHS or SAUSD property, it occurred elsewhere.” (Mot. at 21.) Specifically, the incident occurred in the stairwell of a campus library, which is under the operation, control and management of RSCCD. SAUSD therefore contends it had no duty to supervise the “library premises,” because the library is not “owned, operated, maintained or controlled” by SAUSD.
However, even if the library is not considered SAUSD “school property” for the purpose of section 44808, the statute expressly states that the school district could nevertheless be “responsible” for student safety if the district has “otherwise specifically assumed such responsibility or liability or has failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances.” (Ed. Code, § 44808.)
Plaintiff has proffered evidence that SAUSD arguably took “responsibility” for the students beginning at around 7:15 a.m., when the students were permitted to arrive on the college campus and were provided with breakfast. (Pl. Depo. Tr. 160:22-24.) Plaintiff further testified at her deposition that “students were allowed to eat breakfast wherever they wanted to . . . [t]hey could eat at the Village, they could eat at the quad, wherever they wanted.” (Pl. Depo. Tr. 161:2-5.) However, the first class did not start until 7:55 a.m. (Pl. Depo. Tr. 163:2-5.) During that time period, the facilities were open and available to students. (Pl. Depo. Tr. 163:22-24.)
Plaintiff also proffered the declaration of Ryan Garcia, another freshman high school student in the 2018/2019 school year, in which Garcia attests that students “generally arrived on campus at 7:15,” and could “were free to walk about the SAC campus in the morning.” Garcia further attests they were “permitted to spend free time before or after class . . . on the larger Santa Ana College,” and “there were no restrictions on the movement of Middle College High School students on the larger Santa Ana College campus,” during the 2018-2019 school year. (Garcia Decl. at ¶¶ 4, 6, 7, 16, 17.)
MCHS’s principal also confirmed that he believed “breakfast is served from 7:15 to 8:00” and agreed that high school students generally start arriving around 7:15 a.m. (Voight Depo. Tr. 62:1-6.) He also agreed that supervision of the students at that time was his responsibility, and that “activity supervisors” did not arrive until 7:55 a.m. (Voight Depo. Tr. 62:7-16.) There is no evidence of what – if anything – the supervising principal did to fulfill his responsibility to supervise the students before the “activity supervisors” arrived.
The Court finds that, at minimum, there is a triable issue of fact as to whether SAUSD “failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances,” when it permitted high school students to arrive on campus at 7:15 a.m. (indeed, provided them with breakfast if they arrived early), and allowed them “unrestricted” or “unsupervised” access to the larger college campus.
Plaintiff’s reliance on LeRoy v. Yarboi (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 737 is misplaced, because the facts here are in sharp contrast to the facts in LeRoy, in which a high school student committed suicide in his home after the school year ended. As our high court has stated, “no California decision suggests that when a school district fails to properly supervise a student on school premises, the district can automatically escape liability simply because the student's ultimate injury occurs off school property.” (Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City Sch. Dist. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 508, 515, emphasis added [trial court erred in sustaining school district’s demurrer; school district could be held liable for a 10-year-old student’s injuries if plaintiffs could prove that the student’s injuries were proximately caused by the district’s alleged negligent supervision that allowed him to leave the school’s premises before the end of his scheduled classes].)
SAUSD also argues that, as a matter of law, Plaintiff’s injury was not proximately caused by SAUSD’s negligence, (i.e., there is a “complete lack of causation”), and that it was completely unforeseeable that the college student, Kina, would sexually assault Plaintiff.
The Court has reviewed the authorities cited by SAUSD and Plaintiff, (as well as other cases not cited by either party) and finds that no one case is directly on point. Nevertheless, in considering the facts of this particular case, the Court ultimately cannot conclude, as a matter of law, that proximate causation is lacking.
Proximate cause “is generally a question of fact for the jury.” (Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City Sch. Dist. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 508, 520.) Given the evidence that there may have been either “a total lack of supervision” or “ineffective supervision,” by SAUSD at a time where it permitted students like Plaintiff to be on campus (and even encouraged them to be on campus by providing breakfast), the factfinder should decide whether there was a lack of ordinary care on the part of SAUSD, and, if so, whether it proximately caused Plaintiff’s injury. (Thompson v. Sacramento City Unified School Dist. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1370.)
Lastly, the “issues” of whether Plaintiff was entitled to “police protection” was not alleged in her Complaint; accordingly, they are not properly before the Court for summary adjudication.
Plaintiff is ordered to give notice.
MOTION BY DEFENDANT RANCHO SANTIAGO COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT
No tentative is yet available. The Court will endeavor to post a tentative ruling on this motion by noon on the day of the hearing. If it is unable to do so, the hearing on this motion will be continued.