Judge: Martha K. Gooding, Case: 22-01288249, Date: 2023-07-20 Tentative Ruling
1) Motion to Strike
2) Case Management Conference
The Motion by Defendants Scott Knode (“Scott”), Melissa Knode (“Melissa”), and Vance Knode (“Vance”) to strike portions of Plaintiff Jackson Gutierrez’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) is GRANTED.
The Motion is GRANTED as to Scott and Melissa Knode and the prayer for punitive damages as to them. The Motion is GRANTED as to Vance Knode, paragraph 43 and the prayer for punitive damages against him. If Plaintiff currently has additional facts to allege to state a claim for punitive damages against any of the Knode Defendants, he has leave to do so within 15 days. If he does not now have such additional facts to allege and discovery later reveals facts that Plaintiff believes are sufficient to support his claim(s) for punitive damages, he may then seek timely leave from the Court (after first meeting and conferring, of course, with Defendants’ counsel) to amend to state such facts. In other words, the Motion is granted in this regard without prejudice.
The Motion is GRANTED without leave to amend as to Paragraph 16.
The Court did not consider the declaration of Carlos Hernandez submitted with Plaintiff’s Opposition brief or the exhibits appended to that Declaration. Plaintiff’s impact statement (Exhibit B) is hearsay and improperly attempts to inject matters outside the pleading into the Court’s consideration of the Motion to Strike. Exhibit A – the Court’s prior minute order – does not require judicial notice, as it is part of the Court’s file in this action, but the Court does not find it relevant or helpful to determination of this Motion.
The Court denies the request for judicial notice regarding the criminal charges brought against Plaintiff and the resolution of those charges. Those facts are not relevant to whether Plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded punitive damages against any of the defendants.
Punitive Damages Allegation and Prayer
Plaintiff has sued Defendants Vance, Melissa, and Scott Knode. He asserted two negligence claims: negligence against Vance and negligent entrustment against Melissa and Scott. His FAC seeks punitive damages against all three Defendants.
Civil Code section 3294 provides that punitive damages may be awarded in an action for breach of an obligation not arising from contract if the plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. “Malice” means conduct that is intended to cause injury or despicable conduct that is carried on with a willful and conscious disregard of the right and safety of others. Civ. Code § 3294(c)(1).
At the pleading stage, the complaint must allege facts supporting circumstances of oppression, fraud, or malice. See Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166 (“The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. [Citation] Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim. [Citation].”).
In Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal. 3d 890, the California Supreme Court ruled that nonintentional torts may form the basis for punitive damages when the conduct constitutes a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. Id. at 896-96. The plaintiff must establish, however, that the defendant was aware of the probably dangerous consequences of his conduct, and that he willfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences. Id. at 895-96. In Taylor, the defendant was intoxicated; he hit another car and injured the other driver. Id. at 893. The allegations in Taylor included that, prior to the accident in issue, the defendant had other drunk driving incidents, arrests, and accidents. The Court found sufficient allegations to support a claim for punitive damages because the allegations supported knowledge and disregard of probable injury to others. Id. at 900.
Dawes v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal. App.3d 82, decided before Taylor, addressed the issue of foreseeability, finding that the defendant’s speed and weaving in and out of traffic in an area congested with cars and pedestrians raised the scenario above the foreseeability of injury to others inherent in driving under the influence to a probability of injury. Id. at 86. It was this set of circumstances, rather than the defendant’s intoxication, that provided a basis for punitive damages. Id. at 89.
After those two opinions, the Legislature added the “despicable” requirement for non-intentional malice claims under section 3294. Lackner v. North (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1210 (racing at a high rate of speed did not alone demonstrate malice, particularly where defendant showed some effort to avoid impact.)
As amended to include this word, the statute plainly
indicates that absent an intent to injure the plaintiff, ‘malice’ requires
more than a ‘willful and conscious’ disregard of the plaintiffs’ interests.
The additional component of ‘despicable conduct’ must be found.” (College Hospital, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 725, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 898, 882 P.2d
894.)
Butte Fire Cases (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1161.
The question raised by the Motion is whether Plaintiff has alleged facts showing despicable conduct by each of the Knode Defendants, carried out with a willful and conscious disregard of the right and safety of others. As explained below, the Court concludes Plaintiff’s FAC does not sufficiently allege such facts.
For Vance Knode, the allegations are that at the time of the accident he was young (19 years old); he had previously held a restricted license (until he was 18 years of age); he had “often recklessly operated” the vehicle (his parent’s high-powered car) at a speed in excess of 200 miles an hour – and that he had done so the day before the accident, when Plaintiff was riding with Vance in the same car and had yelled at Vance to slow down.
But there are no facts alleged regarding the speed at which Vance was driving on the night in question, other than the vague allegations that the speed was “excessive” – along with allegations that Plaintiff had yelled at Vance to slow down, Vance did not slow down, and the collision happened “moments later.”
The Court finds these allegations insufficient to state facts asserting a claim for punitive damages against Vance. Accordingly, the Motion to strike the punitive damages allegations as to Vance Knode is granted.
As to Scott and Melissa Knode, the motion to strike the prayer for punitive damages is also granted.
Plaintiff alleges that Scott and Melissa Knode “knew or should have known” Vance had a “penchant to drive recklessly”; that they “knew or should have known” that Vance “often recklessly operated” their car “at speeds in excess of 200 miles per hour, including that he had done so on the day before the accident at issue; and they “knew or should have known” that Vance had in the past posted online videos of him driving his own car more than 130 miles per hour.
But again, there are no facts alleged to support these conclusory allegations about what both Scott and Melissa Knode “knew or should have known.” The fact that Scott and Melissa are the parents of an adult son is not enough to show that they knew or should have known their son’s driving habits or behavior – or even that they knew or should have known what he posted on various social media. And the fact that they allowed their adult son to drive a powerful car capable of reaching high speeds is not enough to allege that they engaged in despicable conduct with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights and safety of others.
Irrelevant Allegations
Defendants move to strike the allegation at paragraph 16 of the FAC that Vance had been provisionally licensed until one year before the accident – which is to say, at the time of the accident, Vance had legally been permitted to drive without restriction for a year.
The Court agrees the allegations in this paragraph are irrelevant.
Plaintiff points to the limits of a provisional license to argue that Melissa and Scott Knode were negligent in letting Vance Knode drive without the restrictions of a provisional license. But Vance Knode did not have a provisional license at the time of the accident. He was 19 years old and he was licensed to legally drive without restrictions – and had been for at least a year. The fact that Vance had a provisional license a year or more before the accident, before he turned 18, does not impose on his parents the responsibility to maintain or impose those restrictions even when he became fully licensed; nor does it tend to show that they were negligent in complying with California law concerning when a licensed driver may drive without restrictions.
Relevant evidence is evidence that has “any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.” Evid. Code § 210. The disputed facts here are whether Vance Knode – or his parents, Defendants Scott and Melissa – acted negligently or engaged in despicable conduct with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights and safety of others. The fact that Vance Knode had, at least one year earlier, held a license that was subject to restrictions – restrictions that are imposed by California law on all young drivers between the ages of 16 and 18 (Veh. Code §12814.6) and were not imposed on Vance because of any wrongdoing or demonstrated incompetence or negligence on his part – is not relevant to either of these issues.
This is not to say that Vance’s experience – or relative lack thereof – might not be potentially relevant. But Vance’s experience and proficiency as a driver is a different issue that does not turn on whether he once held a restricted license. If the fact that Vance had been issued a provisional license until he turned 18 years of age is evidence tending to show that he was negligent or that he engaged in despicable conduct with conscious disregard when he was involved in an accident more than a year later, then it would be evidence that every driver in California (or at least every driver who first was issued a license subject to restrictions) is negligent or has acted in a way warranting punitive damages when they later have an accident.
The Motion to strike is granted as to paragraph 16 of the FAC without leave to amend.
Defendants are ordered to give notice.