Judge: Martha K. Gooding, Case: 22-01296308, Date: 2023-08-07 Tentative Ruling
Motion to Quash Service of Summons – GRANTED
The Motion by Defendant Boys & Girls Club of America (“Defendant”) to quash service of summons is GRANTED.
Plaintiff John Doe (“Plaintiff”), currently aged 46, alleges that starting from age 12, he was sexually abused, molested, and raped by Defendant Yannoni (as well as others) when he was a member of the Boys & Girls Club of Central New Mexico (“BGCCNM”). Defendant Yannoni was the director of the Old Town Boys Club, which was owned and operated by the Boys & Girls Club of Central New Mexico.
Personal Jurisdiction
A nonresident defendant may not be called upon to defend in a foreign forum unless he or she has minimal contacts with that state. See Hensa v. Denckla (1958) 357 U.S. 235, 251.
The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that a nonresident defendant has sufficient contacts with the forum state to support personal jurisdiction. See, Aquila, Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 148 Cal. App. 4th 556, 570. If the plaintiff establishes that the defendant has minimum contacts with the forum state, the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable. Stone v. Texas (1999) 76 Cal. App. 4th 1043, 1048.
Personal jurisdiction may be general or specific.
A nonresident defendant may be subject to general jurisdiction if his or her contacts with the forum are substantial, continuous and systematic. See Perkins v. Benguet Mining Co. (1952) 342 U.S. 437, 445.
Here, it is not disputed that Plaintiff has not shown general jurisdiction, as the basis for jurisdiction is alleged to be trips to Disneyland that occurred on just three separate occasions. Defendant was incorporated in Delaware, is domiciled in D.C., and is headquartered in Georgia. (See Exhibits B, C1, C2; Complaint, ¶ 7.)
A nonresident defendant may be subject to specific jurisdiction if: (1) the defendant has purposefully availed himself or herself of forum benefits, and (2) the controversy is related to or arises out of the defendant’s contacts with the forum. See Vons Companies Inc., supra, 14 Cal. 4th 434 at 446, citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S. 462, 472-73. The assertion of jurisdiction over the defendant must also be reasonable – that is, comport with fair play and substantial justice. Id. at 477-78.
Discussing Burger King, the California Supreme Court in Vons explained that a state may exercise specific jurisdiction over a nonresident who purposefully avails himself or herself of the forum’s benefits because the state has a manifest interest in providing its residents with a forum for redressing injuries inflicted by out-of-state actors, and where individuals derive economic benefit from interstate activities it would be unfair to allow them to escape having to account in other states for the consequences that arise from such activities. See, Vons, at 447. The Vons court further noted that modern transportation and communications makes defending in another state a much less burdensome proposition today. Id.
Moving Defendant here how shown that it is a federally chartered corporation that serves “to promote the health, social, educational, vocational, and character development of youth throughout the United States . . . .” (Defendant’s Ex. B.) Defendant’s Constitution establishes that it exists to support the nationwide mission (Exhibit C1, p. 1, Art. II), while independent local member clubs are the “organizations which operate one or more Clubs in accordance with requirements and standards established by the National Council….” (Id., Art. III, § 1 [emphasis added].)
Defendant’s Constitution, which can only be modified by a National Council vote, requires that each independent, local entity’s own governing body:
shall have control of the Club buildings or designated Club rooms of the Clubs it operates; shall have control of the expenditures of any such Club within an established budget; shall have authority to determine policies and establish programs; shall have the sole authority to appoint, to fix the compensation of, to prescribe the duties of, and to establish the terms of employment of its executive director; and shall [have] the sole authority (or delegate the authority to its executive director) to hire and discharge employees, to fix their compensation, and to prescribe their duties.
(Exhibit C2, p. 1, II. Eligibility Requirements for Member Organizations, ¶ D[3].) Further, Defendant’s Constitution established that “[Defendant] shall have no authority whatsoever with respect to any such control or authority of any such governing body.” (Id.)
Nothing in Defendant’s enacting statute authorizes or even permits it to control independent local member corporations. (See id., 36 U.S.C. § 31101 et seq.) Defendant has only one statutory enforcement power: conditioning or terminating an independent club’s affiliation. (Id., 36 U.S.C. § 31103(c)(2).)
In Daimler AG v. Bauman (2014) 571 U.S. 117, the plaintiffs sought personal jurisdiction in California over a German corporate defendant based on the California contacts of Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, a subsidiary of the German corporate defendant that distributed vehicles manufactured by the German corporate defendant throughout the United States. The Daimler court rejected the jurisdictional theory that “a foreign corporation may be subjected to a court’s general jurisdiction based on the contacts of its instate subsidiary.” (Daimler AG, 571 U.S. at 135-136.)
Defendant argues that, under Daimler, even if BGCCNM were a subsidiary of Defendant – which the evidence shows it is not – jurisdiction over Defendant would remain absent. (Id.) Relying on Daimler, California courts have similarly held the in-state presence of a related corporate entity does not create jurisdiction over another. (See Young v. Daimler AG (2014) 228 Cal. App. 4th 855 (due process did not permit exercise of general jurisdiction over the parent corporation in California).)
Here, Plaintiff pleads no actionable conduct on Defendant’s part targeting California. Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant was the principal of BGCCNM and exercised control and oversight over BGCCNM such that it should be subject to California’s jurisdiction for the actions of Yannoni (BGCCNM’s employee) are not supported by evidence.
Plaintiff contends that Defendant exercises control over BGCCNM through Defendant’s wholly-owned New Mexico subsidiary, NM Alliance of BGC. Plaintiff notes that NM Alliance’s stated corporate purpose is to “[p]rovide support and guidance to the local Boys and Girls clubs in the state,” and assist with fund raising, among other things. (Scott Decl. Ex. 2 [Articles of Incorporation], Ex. 3 [By-Laws Art. II, § 1].)
But support and guidance and assistance with fundraising is not the same thing as oversight or control. Plaintiff provides no actual evidence to support his arguments. Moreover, the Alliance did not even exist until years after Plaintiff’s alleged abuse took place. (See Scott Decl., Ex. 2 (New Mexico Alliance of Boys & Girls Clubs, Inc. (“NM Alliance”) was incorporated January 4, 2002).)
Plaintiff’s argument that Defendant’s Constitution specifies that Defendant must approve the employment of any executive director of a local club – which would include Defendant Yannoni - is similarly unsupported. The evidence cited (Ex. C-2 ¶ II.J.5, III.G) is inconsistent with Plaintiff’s argument.
Plaintiff’s citation to websites regarding Defendant’s proffer of training for its local clubs to detect and prevent sexual abuse of minors are also not material, as nothing on the websites suggest that Defendant exercised control or oversight over the local clubs at the time the assaults occurred.
For the state to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant consistent with due process, “the defendant's suit-related conduct must create a substantial connection with the forum State.” (Walden v. Fiore, (2014) 571 US 277, 284; Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Sup.Ct. of Calif., San Francisco County (2017) 582 US 255, 262-268.)
The evidence shows that Defendant was not the employer of Yannoni and did not exercise oversight or control over BGCCNM. No evidence shows, or even suggests, that Defendant has purposefully availed itself of the forum benefits, or that Plaintiff’s claims arise out of Defendant’s contacts with California.
Finally, Plaintiff asks the Court to continue the hearing on the Motion for 90 days to permit it to conduct jurisdictional discovery, including, but not limited to, the following:
Depositions, requests for production and interrogatories relating to BGCA’s, NM and CA Alliance for BGC’s, and BGCCNM’s conduct and activity within the State of California; the corporate structure of each entity, the relationship and any agreements between the two entities and/or with any of their member organizations, including BGCCNM; BGCA’s employment and/or agency relationship with any employees of BGCCNM, including Yannoni; BGCA’s corporate constitution(s), bylaws, and governing structures; policies and procedures concerning training, employment practices, screening and background checks; and other related matters during the relevant time period.
The Court denies Plaintiff’s broad request for jurisdictional discovery. Particularly given the evidence already produced in connection with the Motion, Plaintiff has not shown that discovery would be likely to lead to the production of evidence establishing jurisdiction. See In re Automobile Antitrust Cases I & II (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 100, 127 (court rejected plaintiff’s request to conduct discovery, because “plaintiffs failed to show that further discovery was likely to lead to the production of evidence establishing jurisdiction.”).
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Defendant’s motion to quash.
Defendant Boys & Girls Club of America is ordered to give notice.