Judge Mary H. Strobel, Case 20STCP01949 2023-01-12 Tentative Ruling

Hon. Mary H. Strobel

The clerk for Department 82 may be reached at (213) 893-0530.

In her third cause of action, Petitioner Aurolivia Nieto Luna, individually and as Guardian ad Litem for Minor Antonio O. (“Petitioner”) petitions for a writ of ordinary mandate directing Respondent Lennox School District (“Respondent” or “District”), as follows:

· “to change its practice, change its website, and change all other documentation purporting to limit the type of documentation that a student may submit to verify his or her residency to comport with [Education Code] Section 48204.1; … to properly implement the required appeals process to conform with the Code; and … to specify the basis or bases for determining that students are not District residents when notifying them of same to conform with the Code….” (Reply 6.)

Petitioner seeks this relief “on behalf of all students seeking to attend, currently attending, or, in the future, will attend, Respondent’s schools.” (Reply 2; see First Amended Petition (“FAP”) ¶¶ 31-32, 68, 93, 101.)

On October 20, 2022, the writ petition came for hearing before the court. After oral argument, the court adopted its tentative ruling to deny the fifth, seventh, ninth, and eleventh causes of action. The court continued the hearing and ordered supplemental briefing “on the issue of standing with respect to the third cause of action for writ of mandate as it relates to residency requirements and procedures.” In its minute order, the court emphasized that “[b]riefing will be limited to the issue of standing. The parties may not present any additional evidence or make other legal arguments regarding violation of any statutes.” (10/20/22 Ruling at 14.)

On December 16, 2022, Petitioner and Respondent each filed a supplemental brief. The court now issues its tentative ruling on the third cause of action. The October 20, 2022, minute order discusses the background and procedural history of the case, the standard of review, and the court’s ruling for the fifth, seventh, ninth, and eleventh causes of action. That discussion is not repeated here but is incorporated by reference.

Respondent contends that the third cause of action is moot and Petitioner lacks a beneficial interest because “Antonio has been reenrolled in the District” and “[t]here is no controversy between the parties regarding Antonio’s eligibility to be enrolled in the District.” (Oppo. 8.)

The request for relief pertaining to the February 28, 2020 residency decision as to Antonio is clearly moot because Antonio is presently enrolled in District based on a Caregiver’s Affidavit. (FAP ¶ 1, fn. 1; Oppo. 6:8-10; Reply 2:6-7.) Petitioner concedes this point. Petitioner also concedes she has no other children, and there is no further need for enforcement as to her or Antonio O. (Suppl. Brief, p. 4.)

Petitioner contends she has public interest standing to pursue at least part of her claim set forth in the Third Cause of Action. “A petitioner who is not beneficially interested in a writ may nevertheless have ‘citizen standing’ or ‘public interest standing’ to bring the writ petition under the ‘public interest exception’ to the beneficial interest requirement. The public interest exception ‘applies where the question is one of public right and the object of the action is to enforce a public duty—in which case it is sufficient that the plaintiff be interested as a citizen in having the laws executed and the public duty enforced.’” (Rialto Citizens for Responsible Growth v. City of Rialto (2012) 208 Cal. App. 4th 899, 913-914.)

In a citizen standing analysis, “[t]he courts balance the applicant’s need for relief (i.e., his beneficial interest) against the public need for enforcement of the official duty. When the duty is sharp and the public need weighty, the courts will grant a mandamus at the behest of an applicant who shows no greater personal interest than that of a citizen who wants the law enforced.” (Citizens for Amending Proposition L v. City of Pomona (2018) 28 Cal.App. 5th 1159, 1174.) “Judicial recognition of citizen standing is an exception to, rather than repudiation of, the usual requirement of a beneficial interest.” (Reynolds v. City of Calistoga (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 865, 873-874.)

In her supplemental brief, Petitioner argues that she has public interest standing to enforce the residency verification requirements set forth by the legislature. (Id. p. 1.)

Case law recognizes that “Since its admission to the Union, California has assumed specific responsibility for a statewide public education system open on equal terms to all. The Constitution of 1849 directed the Legislature to ‘provide for a system of common schools, by which a school shall be kept up and supported in each district ....’ (Cal. Const. of 1849, art. IX, § 3.) That constitutional command, with the additional proviso that the school maintained by each district be ‘free,’ has persisted to the present day. (Cal. Const., art. IX, § 5.)” (Butt v. State of California (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 680.)

“Accordingly, California courts have adhered to the following principles: Public education is an obligation which the State assumed by the adoption of the Constitution. [Citations.] The system of public schools, although administered through local districts created by the Legislature, is ‘one system ... applicable to all the common schools ….’ [Citation.] ‘... In view of the importance of education to society and to the individual child, the opportunity to receive the schooling furnished by the state must be made available to all on an equal basis. ... ‘ [Citations.] ‘[M]anagement and control of the public schools [is] a matter of state[, not local,] care and supervision. ...’ [Citations.] The Legislature's ‘plenary’ power over public education is subject only to constitutional restrictions. [Citations.] Local districts are the State’s agents for local operation of the common school system….” (Butt, supra, 4 Cal.4th at 680-681.)

In 2011, the California Legislature enacted Education Code sections 48204.1, et. seq., which requires school districts to accept a wide range of documents and representations from the parent or legal guardian of a pupil living with his or her parent or legal guardian as reasonable evidence that the pupil meets residency requirements for admission to a public school. (See AB 207 (October 3, 2011, Legislative Counsel’s Digest: Enacting Section 48204.1, JA 100-102.) The apparent intent of the legislation was to remove obstacles to a parent or guardian proving that residency requirements for enrollment are met.

In addition, Petitioner develops an argument that the District’s duties with respect to documentation of residency are “sharp and weighty.” Petitioner notes that public education is a right guaranteed to children under the California Constitution; the California Legislature enacted Education Code sections 48204.1, et. seq., to ensure that all children are free from undue obstacles to enrollment in a public school; and Respondent’s practices regarding residency verification and investigations impart a “chilling effect” on student enrollment in District’s public schools, including on students at the poverty level. (Pet. Suppl. Br. 1-5.) Petitioner cites to specific statements regarding residency verification found on the United States Department of Education Office for Civil Rights website. Among other statements, the DOE recognizes that school districts typically accept a variety of documents as proof residence, and opines that “A parent must be permitted to establish residency using any of the alternative methods provided for by state or local law. States and districts cannot apply different rules, or apply the same rules differently, to children based on their or their parents’ actual or perceived race, color, national origin, citizenship, immigration status, or other impermissible factors.”

Petitioner has shown a duty that is sharp and a weighty public need for enforcement related to District’s practices regarding documentation of residency.

Respondent’s public interest standing arguments are terse and not persuasive. Respondent argues that “Petitioner’s primary concern is … her son’s enrollment” and that Petitioner “is driven by personal objectives.” (Resp. Suppl. Br. 3.) The court already concluded in its prior ruling that Petitioner herself does not have a beneficial interest in the third cause of action. Petitioner’s lack of beneficial interest is not dispositive to public interest standing. While public interest standing may not be found where an individual is “driven by personal objectives,” Respondent does not explain what personal objectives Petitioner has in the third cause of action. Unlike the example discussed in SJJC Aviation Services, LLC, supra, Petitioner is not using the third cause of action to promote personal interests as a “business competitor.” Nor does any other personal objective of Petitioner appear from the record.[1]

Respondent also argues that Petitioner “cannot establish that any other person has” suffered injury and also that there is “no broader public concern at issue.” (Resp. Suppl. Br. 3-4.) Respondent does not elaborate or sufficiently develop the argument. Enforcement of section 48204.1, et. seq. implicates broad public concerns.

The court finds that Petitioner has public interest standing for the third cause of action as it relates to residency requirements.

Petitioner contends that, for various reasons, District fails to comply with Education Code sections 48204.1 and 48204.2 in its policies and practices related to residency investigations and appeals. (OB 9-13; see also Reply 2-4.)

Petitioner raises certain issues of statutory interpretation. “The rules governing statutory construction are well settled. We begin with the fundamental premise that the objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent. [Citations.] To determine legislative intent, we turn first to the words of the statute, giving them their usual and ordinary meaning. [Citations.] When the language of a statute is clear, we need go no further. However, when the language is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation, we look to a variety of extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, contemporaneous administrative construction, and the statutory scheme of which the statute is a part.” (Nolan v. City of Anaheim (2004) 33 Cal.4th 335, 340.)

When interpreting a statute, the court must construe the statute, if possible to achieve harmony among its parts. (People v. Hull (1991) 1 Cal. 4th 266, 272.) The court “must select the construction that comports most closely with the apparent intent of the Legislature, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the statute, and avoid an interpretation that would lead to absurd consequences.” (People v. Jenkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 234, 246.)

“Generally, elementary and secondary school students must attend school in the district in which their parent or legal guardian resides.” (B.H. v. Manhattan Beach Unified School District (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 563, 571, discussing Education Code § 48200.) However, there are exceptions to this residency rule, as set forth in Education Code section 48204[2], including for “[a] pupil who lives in the home of a caregiving adult that is located within the boundaries of that school district.” (§ 48204(a)(5).)

(a) A school district shall accept from the parent or legal guardian of a pupil reasonable evidence that the pupil meets the residency requirements for school attendance in the school district as set forth in Sections 48200 and 48204. Reasonable evidence of residency for a pupil living with his or her parent or legal guardian shall be established by documentation showing the name and address of the parent or legal guardian within the school district, including, but not limited to, any of the following documentation:

(7) Declaration of residency executed by the parent or legal guardian of a pupil.

(b) Nothing in this section shall be construed to require a parent or legal guardian of a pupil to show all of the items of documentation listed in paragraphs (1) to (7), inclusive, of subdivision (a).

(c) If an employee of a school district reasonably believes that the parent or legal guardian of a pupil has provided false or unreliable evidence of residency, the school district may make reasonable efforts to determine that the pupil actually meets the residency requirements set forth in Sections 48200 and 48204.

(a) If a school district elects to undertake an investigation pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 48204.1, the governing board of the school district shall adopt a policy regarding the investigation of a pupil to determine whether the pupil meets the residency requirements for school attendance in the school district before investigating any pupils.

(1) Identify the circumstances upon which the school district may initiate an investigation, which shall, at a minimum, require the school district employee to be able to identify specific, articulable facts supporting the belief that the parent or legal guardian of the pupil has provided false or unreliable evidence of residency.

(5) Require a school district to specify the basis for a determination of nonresidency of a pupil, and provide a process to appeal that determination. If an appeal is made, the burden shall be on the appealing party to show why the decision of the school district should be overruled.

(c) The policy required pursuant to this section shall be adopted at a public meeting of the governing board of the school district.

Pursuant to authority granted by section 48204.2, District’s Board has promulgated Board Policy 5111.1, a copy of which is included in the parties’ joint appendix. (JA 23-28.) This Board Policy states, in pertinent part:

The Superintendent or designee shall require parents/guardians to provide documentation of the student's residency upon admission to a district school. A copy of the document or written statement offered as verification of residency shall be maintained in the student's mandatory permanent record. (5 CCR 432)

When the Superintendent or designee reasonably believes that a student's parent/guardian has provided false or unreliable evidence of residency, he/she may make reasonable efforts to determine that the student meets district residency requirements. An investigation may be initiated when the Superintendent or designee is able to identify specific, articulable facts supporting the belief that the parent/guardian has provided false or unreliable evidence of residency. (Education Code 48204.1, 48204.2)

If the Superintendent or designee, upon investigation, determines that a student does not meet district residency requirements and denies the student's enrollment in the district, he/she shall provide the student's parent/guardian an opportunity to appeal that determination. (Education Code 48204.2)

The Superintendent or designee shall send the student's parent/guardian written notice specifying the basis for the district's determination. This notice shall also inform the parent/guardian that he/she may, within 10 school days, appeal the decision and provide new evidence of residency.

The burden shall be on the parent/guardian to show why the district's determination to deny enrollment should be overruled. (Education Code 48204.2)

In an appeal to the Superintendent of a determination that district residency requirements were not met, the Superintendent shall review any evidence provided by the parent/guardian or obtained during the district's investigation and shall make a decision within 10 school days of receipt of the parent/guardian's request for the appeal. The Superintendent’s decision shall be final.

Evidence of residency may be established by documentation showing the name and address of the parent/guardian within the district, including, but not limited to, any of the following: (Education Code 48204.1)

Education Code section 48204.1, as well as Board Policy 5111.1, are reasonably interpreted to require District to accept all seven types of documentation listed in section 48204.1(a) as “reasonable evidence of residency.” This interpretation is supported by the plain language, which states that “[r]easonable evidence of residency … shall be established by documentation showing the name and address of the parent or legal guardian within the school district, including, but not limited to, any of the following documentation ….” (bold italics added.) Furthermore, the legislative history of the statute also shows intent to require a school district “to accept a wide range of documents and representations from the parent or legal guardian of a pupil living with his or her parent or legal guardian as reasonable evidence that the pupil meets those residency requirements,” including the seven types of documentation listed in section 48204.1(a). (See Legislative Counsel’s Digest for A.B. No. 207, submitted at JA 100-102.)

Education Code section 48204.1, as well as Board Policy 5111.1, do not prohibit a school district from requiring two proofs of residency at the time of admission. Section 48204.1(b) states that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed to require a parent or legal guardian of a pupil to show all of the items of documentation listed in paragraphs (1) to (7), inclusive, of subdivision (a).” Thus, the legislature has directed that school districts cannot require all seven proofs of residency. However, this subdivision does not state that a school district can only require one proof of residency. Nor does the legislative history support such a construction. Since the legislature expressly stated that districts cannot require “all of the items of documentation” listed in section 48204.1(a), but included no other restriction, it is reasonably inferred that the legislature did not intend to prohibit districts from requiring two proofs of residency.

Proof of Residency at Admission. Petitioner fails to show that District’s current policies and practices with respect to admission of students violates section 48204.1, as interpretated by the court above. Board Policy 5111.1 states that “[t]he Superintendent or designee shall require parents/guardians to provide documentation of the student's residency upon admission to a district school.” (JA 23.) The policy also expressly incorporates the proof of residency requirements of section 48204.1(a), including the list of seven exemplar proofs of residency stated therein. (JA 28.) These policies, which are available for review by all parents and guardians, are consistent with the court’s interpretation of section 48204.1 with respect to admission of students.

The only evidence Petitioner cites that District has a practice of not complying with section 48204.1 at the time of admission is a copy of District’s webpages regarding enrollment, last visited and printed in April 2021. (JA 9; see also Table of Contents for Joint Appendix No. 6.) The webpage states, in pertinent part: “The following documents are required to fully enroll your child: Birth Certificate; Immunization Records; 2 proofs of residency (utility bills or statements).” (JA 9.) The court finds this evidence somewhat dated. Petitioner has not shown that District’s webpage still includes this language. Moreover, even if this language is still included on District’s webpage, it does not show a violation of section 48204.1 with respect to District’s enrollment practices upon admission. As discussed, section 48204.1 does not prohibit school districts from requiring two proofs of residency. The webpage’s vague, parenthetical reference to “utility bills or statements” does not sufficiently show that District has a practice of not accepting all proof of residency authorized by section 48204.1(a). While the webpage could be worded more clearly, Petitioner does not show that Respondent has a clear, present, and ministerial duty under the law to re-word its webpage. Nor does Petitioner show a sharp duty or weighty public need for Respondent to re-word its webpage given that Board Policy 5111.1 is consistent with section 48204.1 and is available for review by parents or guardians.

Proof of Residency During Residency Investigation. Petitioner contends that the February 7, 2020, letter to Petitioner and “letters sent to other families between about February 2019 and December 2020” show that District has improperly demanded two “proofs” of residency, from a list of three types of documentation, for students whom District found to not meet the residency requirements of section 48204. (OB 10, citing JA 6 and 51-96.)

Education Code section 48204.1, as well as Board Policy 5111.1, are somewhat ambiguous concerning the extent to which a school district has discretion to limit the proofs of residency that will be accepted in or after a residency investigation. The legislature vested discretion in school districts to formulate the procedure for investigating whether a student satisfies the residency requirement. (§ 48204.2(a).) However, this statute must be harmonized with section 48204.1, discussed above. Presumably, if a school district found the residency requirement was not met based on one proof of residency, it could have discretion to require the parent or guardian to submit a different proof of residency. Barring such reason to limit the types of proofs of residency, section 48204.1(a) controls and requires the school district to accept any “reasonable evidence of residency for a pupil living with his or her parent or legal guardian.”

As discussed above, Education Code section 48204.1, as well as Board Policy 5111.1, prohibit a school district from requiring all seven proofs of residency listed in section 48204.1(a), but do not prohibit a school district from requiring two proofs of residency. That same statutory analysis applies to a residency investigation.

Here, Petitioner cites undisputed evidence that from February 2019 to December 2020, including in Antonio’s residency investigation, District informed the parent or guardian in written letters that the proofs of residency “need to be utility bills, rental agreement and/or license.” (JA 6, 51-96 [bold italics added].) The instruction given in these letters is clear. District directed the parents or guardians that they could only submit the three proofs of residency listed. The letters omit several permissible proofs of residency under section 48204.1(a), including pay stubs, voter registration, correspondence from a government agency, and a declaration of residency. None of these letters specified any reason that these other proofs of residency could not be used.

In opposition, Respondent argues that it has “complied with the statute” in several other respects. (Oppo. 8.) However, Respondent does not address the argument that the letters submitted at JA 6 and 51-96 show that District inaccurately instructed parents or guardians that they could only submit “utility bills, rental agreement and/or license” as proof of residency. (Sehulster Tunnels/Pre-Con v. Traylor Brothers, Inc. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1328, 1345, fn. 16 [failure to address point is “equivalent to a concession”].) Nor has Respondent disputed that this evidence -- multiple letters on District letterhead over nearly two years – shows a pattern and practice of the District. (See Oppo. 8-11.)

In its supplemental brief, Respondent argues, for the first time, that the form letters do not prove a violation of section 48204.1(a) because “District’s policy and the Education Code from which it was formulated, are readily available on the District’s website, thus providing all parents/guardians access to the legal requirements at issue here.” (Resp. Suppl. Br. 4.) Respondent further argues that “[t]he District’s webpage on student enrollment provides a link to an enrollment welcome packet” and “[t]he packet directs parents/guardians to the Education Code and AR 5111.1, both of which provide an identical list of acceptable types of proof of residency and state that the list is not exhaustive.” (Ibid.)

These new arguments exceed the scope of the supplemental briefing and are procedurally improper. In its October 20 minute order, the court emphasized that “[b]riefing will be limited to the issue of standing. The parties may not present any additional evidence or make other legal arguments regarding violation of any statutes.” (10/20/22 Ruling at 14.) Respondent’s new arguments that it “fulfilled its statutory obligation” concern the merits of Petitioner’s claim, and violate the court’s express order.

Even if considered, the court finds Respondent’s new merits arguments unconvincing. Respondent does not dispute that it issued the form letters at issue. The letters evidence Respondent’s “practice” of violating section 48204.1(a). The form letters did not direct the parents or guardians to relevant provisions of the Education Code, Board Policy 5111.1, District’s webpage, or an enrollment welcome packet. The letters stated that the proofs of residency “need to be utility bills, rental agreement and/or license.” (JA 6, 51-96 [bold italics added].) A parent or guardian could reasonably believe that District would not accept any other proofs of residency. Because the form letters related to residency investigations and not initial enrollment, a parent or guardian also could reasonably believe that the enrollment welcome packet did not apply to such investigations. Respondent also does not cite to the record in support of its contention that its webpage directs parents or guardians to any specific information concerning section 48204.1(a) and Board Policy 5111.1.

The court concludes that District has a clear, present, and ministerial duty under section 48204.1(a) and 48204.2 to refrain from issuing letters or notices to parents or guardians during or related to residency investigations or appeals that direct the parents or guardians that proofs of residency “need to be utility bills, rental agreement and/or license.” District has a clear, present, and ministerial duty to ensure that its notices to parents and guardians are consistent with Education Code section 48204.1(a) and 48204.2 as interpreted above.

Written Notice of Basis for the District’s Residency Determination and Notice of Appeal Rights

Petitioner contends that District has a practice “to never provide written notice specifying the basis for the [residency] determination” in violation of Board Policy 5111.1 and the Education Code. (OB 12-13; see also Reply 2-4.) Petitioner also contends that both District’s Board Policy 5111.1 and practices “violate Section 48204.2 because Respondent fails to accurately inform parents in general, and Petitioner in particular, that the determination of non-residency may be appealed within 10 days whether or not they have any new evidence of non-residency.” Petitioner no longer has any direct beneficial interest in these aspects of her claim given that Antonio is enrolled in the District. Petitioner does not develop any argument in her supplemental briefing that these particular duties are weighty and the need for enforcement sharp. In fact, these aspects of her claim are not mentioned at all in Petitioner’s supplemental brief. The court denies these portions of the third cause of action for failure to show standing.

The fifth, seventh, ninth, and eleventh causes of action are DENIED as set forth in the October 20, 2022 minute order.

The third cause of action for writ of mandate is GRANTED IN PART. The court will issue a writ directing District as follows:

-to refrain from issuing letters or notices to parents or guardians during or related to residency investigations or appeals that direct the parents or guardians that proofs of residency “need to be utility bills, rental agreement and/or license”. The writ will state that any such notices to parents and guardians shall be consistent with the court’s interpretation of Education Code section 48204.1 as set forth in this ruling.

The court will discuss with the parties whether any non-writ claims that the court stayed will be sent to Dept. 1 for reassignment to a direct calendar court.

[1] To the extent Respondent suggests that Petitioner or her attorney has an interest in a fee award pursuant to CCP section 1021.5, Respondent cites no case authority that supports a conclusion that such interest is relevant to public interest standing. Indeed, since CCP section 1021.5 is intended to promote public interest litigation, it stands to reason that the potential for a fee award under that statute cannot, in itself, deprive a litigant of public interest standing.

[2] Unless otherwise stated, statutory references are to the Education Code.