Judge: Mary H. Strobel, Case: 20STCP02157, Date: 2022-10-13 Tentative Ruling
Hon. Mary H. Strobel
The clerk for Department 82 may be reached at (213) 893-0530.
Case Number: 20STCP02157 Hearing Date: October 13, 2022 Dept: 82
|
v. Alliant International University, Inc., |
Judge
Mary Strobel Hearing:
October 13, 2022 |
|
20STCP02157 |
Tentative
Decision on Motion for Reconsideration |
Petitioner
Stephanie Aba (“Petitioner”) moves for reconsideration pursuant to CCP section
1008(a) of this court’s July 7, 2022, order denying Petitioner’s motion for
attorney fees. Respondent Alliant
International University, Inc. (“Respondent”) opposes the motion.
Petitioner’s Evidentiary Objection
(1)
Overruled.
Procedural History
On July 7, 2020, Petitioner filed a
petition for writ of administrative mandate against Respondent pursuant to CCP
section 1094.5.
On August 12, 2020, Respondent
answered.
On June 21, 2021, Petitioner filed her
opening brief in support of the petition.
The court received Respondent’s opposition, Petitioner’s reply, the
administrative record, and the joint appendix.
On August 19, 2021, after a hearing,
the court granted the petition in part, and denied the petition in part. The court’s minute order provides a lengthy
discussion of the relevant evidence and the court’s reasoning, which is not
repeated here but incorporated by reference.
On September 10, 2021, the court
entered judgment in favor of Petitioner and against Respondent. The court issued a writ of mandate directing
Respondent to set aside the sanctioning decision of Academic Misconduct
Termination and to reconsider the appropriate sanction based solely on the
factual findings made by the Hearing Panel and in a manner not inconsistent
with the court’s ruling.
Respondent did not appeal the
judgment or writ.
On October 8, 2021, Respondent filed
a return to the writ. The return states
that, after reconsideration, Respondent determined that Petitioner’s dismissal
from Respondent’s Clinical Psychology Program was the appropriate penalty. On October 22, 2021, Petitioner filed an
objection to the return. On October 29,
2021, the court instructed the parties that Petitioner may file a motion to enforce
compliance with the writ under CCP section 1097 or file a new writ
petition.
On January 25, 2022, Petitioner
filed her first motion to enforce. The
court received Respondent’s opposition and Petitioner’s reply.
On
February 22, 2022, the court granted the motion to enforce in part, and denied
the motion in part.
On
March 24, 2022, Respondent filed a second return to the writ. The return states that, after reconsideration
of mitigating factors, Respondent determined that Petitioner’s dismissal from
Respondent’s Clinical Psychology Program was still the appropriate penalty.
On
April 18, 2022, Petitioner served and filed a notice of motion for attorney
fees without any supporting documents.
On
May 19, 2022, Petitioner filed her motion for attorney fees, including
supporting declarations and exhibits. Respondent
filed an opposition and Petitioner filed a reply.
On
June 9, 2022, Petitioner filed a second motion to enforce compliance with the
writ. The court received Respondent’s
opposition and Petitioner’s reply.
On
July 7, 2022, after a hearing, the court denied Petitioner’s second motion to
enforce and also Petitioner’s motion for attorney fees. The court found that the motion for attorney
fees was untimely and Petitioner did not show good cause to extend the deadline
to file the motion. The court denied
Petitioner’s oral request for a continuance of the hearing on the motion for
attorney fees. (See Minute Order dated 7/7/22 at 1 and 6-7.)
On
July 17, 2022, Petitioner filed the instant motion for reconsideration. The court has received Respondent’s
opposition and Petitioner’s reply.
Analysis
Legal Standard
Code
of Civil Procedure section 1008 governs applications to reconsider and
provides, in relevant part:
(a) When an application for an order has
been made to a judge, or to a court, and refused in whole or in part, or
granted, or granted conditionally, or on terms, any party affected by the order
may, within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of
the order and based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, make
application to the same judge or court that made the order, to reconsider the
matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior order. The party making the
application shall state by affidavit what application was made before, when and
to what judge, what order or decisions were made, and what new or different
facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown.
….[¶]
(e)
This section specifies the court's jurisdiction.... No application to
reconsider any order … may be considered by any judge or court unless made
according to this section.
“A
motion for reconsideration may only be brought if the party moving for
reconsideration can offer ‘new or different facts, circumstances, or law’ which
it could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the
time of the prior motion. . . .A motion for reconsideration will be denied
absent a strong showing of diligence.” (Forrest v. State Of Cal. Dept. Of Corps. (2007)
150 Cal.App.4th 183, 202.)
“A
trial court may not grant a party’s motion for reconsideration that does not
comply with section 1008.’” (Cox v. Bonni (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 287,
312.)
Grounds
for Reconsideration
Respondent
contends that Petitioner has not presented any new facts, circumstances, or law
that justify reconsideration because Petitioner “merely reiterates” arguments
made in her reply for the motion for fees and at the hearing on July 7,
2022. (Oppo. 5.) Respondent also contends that Petitioner has
not provided a sufficient reason for failing to present the “new” evidence
earlier. (Oppo. 5-6.) The court agrees in part.
When
a motion for reconsideration is based on alleged new or different facts, it is
not sufficient for the moving party merely to adduce facts not previously
presented to the court. (Garcia v.
Hejmadi (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 674, 689-690.) Facts that were known to a
party at the time of the hearing or ruling on the order sought to be
reconsidered, by their very nature, are not “new” or “different.” (Id. at 690.) Furthermore, that party must show
that diligence was used in uncovering all pertinent facts before the original
motion was made. (Forrest v. State of
California Dept. of Corporations (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 183, 202,
disapproved of on other grounds by Shalant v. Girardi (2011) 51 Cal.4th
1164.) This diligence requirement also applies to motions on the basis of
different law, and is not satisfied where the moving party presents a legal
principle based on a case that was available and could have been provided to
the trial court prior to the initial ruling. (Baldwin v. Home Sav. of America (1997)
59 Cal.App.4th 1192, 1196-1197.) The requirement of introducing new or
different facts, circumstances or law cannot be satisfied on the theory that
the trial court misinterpreted California law in its existing decision; thus, a
party does not rely on “different” law when it reiterates its prior reasoning
and authorities. (Gilberd v. AC
Transit (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1500.)
Here,
in opposition to the motion for fees, Respondent argued the motion was untimely
pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1702. (Oppo. to Mot. for Fees 10.) In her reply brief for the motion for fees,
and also at the hearing on July 7, 2022, Petitioner argued that “[it] makes
sense that Ms. Aba would wait to file her motion for attorney fees until after
litigating the motion to enforce compliance with the writ because Ms. Aba
continued to accrue attorney fees in this litigation.” (Reply to Mot. for Fees 6.) Petitioner argued that the time limit in Rule
3.1702 starts to run from entry of an appealable order, which Petitioner argued
was “[t]he Court’s February 22, 2022 Order” granting in part and denying in
part the first motion to enforce.
(Ibid.) Petitioner also argued
that “[a]ny late filing in this case was inadvertent and based on an honest
mistake of law, as described above, and Alliant has expressed no prejudice.” (Id. at 7:14-15; see also Park Decl. in
support of Mot. for Reconsideration (“Parker Decl.”) ¶ 35.)
Petitioner
makes these identical arguments in the declaration of Jenna Parker filed in
support of the motion for reconsideration.
Parker asserts that “[t]he Court’s February 22, 2022 order on
Petitioner’s motion to enforce compliance with the writ is an appealable order”
and “[a]ny mistake of law regarding the deadline to file a motion for attorney
fees in this rare scenario where entry of the judgment did not conclude the
trial court litigation was an honest mistake of interpretation of law by me.” (Parker Decl. ¶¶ 27-30.) Because these legal arguments were already
presented to the court in the reply for the motion for fees, and at the hearing
on July 7, 2022, Petitioner has not identified any new law that would authorize
the court to reconsider the July 7, 2022, ruling pursuant to CCP section 1008(a).
However,
in its previous denial of the motion for attorneys’ fees, the court noted Petitioner’s
argument that the court should extend the deadline because of Petitioner’s good faith mistake of
law was not supported by evidence such as a declaration of counsel. To the extent counsel’s declaration is
considered new facts, Petitioner must show that those facts could not have been
presented to the court, with reasonable diligence, in the reply brief for the
motion for fees or at the hearing on July 7, 2022. Attorney Parker declares that “[o]n reply, I
did not attempt to submit new evidence in the form of a declaration showing
good cause to extend the deadline to file a motion for attorney fees with the
reply brief because Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1702(d) does not require a
declaration showing good, it is generally understood that a moving party is not
permitted to submit new facts and evidence with their reply papers.” (Parker Decl. ¶ 34.) She also states that “I was confident in my
belief that the attorney fee motion was filed in a timely manner.” (Ibid.)
While
new reply arguments are generally not permissible, there is a “good cause”
exception, including when the opposing party first raises an important defense
in opposition. (Balboa Ins. Co. v. Aguirre (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 1002, 1010.) Because Respondent first raised the timeliness
issue in its opposition brief, Petitioner had good cause to submit new evidence
in reply regarding the timeliness of the motion for fees. However, Petitioner’s counsel personal belief
that the fee motion was timely does not show reasonable diligence in presenting
all relevant facts, circumstances, or law to the court for the July 7, 2022,
hearing.
Under
these circumstances, it is debatable whether Petitioner has shown grounds to
reconsider the motion for attorneys’ fees based on the alleged new evidence in
counsel’s declaration. In any event the
court may reconsider on its own motion.
The court analyzes the reconsideration motion on the merits, and would
reach the same conclusion as discussed below.
Timeliness
of Motion for Attorney Fees; and Petitioner’s Request for Extension of Time
If the court reconsiders its ruling on the
motion for fees, the court reaches the same result and denies the motion as
untimely.
Respondent
argued the motion was untimely pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule
3.1702. (Oppo. to Mot. for Fees 10.) Rule 3.1702(b)(1) provides in pertinent part:
A
notice of motion to claim attorney’s fees for services up to and including the
rendition of judgment in the trial court . . . must be served and filed within
the time for filing a notice of appeal under rules 8.104 and 8.108 in an
unlimited civil case. . . ..
Rule
8.104 clearly sets for the time by which an appeal from a judgment must be
filed. That rule provides:
a)
Normal time Unless
a statute or rules 8.108, 8.702, or 8.712 provides otherwise, a notice of
appeal must be filed on or before the earliest of:
(1)
(A) 60
days after the superior court clerk serves on the party filing the notice of
appeal a document entitled "Notice of Entry" of judgment or a
filed-endorsed copy of the judgment, showing the date either was served;
(B) 60
days after the party filing the notice of appeal serves or is served by a party
with a document entitled "Notice of Entry" of judgment or a
filed-endorsed copy of the judgment, accompanied by proof of service; or
(C) 180
days after entry of judgment.
Here,
the motion for fees sought “attorney’s fees for services up to and including
the rendition of judgment in the trial court.”
(See Rule 3.1702(b)(1).) Notice
of entry of judgment was mailed by the clerk on September 10, 2021. Petitioner was required to file her motion
for attorneys’ fees within the time to file an appeal, 60 days after notice of
entry of judgment. Petitioner served and
filed two sets of documents on two separate dates: (1) a two-page notice of
motion filed and served by electronic transmission on April 18, 2022; and (2) a
“further notice of motion” with supporting papers, including a memorandum of
points and authorities, two declarations, and exhibits, all filed and served by
electronic transmission on May 19, 2022.
Whether the court considers the motion to have been filed April 18,
2022, or May 19, 2022, the motion was untimely by at least five months pursuant
to the plain language of Rule 3.1702(b)(1).
Petitioner
argues that the court’s order enforcing the writ is a separately appealable
order. While that may be correct, that fact
would not extend the time to appeal from the judgment. It does not cure the untimeliness of the
motion for attorneys’ fees at issue, which sought fees for the writ action
through judgment and for the underlying administrative proceedings. Under
Petitioner’s theory, she could file seriatim motions to enforce the judgment (presumably
without any time limit to so file) and thereby extend the time to appeal and by
analogy to file its motion for attorneys fees.
That would be an illogical interpretation of the rule.
Petitioner
also argues the court has discretion to extend the time for filing a motion for
attorneys’ fees for good cause. Rule
3.1702(d) provides that “[f]or good cause, the trial judge may extend the time
for filing a motion for attorney's fees in the absence of a stipulation or for
a longer period than allowed by stipulation.”
Petitioner argues that “any late filing in this case was inadvertent and
based on an honest mistake of law.”
(Reply for Mot. for Fees 7; Parker Decl. ¶¶ 21-35; and Mot. for
Reconsideration 4-5, citing Robinson and Lewow, infra.)
“A
court may grant a request for extension of time to file a motion for attorney's
fees even if the motion is not filed until after the deadline for filing an
attorney's fees motion under Rule 3.1702….[¶] Counsel's ‘honest mistake of law’
may constitute good cause under Rule 3.1702(d), depending in large part on the
reasonableness of the misconception.” (Robinson
v. U-Haul Co. of California (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 304, 326-328.) In making that assessment, the court may
consider whether the legal issue involved is complex and debatable. (See Lewow v. Surfside III Condominium
Owners’ Assn., Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 128, 135.)
Unlike
in Robinson and Lewow, Petitioner has not shown that a reasonable
mistake of law justifies an extension under Rule 3.1702. The motion for fees sought “attorney’s fees
for services up to and including the rendition of judgment in the trial court”
(see 3.1702(b)(1)), including fees incurred well before entry of judgment and
those incurred during the administrative proceedings. In those circumstances, the court finds the
time limit in Rule 3.1702(b)(1) to be clear and counsel’s misconception about
the time limit to be unreasonable. Further,
Petitioner motion is at least five months late.
Petitioner did not request an extension of time to file the motion until
the reply brief was filed on June 9, 2022, about seven months after the time
limit had expired. In the court’s
discretion, the court does not find good cause to extend the deadline for
Petitioner’s motion for fees.
Conclusion
The motion for reconsideration is
DENIED.