Judge: Mary H. Strobel, Case: 20STCP03274, Date: 2023-01-03 Tentative Ruling
Hon. Mary H. Strobel
The clerk for Department 82 may be reached at (213) 893-0530.
Case Number: 20STCP03274 Hearing Date: January 3, 2023 Dept: 82
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Neil Chudgar, v. Department of Motor Vehicles, et al. |
Judge Mary
Strobel Hearing: January
3, 2023 |
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20STCP03274 |
Tentative
Decision on Motion to Seal Court File |
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Petitioner Neil Chudgar
(“Petitioner”) moves for an order sealing the entire court file pursuant to
Penal Code section 851.91, and 851.92, as well as California Rules of Court
2.551 et seq. Respondent Department of
Motor Vehicles (“Respondent” or “DMV”) opposes the motion to seal “all court
documents” but “has no objections to the sealing of the arrest report, the body
cam footage, and other related documents that expressly discuss the arrest.” (Resp. Suppl. Br. 2:9-12.)
On August 30, 2022, the motion came
for hearing before the court. After oral
argument, the court adopted its tentative ruling to continue the hearing so
that (1) Respondent could provide its position in writing as to the statutory
construction of Penal Code sections 851.91 and 851.92; (2) the parties could
further address the court’s tentative interpretation of these statutes,
including by discussing any relevant legislative history; and (3) Petitioner
could propose a narrowly tailored sealing order under Rule of Court 2.550. (Minute Order dated 8/30/22 at 11-12.) The court has received Petitioner’s opening
supplemental brief, Respondent’s supplemental opposition, and Petitioner’s
supplemental reply.
The
court incorporates by reference and does not repeat certain parts of the August
30, 2022, minute order, including the procedural history and summary of Penal
Code sections 851.91 or 851.92. As the court discussed
in its August 30, 2022, minute order, Judge Munisoglu's sealing order
did not require the sealing of any records in this separate civil case. (Minute Order dated 8/30/22 at 6-7.) The court does not repeat that analysis.
Analysis
“[S]ubstantive
courtroom proceedings in ordinary civil cases are ‘presumptively open.’” (NBC
Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Sup.Ct. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1178, 1217.) To allow sealing of the record, including
redactions thereof, the court must make the necessary findings under California
Rules of Court, Rules 2.550 and 2.551.
Petitioner argues that sealing of the entire court
file is required by Penal Code sections 851.91 or 851.92. Petitioner contends that the sealing rules in
Rule 2.550 et seq. do not apply because the court records “are required to be
kept confidential by law.”
Alternatively, Petitioner argues that the requirements of section
2.550(d) to seal the court file are met.
Application
of Penal Code Sections 851.91 and 851.92 to the Court Records in this Writ
Action
Petitioner contends that sections
851.91 or 851.92 are worded broadly and a sealing order granted under these
statutes applies to “all court proceedings involving the arrest,” including
civil proceedings in which the arrest records are already part of the public
court file or the sealed arrest is discussed in a court’s statement of
decision. (Mot. 7-10.) Petitioner raises a question of statutory
interpretation.
“The
rules governing statutory construction are well settled. We begin with the
fundamental premise that the objective of statutory interpretation is to
ascertain and effectuate legislative intent. [Citations.] To determine
legislative intent, we turn first to the words of the statute, giving them
their usual and ordinary meaning. [Citations.] When the language of a statute
is clear, we need go no further. However, when the language is susceptible of
more than one reasonable interpretation, we look to a variety of extrinsic
aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved, the evils to be
remedied, the legislative history, public policy, contemporaneous
administrative construction, and the statutory scheme of which the statute is a
part.” (Nolan v. City of Anaheim (2004) 33 Cal.4th 335, 340.)
When interpreting a statute, the court must
construe the statute, if possible to achieve harmony among its parts. (People
v. Hull (1991) 1 Cal. 4th 266, 272.)
“When interpreting statutory language, we may
neither insert language which has been omitted nor ignore language which has
been inserted.” (See People v. National Auto. and Cas. Ins. Co. (2002)
98 Cal.App.4th 277, 282.) “[I]nterpretations which render any part of a
statute superfluous are to be avoided.” (Young v. McCoy (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th
1078, 1083.) The court “must select the construction that
comports most closely with the apparent intent of the Legislature, with a view
to promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the statute, and
avoid an interpretation that would lead to absurd consequences.” (People v. Jenkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th
234, 246.)
Penal Code section
851.91(a) states that “[a] person who has suffered an arrest that did not
result in a conviction may petition the court to have his or her arrest and
related records sealed.” Section
851.91(a)(1)(B) states that circumstances in which an arrest does not “result
in a conviction” include when the prosecuting attorney filed an accusatory
pleading based on the arrest but “no conviction occurred” or a conviction
occurred “but has been vacated or reversed on appeal.” As Petitioner points out, section
851.91(a)(1)(B) shows that a sealing order could apply “retroactively” to court
files already in the public record.
(Mot. 9.) However, the
“accusatory pleading” and any subsequent appeal would only be filed in a court
with “criminal jurisdiction.” (See also
§ 851.91(b)(1)(B).) Thus, section
851.91(a)(1)(B), standing alone, does not show legislative intent for the
sealing order to apply to arrest records or statements about a sealed arrest that
are already part of the public record in civil proceedings.
Petitioner also cites to
sealing rules in section 851.92 as evidence that the legislature intended the
sealing order to apply to arrest-related records already part of the public
record in pending civil proceedings.
(Mot. 7-10.)
Section 851.92(b)
specifies how the sealing “shall be accomplished” when a court issues an order
to seal an arrest under section 851.91. Section
851.92(b) states, inter alia, that the sealing shall be accomplished by
the following actions related to “court records”:
(4) Court records related to the sealed arrest
shall, only as to the person whose arrest was sealed, be stamped “ARREST
SEALED: DO NOT RELEASE OUTSIDE OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTOR,” and shall note
next to the stamp the date of the sealing and the section pursuant to which the
arrest was sealed. This stamp and note shall be included on all master
court dockets, digital or otherwise, relating to the arrest.
(5) Arrest records, police investigative reports,
and court records that are sealed under this section shall not be disclosed to
any person or entity except the person whose arrest was sealed or a criminal
justice agency. Nothing shall prohibit disclosure of information between
criminal history providers.
Section 851.92(d)(2) defines “court
records” to include: “records, files, and materials created, compiled, or
maintained by or for the court in relation to court proceedings, and includes,
but is not limited to, indexes, registers of actions, court minutes, court
orders, court filings, court exhibits, court progress and status reports, court
history summaries, copies of state summary criminal history information and
local summary criminal history information, and any other criminal history
information contained in any of those materials.”
Petitioner argues
section 851.92(b) requires sealing of any court records “related to the sealed
arrest,” and that “court records” is defined broadly and includes no express
limitation to the records in criminal proceedings or the case in which the
sealing order is made. However, the
section immediately preceding the definition of “court records” defines “arrest
record” and “record pertaining to an arrest” to mean information about an
arrest or detention that is contained in the local summary criminal history
information, or state summary criminal history information. (Ibid.) There is some implication that court records
would similarly be those related to criminal proceedings. Section 851.92(b)(5) states that “court records that are sealed under this section shall not be
disclosed to any person or entity except the person whose arrest was sealed or
a criminal justice agency.” The statute
defines “criminal justice agency” to mean any agency of government that performs,
as its principal function, activities related to the “apprehension, prosecution
defense, adjudication, incarceration or correction of criminal suspects and criminal
offenders.” It includes a court of this
state. (851.92(d)(4).) Again these sections imply that sealing is
intended to apply to criminal proceedings.
Petitioner argues an
interpretation of the statutory scheme to apply only to criminal court
proceedings would weaken the effectiveness of sections 851.91 and 851.92. A person or entity that wished to locate
sealed arrest records could do so by reviewing the public record in pending
civil cases in which the sealed arrest report and related documents are
included. On the other hand, an
interpretation of these provisions to require sealing, and prohibit
dissemination of information regarding an arrest in separate administrative
proceedings could also produce anomalous results.
Pursuant to section
851.91, the effect of a sealing order is that “[t]he record of arrest has been
sealed as to petitioner, the arrest is deemed not to have occurred,
the petitioner may answer any question relating to the sealed arrest
accordingly, and the petitioner is released from all penalties and disabilities
resulting from the arrest.” (§
851.91(e)(2)(B) [bold italics added].) However,
under the administrative per se statutes, in order for the DMV to validly
suspend a person's driver's license, there must have been a lawful arrest. (Dyer
v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 161, 168.) Thus, Petitioner’s construction of section 851.91(e)(2)(B)
could severely undermine the important policies in the implied consent
law.
Section 851.91 also
provides “the sealing of an arrest pursuant to this section does not relieve
the petitioner of the obligation to disclose the arrest, if otherwise required
by law, in response to any direct question contained in a questionnaire or
application for public office, for employment as a peace officer, for licensure
by any state or local agency, or for contracting with the California State
Lottery Commission. (§ 851.92(e)(2)(B)(ii).) The statute itself seems to recognize that
different rules may apply when considering arrests in the context of state
licensing procedures.
In his supplemental
brief, Petitioner argues as follows: “[N]othing in SB393, or the statutes it
created, or amended, interferes in anyway with the administrative hearing
process conducted by the California DMV regarding the suspension of driving
privilege after a driving under the influence arrest. Due to the statutory requirements
for sealing an arrest and its related records, an order to seal under section
851.91 would not take effect until long after the administrative DMV
proceedings have ended.” (Suppl. Br.
8.)
Petitioner does not
support this argument with persuasive legal analysis. While in this case the DMV and writ
proceedings were concluded before Judge
Munisoglu issued the sealing order, it does not follow that all DMV and related
civil proceedings would always be completed before a sealing order is issued under
section 851.91. For instance, if a DMV
administrative decision was remanded by the trial court or court of appeal for
further proceedings, and the criminal statute of limitations then runs on the
underlying criminal offense, the arrest could be sealed and “deemed not to have
occurred” under section 851.91(e), before completion of all DMV and related civil
proceedings. In that scenario, section
851.91 could substantially interfere with the administrative per se proceedings
or a related writ action or civil appeal.
The court finds ambiguity
in the statutory scheme as applied to a civil administrative challenge to a
driver’s license suspension based on failure to take a chemical test. Section 851.92(b)(4) and (5) state that court
records related to the arrest must be sealed.
In one sense, the administrative mandate proceedings do not relate to
the arrest, but to the driver’s license suspension. However, because there is some ambiguity in
the statutes, the court will consider the legislative history cited by
Petitioner.
The Legislative History Does Not
Support Petitioner’s Construction of Sections 851.91 and 851.92 to Require
Sealing of the Entire Civil Court File
As
a preliminary matter, Petitioner has not requested judicial notice of any
legislative history of sections 851.91 and 851.92 or submitted the copies of
the legislative history upon which he relies, as required by the Rules of
Court. (See Rule of Court
3.1306(c).) Rather, Petitioner cites to the California Legislature's website,
leginfo.legislature.ca.gov. (Suppl. Br.
2.) Respondent has not disputed the
accuracy of the legislative history cited by Petitioner, and Petitioner’s
quotations appear accurate from the court’s review of leginfo.legislature.ca.gov.
Sealing
Parts of the Court File Related to His Arrest Pursuant to CRC Rule 2.550(d)
California
Rules of Court, Rule 2.550 authorizes sealing when the court finds (1) There
exists an overriding interest that overcomes the right of public access to the
record; (2) The overriding interest supports sealing of such records; (3) A
substantial probability exists that the overriding interest will be prejudiced
if the record is not sealed; (4) The proposed sealing of the arrest report is
narrowly tailored; and (5) No less restrictive means exist to achieve the
overriding interest. (CRC Rule
2.550(d).)
The above findings are made with respect to
portions of the court file which contain the arrest report, or discuss the
arrest as part of a different analysis. The
court orders sealed the following documents:
10/09/20 Petition for writ of mandate
10/09/20 Ex parte application for a stay
2/05/21 Answer
9/07/21 Opposition to Petition for Writ of
Mandate
10/12/21 Minute order
2/18/21 Stipulation to seal court file (2
entries with this title this date)
2/23/21 Minute order
6/08/22 Motion to seal court file
6/08/22 proposed order to seal
9/21/22 Supplemental brief in support of motion
to seal
10/20/22 Brief addressing Petitioner’s Motion to
seal court documents
10/25/22 DMV’s supplemental brief addressing
petitioner’s motion to seal court documents
11/4/22 Petitioner’s reply brief
The court notes that the administrative record
in this case was lodged, but not filed.
The administrative record has been returned to the Petitioner. This tentative ruling will not be posted, but
will be emailed to counsel. The court’s
minute order ruling on the motion to seal will also be ordered sealed.
Conclusion
The motion to seal the entire file based on Judge
Munisoglu's sealing order and Penal Code sections 851.91, and 851.92 is denied.
The motion to seal under Rule 2.550 et seq. is granted
as to documents listed above.