Judge Mary H. Strobel, Case 20STCP04175 2022-09-20 Tentative Ruling

Hon. Mary H. Strobel

The clerk for Department 82 may be reached at (213) 893-0530.

Petitioner Marc Sandoval (“Petitioner”) petitions for a writ of administrative mandate directing Respondents City of Torrance (“City”), Leroy J. Jackson, City Manager, and Eve Berg, Chief of Police (“Respondents”) to set aside City’s decision to remove Petitioner from his premium pay position as Field Training Officer (“FTO”) with the City’s Police Department.

At the time of the incident leading to Petitioner’s removal as FTO, Petitioner had been employed by the City of Torrance Police Department (“Department”) for 16 years. Petitioner had not previously been disciplined and had “above-standards” or “outstanding” performance evaluations. As FTO, Petitioner provided patrol training to officers new to Department. Under the parties’ Memorandum of Understanding, FTOs receive “premium pay” in the amount of 7% of their salary. (AR 555-556.)[1]

The incident that resulted in Petitioner’s removal as FTO occurred in the early morning of May 16, 2018. At approximately 4:43 am, Emma Fletcher called the Department to report that a neighbor had rung her doorbell and was outside the house yelling that he had “fucked up.” (AR 557, 432.) She also informed the dispatcher that the man outside her door was in his mid-twenties, 6 feet and one inches tall, had several tattoos, and was a known drug user. (Ibid.) Emma indicated that the man lived next door with his parents and provided the dispatcher with his name. (Ibid.) This information was logged into the Call Detail Report and into the CAD system, and was available to Petitioner and his trainee, Officer Chandler, before they responded to the scene. (AR 418; AR 52:3-54:6.) The CAD system also informed the responding officers, in real time, that the subject had previously been involuntarily committed to a mental facility under Welfare & Institutions Code section 5150. (AR 557, 53.)

Evidence reflects that Emma Fletcher is the daughter of Sergeant Steven Fletcher of the Department. At the time of the incident, Officer Fletcher and his wife were out of town in Seattle, Washington, and Emma, who was 19 at the time, was home alone with her younger brother. (AR 56-71.)

The Call Detail Report indicates that Petitioner and Officer Chandler received the call from dispatch at 4:43 a.m. and were “enroute to call.” (AR 432.) In his interview, Petitioner stated that at the time the call came in he was “giving Officer Chandler his required thirty minute Code 7” (i.e., meal break) at the Torrance Police Officer Association (“TPOA”) Building on Arlington. (AR 406:34-47.) The TPOA Building is 1.2 miles away from Officer Fletcher’s home. (AR 119:14-18.) In the middle of the afternoon on a weekday, the estimated travel time as indicated on Google Maps would only be five minutes. (AR 119:21-120:1.) The Call Detail Report indicates that Officer Chandler reported to dispatch that they arrived on scene at 4:58 a.m., approximately 15 minutes later. (AR 407:26-29, AR 432.) When asked why he took so long to respond to the call, Petitioner stated that Officer Chandler had to “wrap up his lunch” and that he had to re-organize the chairs, set the alarm, and use the restroom before they responded to the call. (AR 408:3-9.)

When Petitioner and Officer Chandler arrived at the scene, both were aware that the house they were responding to belonged to Officer Fletcher. (AR 213, 247, 405.) Evidence reflects that Petitioner and Officer Chandler read the CAD system either prior to or while at the scene. (AR 235:7- 21.) In his investigative interview, Petitioner recalled that he had responded to the location at a previous time when the neighbors called regarding a possible “5150” inside the house and reported that the subject had “barricaded” himself. Petitioner recalled that he spent at least 45 minutes “trying to coax” the subject out of the neighbors’ house. (AR 405.)

Upon arrival at the scene, Officer Chandler and Petitioner used the spotlight on their vehicle to illuminate the yard area of Officer Fletcher’s and his neighbor’s home. (AR 215-216.) Officer Chandler parked the car and told Petitioner he’d “check real quick.” Officer Chandler got out and inspected the location with a flashlight. When he did not see anything, he got back into the car. (AR 215-217.) The Call Detail Report indicates that at 5:02 a.m., four minutes after they arrived on scene, Officer Chandler reported to dispatch that the call was completed. (AR 432, AR 120:4-121:8.)

During the time they spent on scene, Petitioner never left the vehicle. The officers also did not contact the occupants of Officer Fletcher’s residence or the neighbor’s residence. (AR 558-564.)

Patrol Sergeant Scott Stiller, a 20-year employee of the Department, was asked to conduct an audit concerning Petitioner’s and Officer Chandler’s response to the 911 call. (AR 15-16.) After reviewing video provided by Officer Fletcher and other materials, Sergeant Stiller concluded that misconduct may have occurred. He thereafter prepared a personnel complaint. (AR 17-19.)

Lieutenant Patrick Hunt of the Internal Affairs Division performed the Personnel Investigation and prepared an investigation report. Lieutenant Hunt’s report was then sent to Captain Mark Athan to review and make recommendations. (AR 371-385, AR 111-113.)

When questioned at his interview, Officer Chandler responded that he could not recall instances where he searched while his training officer remained in the car. When asked if that was safe, he responded that it was “not ideal,” and was not a way he would handle a call. (AR 394-395.) Officer Chandler stated that he was not upset with Petitioner for having him inspect the scene alone at 5 am in the morning, but that he had worked with partners before coming to Torrance, and it was “definitely odd” and it had never happened before. (AR 396:28-41.)

Petitioner stated in his interview that after doing an initial sweep of the front yards with their lights, they did not see anything. He then told Officer Chandler “‘I’m gonna stay in the car and confirm if this was the person I’d had a prior contact with’ and try to locate a picture of him in the Spillman System so I knew who I was looking for.” (AR 408.) At his interview, Petitioner acknowledged there would not likely “be a lot of people out at that time.” (Ibid.) When asked why he would allow a trainee to get out of the car and search by himself on a call of this nature, Petitioner responded that Officer Chandler had been a cop for several years and was “the most squared away trainee” he had ever had. (AR 409) He further stated he never lost visual or audible contact with Officer Chandler. (AR 409.)

On March 28, 2019, Captain Athan submitted his written findings and recommendations. He found that Petitioner performed below standards on the call to Officer Fletcher’s house in four specific areas: (1) response time; (2) searching alone; (3) contacting the reporting party (“RP”); and (4) contacting the possible suspect living next door. (AR 367.) Captain Athan recommended removing Petitioner as FTO because Petitioner believed “this kind of performance is acceptable.” He also recommended a two-day suspension. (AR 368-369.)

After Chief Berg was presented with the findings and recommendations made by Captain Athan, she issued a notice of intent to suspend Petitioner and remove him from his FTO assignment. After a Skelly meeting, Chief Berg determined that removal of Petitioner as FTO was appropriate, but she did not impose a suspension. (AR 148-157.)

Petitioner appealed his reassignment. As Petitioner’s removal from his FTO assignment was not a “suspension, demotion or termination,” but was instead a reassignment from a premium paid position, the appeal was conducted before a neutral Hearing Officer pursuant to Exhibit 3, Section 3.A to the Memorandum of Understanding between the City and the TPOA (“MOU”). (AR 504-506.) On appeal, the City had the burden of proving that the reassignment from his premium position was supported by “good cause.” (MOU, Section 3.B.)

Following an evidentiary hearing, the arbitrator issued an advisory decision that recommended that the reassignment from FTO be reduced from an indefinite “demotion” to a temporary six month “demotion.” (AR 586-587.) As discussed below, the arbitrator made findings of fact and found that Petitioner’s response time and decision to remain in the car on May 16, 2018, violated Department policies and procedures. The arbitrator found that Petitioner’s failure to contract the “RP” and neighbors did not violate Department’s policy or procedures, as written. (AR 582-584.)

The city manager adopted the arbitrator’s factual findings, but disagreed with the recommendation to reduce the duration of the reassignment. The city manager reasoned that the arbitrator "incorrectly equated the reassignment with a disciplinary demotion.” The city manager also disagreed with the arbitrator’s conclusions, in part, and concluded that Petitioner “should have ensured” that he or Officer Chandler contacted the reporting party and neighbors. The city manager then explained the reassignment decision, as follows:

Based on Appellant’s failure to respond to the May 16, 2018 call for service in the manner that is expected of an FTO and in a manner that was inconsistent with the Department's values of “pride, integrity, compassion, and excellence,” I conclude that Chief Berg’s decision to reassign Appellant as an FTO was supported by good cause and just cause. Even if Appellant had ensured that Officer Chandler contacted the reporting party and neighbors, his delayed response to the call was so egregious as to warrant his reassignment (removal) as FTO. Likewise, his decision to remain in the car is very concerning and independently warrants his reassignment (removal) as FTO.

On December 18, 2020, Petitioner filed his verified petition for writ of administrative mandate.

On May 23, 2022, Petitioner filed his opening brief in support of the petition. The court has received Respondents’ opposition, Petitioner’s reply, the administrative record, and the joint appendix.

Under CCP section 1094.5(b), the pertinent issues are whether the respondent has proceeded without jurisdiction, whether there was a fair trial, and whether there was a prejudicial abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion is established if the agency has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence. (CCP § 1094.5(b).)

Because the removal of Petitioner from the FTO position concerns a fundamental vested right, the court exercise its independent judgment on the administrative findings. (See Wences v. City of Los Angeles (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 305, 314; Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal. 3d 130, 143.) Under the independent judgment test, “the trial court not only examines the administrative record for errors of law, but also exercises its independent judgment upon the evidence disclosed in a limited trial de novo.” (Bixby, supra, 4 Cal. 3d at 143.) The court must draw its own reasonable inferences from the evidence and make its own credibility determinations. (Morrison v. Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles Board of Commissioners (2003) 107 Cal. App. 4th 860, 868.)

An agency is presumed to have regularly performed its official duties. (Evid. Code § 664.) “In exercising its independent judgment, a trial court must afford a strong presumption of correctness concerning the administrative findings, and the party challenging the administrative decision bears the burden of convincing the court that the administrative findings are contrary to the weight of the evidence.” (Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal. 4th 805, 817.)

Under CCP section 1094.5, Petitioner bears the burden of proof to demonstrate, by citation to the administrative record, that the evidence supports his position. (See Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28, 32; Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal. 3d 130, 143.) When an appellant challenges “’the sufficiency of the evidence, all material evidence on the point must be set forth and not merely [his] own evidence.” (Toigo v. Town of Ross (1998) 70 Cal.App.4th 309, 317.)

The City Manager’s Decision Complies with Topanga with Respect to the Material Findings

Petitioner contends that the city manager’s final decision does not comply with the findings requirement of CCP section 1094.5, as set forth in Topanga. (Opening Brief (“OB”) 7-8.)

Under CCP section 1094.5(b), an abuse of discretion is established if the decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence. (CCP § 1094.5(b).) In Topanga Assn. for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles, (1974) 11 Cal. 3d 506, 515, the Supreme Court held that "implicit in [Code of Civil Procedure] section 1094.5 is a requirement that the agency which renders the challenged decision must set forth findings to bridge the analytic gap between the raw evidence and ultimate decision or order." (11 Cal. 3d at 516-517 [fns. Omitted].)

“Administrative agency findings are generally permitted considerable latitude with regard to their precision, formality, and matters reasonably implied therein.” (Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 938, 954.) The agency's findings may “be determined to be sufficient if a court has no trouble under the circumstances discerning the analytic route the administrative agency traveled from evidence to action.” (West Chandler Blvd. Neighborhood Ass’n vs. City of Los Angeles (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1506, 1521-22.) “The nature of the statute, ordinance, or rule being applied by that agency is also relevant to the analysis of the adequacy of an administrative agency's findings.” (Young v. City of Coronado (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 408, 421 [City's findings satisfied Topanga].)

Petitioner contends that the city manager’s decision “failed to bridge the gap between the raw evidence and the ultimate decision related to the allegations that Petitioner did not provide excellent service by responding within 15 minutes of the radio call and that Petitioner allowed his partner to conduct a search of the yard while Petitioner remained in the vehicle to locate a photograph of the possible suspect.” (OB 7-8.) The court disagrees. The city manager stated that his decision was “based upon the facts describing in the Hearing Officer’s recommendation regarding events on May 16, 2018.” (AR 601.) The arbitrator’s decision provides a detailed summary of the evidence and the events occurring on May 16, 2018. (AR 555-577.) The arbitrator also explained why Petitioner’s response time and decision to remain in the car on May 16, 2018, violated Department policies and procedures. (AR 582-583.) The city manager expressly agreed with those findings and legal conclusions. (AR 601.) Petitioner and the court can determine the city manager’s mode of analysis, and the evidence upon which he relied, for these findings.

Petitioner also contends that the city manager’s decision failed to comply with Topanga with regard to the determination that Petitioner “should have ensured that he or Officer Chandler contacted the reporting party and neighbors.” (OB 7-8.) Based on the court’s independent review, the court agrees. The city manager did not make any findings in support of this conclusion or specify the evidence upon which he relied. (AR 601-602.) The arbitrator expressly found that Department did not prove these charges. (AR 583-584.) The arbitrator reasoned, in part, that Department’s policy for contacting an RP is not clear and the CAD report indicated that the RP could be contacted “if needed.” (Ibid.) While the arbitrator’s summary of the evidence was adopted by the city manager, the court cannot determine from the city manager’s decision or the arbitrator’s Statement of Fact what specific evidence was relied upon for the finding that Petitioner “should have ensured that he or Officer Chandler contacted the reporting party and neighbors.” Furthermore, the city manager’s reasoning for such finding is not stated.

Respondents declined to address this Topanga argument in opposition. (See Sehulster Tunnels/Pre-Con v. Traylor Brothers, Inc. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1328, 1345, fn. 16 [failure to address point is “equivalent to a concession”].) Respondents do not show that the findings were sufficient for the conclusion that Petitioner violated Department policies or procedures, under the facts of this case, by failing to contact the RP and neighbors. Under CCP section 1094.5, the court must examine the findings made by the administrative agency, not findings supplied in the respondent’s opposition brief. Thus, for purposes of this writ petition, Respondents’ arguments that Petitioner should have contacted the RP and neighbors are not determinative. (See e.g. Oppo. 9-11, 17:15-24.)

Despite the foregoing, Petitioner does not show that the violation of Topanga was prejudicial. Procedural errors, “even if proved, are subject to a harmless error analysis.” (Hinrichs v. County of Orange (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 921, 928.) A court will not issue a writ of administrative mandate unless the petitioner shows that the agency’s error “prejudicially affect[ed] the petitioner's substantial rights.” (Thornbrough v. Western Placer Unified School Dist. (2013) 223 Cal.App.4th 169, 200.)

Here, the city manager expressly stated that “even if Appellant had ensured that Officer Chandler contacted the reporting party and neighbors, his delayed response to the call was so egregious as to warrant his reassignment (removal) as FTO. Likewise, his decision to remain in the car is very concerning and independently warrants his reassignment (removal) as FTO.” (AR 601-602 [bold italics added].) Accordingly, because the city manager would have reached the same result without the findings that Petitioner should have contacted the RP or neighbor, those findings were not necessary to the decision. To establish a prejudicial abuse of discretion, Petitioner must show that the material findings regarding his response time and decision to remain in the car are not supported by the weight of the evidence. Alternatively, Petitioner must show that, in light of the material findings, there was not good cause to remove him from the FTO position. The court addresses those issues next.

The notice of Petitioner’s removal as FTO alleged that Petitioner violated Department General Order 2.01.1.A and 2.21.4.G.1. (AR 445-446.) General Order 2.01.1.A states that employees “shall … [r]ender service to the community with pride, integrity, compassion, and excellence… [and] [p]erform their duties in a manner that will not reasonably result in the impairment or disruption of public service or Department business.” (Ibid.) General Order 2.21.4 states that misconduct includes “neglect of duty,” which is the “knowing and willful failure on the part of a Department employee to perform a required duty or assigned task.” (Ibid.)

The arbitrator and city manager found that Petitioner’s response time did not amount to rendering service with “pride, integrity, compassion, and excellence.” It appears that they also found a neglect of duty when Petitioner unjustifiably “took 15 minutes to respond to a call from a female complaining that a person with a history of drug, alcohol abuse, and mental problems was outside her home in the middle of the night yelling about how he had ‘fucked up.’” (AR 582, 601.)[2]

Exercising its independent judgment on the record, the court concludes that the weight of the evidence supports the findings that Petitioner’s response time violated Department policy, as found by the city manager. Petitioner and Officer Chandler received the call from dispatch at 4:43 a.m. (AR 432, 116-119.) They were 1.2 miles away from Officer Fletcher’s home. (AR 119:14-18.) During the middle of the day, the estimated travel time as indicated on Google Maps would only be five minutes. (AR 119:21-120:1.) The travel time at 4:43 a.m. in the morning is presumably less. The officers arrived on scene at 4:58 a.m., approximately 15 minutes later. (AR 407, 432, 116-119.) When asked at his interview why he took so long to respond to the call, Petitioner stated that Officer Chandler had to “wrap up his lunch” and that he had to re-organize the chairs, set the alarm, and use the restroom before they responded to the call. (AR 408:3-9.) Captain Athan testified that finishing a meal, rearranging furniture, and setting an alarm should not have taken precedence over responding to the call for service. (AR 114-115.) Considering that the dispatch call was made in the early morning, that Petitioner was only five minutes away from Officer Fletcher’s residence, and that Petitioner did not identify any good reason to delay the response, the weight of the evidence supports the findings that Petitioner’s 15-minute response did not amount to rendering service with “pride, integrity, compassion, and excellence” and was a neglect of duty.

Petitioner’s arguments and record citations do not convince the court to reach a different conclusion. (OB 8-9.) The weight of the evidence, including police records, shows that it took the officers 15 minutes to respond. (AR 407, 432, 116-119.) Petitioner’s cited testimony does not prove otherwise. Whether or not the 15 minutes “didn’t seem that long,” as Petitioner and Officer Chandler testified, is irrelevant. (OB 8:17-26, citing AR 247, 212-213.)

Petitioner cites his testimony, taken in February 2020, that he did not have an independent recollection of the order he did things leaving the Torrance Police Officer Association before responding to the call. (OB 8, citing AR 246.) However, his interview, taken on February 13, 2019, shows that Petitioner did recollect the steps he took prior to leaving for the call. Petitioner stated clearly that Officer Chandler had to “wrap up his lunch”; that Petitioner had to re-organize the chairs and set the alarm before leaving; and that he “may have used the restroom.” (AR 408:3-9.) Those admissions are binding on Petitioner and are more credible than his subsequent testimony on this issue.

Petitioner states that “Captain Athan testified that ‘priority two’ calls like the one at issue here are not considered an emergency and do not provide a basis for officers to respond with lights and sirens.” (OB 9, citing AR 131-132.) Relatedly, Petitioner contends that “City provided no evidence as to what is a reasonable response time for a Priority 2 call where the suspect is no longer at scene or creating a disturbance.” (OB 9.) However, Captain Athan also testified that “even though it’s a priority 2, it’s not just like get there whenever you want.” (AR 133.) As noted, Captain Athan testified that finishing a meal, rearranging furniture, and setting an alarm should not have taken precedence over responding to the call for service. (AR 114-115.) Captain Athan provided credible, persuasive opinion testimony that a 15-minute response time did not comply with Department policies for this type of suspicious circumstances call, at 4:43 am in the morning, and when the responding officers are only 5 minutes away. Petitioner cites no conflicting opinion testimony.

The weight of the evidence supports the findings that Petitioner’s 15-minute response violated Department policies.

The arbitrator and city manager found that Petitioner’s “decision to remain in the car while Chandler searched did not amount to rendering service with ‘pride, integrity, compassion, and excellence.’” They also found a neglect of duty, stating that Petitioner’s decision “does not appear to be consistent with officer safety, a critical issue in policing”; “FTOs are supposed to be role models, displaying and teaching the highest standards”; and “There was no reason why Sandoval had to remain in the car at that time.” (AR 582-83, 601-02.)

Exercising its independent judgment on the record, the court concludes that the weight of the evidence supports these findings and legal conclusions. Petitioner and Officer Chandler read the CAD system either prior to or while at the scene. (AR 235:7- 21.) The Call Detail Report, available to the officers, informed Petitioner that a woman was reporting, at 4:43 am in the morning, that a young, 6’1’’ tall, tattooed man and known drug user was outside her house ringing the doorbell and yelling. (AR 557, 432, 418, 52-54, 235.) The CAD notes provided to Petitioner indicate that the man lived next-door with his parents and that he had convictions for drunk driving, failure to appear, and probation violations. (AR 418-419.) Petitioner recalled that he had responded to the location at a previous time when the neighbors called regarding a possible “5150” inside the house and reported that the subject had “barricaded” himself. (AR 405.) There were certain visibility issues that required the officers to search the property in person. (See e.g. AR 215-217.)

These were not appropriate circumstances for Petitioner, the FTO, to allow Officer Chandler to conduct the search himself. The credible officer statements and testimony support this conclusion. Officer Fletcher, who previously worked as a FTO, testified that “as an FTO, I’ve never seen anyone search someone -- search an area by themselves with their partner not with them. So that was shocking. Especially 5:00 o’clock in the morning, dark places, a 911 call.” (AR 76-77.) When questioned at his interview, Officer Chandler responded that he could not recall instances where he searched while his training officer remained in the car. When asked if that was safe, he responded that it was “not ideal” and “definitely odd.” (AR 394-396.) Captain Athan opined that: “Officer Sandoval should have exited his police vehicle and searched with his partner for two primary reasons. One, being officer safety and two being that he was a training officer and wanted to train the officer, his trainee, the right way to do things.” (AR 121.) Even Petitioner acknowledged that he should not have let his partner get out and conduct a search by himself. (AR 571, 297-300, 310-311.)

Petitioner’s record citations and arguments do not show any abuse of discretion. (OB 9-12.) While Petitioner now claims it is a “common occurrence” within Department for FTOs to remain in the car while a trainee conducts a search, he does not cite evidence of such occurrences for suspicious circumstance calls similar to the one at issue here. (OB 9-12, citing record.) The weight of the credible evidence, summarized above, supports the conclusion that Officer Chandler’s prior police experience did not justify Petitioner’s actions. Indeed, Petitioner admitted that staying in the car was “a miss on my part.” (OB 10, citing AR 310-311.)

Petitioner contends that “Captain Athan testified that Sandoval’s intentions and strategy of searching for a photograph was good police work.” (OB 12, citing AR 122.) However, Athan also opined that, while there is a time to do computer work, “that just wasn’t the time.” (AR 122.) He opined that police officer safety is the paramount concern: “police officer safety [requires] that you make the scene secure first, and then you can do computer work later. But arriving on scene, it is my opinion that it would be more appropriate to stay with your partner, make the scene safe prior to doing any computer work.” (AR 121-122.) Athan’s opinion does not support a conclusion that staying in the vehicle child Chandler searched was consistent with Department policy and the duties of a FTO.

The weight of the evidence supports the findings that Petitioner’s decision to remain in the car while Officer Chandler conducted the search violated Department policies. Because the other findings were unnecessary to the city manager’s decision, and also because of the Topanga issue, the court does not decide Petitioner’s contentions that the evidence does not support the findings regarding his decision to not contact the RP and neighbors. (OB 12-17.)

“The propriety of a penalty imposed by an administrative agency is a matter vested in the discretion of the agency, and its decision may not be disturbed unless there has been a manifest abuse of discretion.” (Williamson v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1343, 1347.) If reasonable minds can differ with regard to the propriety of the disciplinary action, there is no abuse of discretion. (County of Los Angeles v. Civil Service Commission (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 620, 634.)

In considering whether an abuse of discretion occurred, the “overriding consideration … is the extent to which the employee's conduct resulted in, or if repeated is likely to result in, ‘[h]arm to the public service.’ [Citations.] Other relevant factors include the circumstances surrounding the misconduct and the likelihood of its recurrence.” (Skelly v. State Personnel Bd. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194, 218.)

As noted, the city manager expressly stated that the findings regarding Petitioner’s response time and decision to remain in the car “independently” justified his removal as FTO. (AR 601-602.) Those findings are supported by the weight of the evidence, as discussed above.

Petitioner contends that removal as FTO was “excessive” when the full circumstances are considered; that Chief Berg wrongly concluded that Petitioner “was only in it for the money” and did not take responsibility for his actions; and that his “personnel record, commendations, lack of discipline, and willingness to accept responsibility indicates he is a salvageable and trainable Field Training Officer.” (OB 17-19.)

Petitioner focuses on the wrong decisionmaker. The city manager explained the decision to remove Petitioner as FTO, as follows:

[T]he role of the FTO is particularly critical to the proper functioning of the Torrance Police Department. FTOs help ensure that the newest members of the Department are inculcated with Department values and provide the community with the high level of service that it expects and deserves. When an FTO handles a call for service in the poor manner that Appellant did on May 16, 2018, the FTO gives the community a negative impression of the Torrance Police Department and gives their trainee an incorrect impression of Department standards. The ripple effects are very concerning. Thus, the Chief has good and/or just cause to remove an FTO under such circumstances. (AR 602.)

On appeal, the City had the burden of proving that the reassignment from his premium position was supported by “good cause.” (AR 504-506; MOU, Section 3.B.) Petitioner has developed no argument to the contrary. While “good cause” is not defined in Exhibit B to the MOU, California law has held that “good cause” in the context of implied employment contracts is defined as: “‘fair and honest’ reasons, regulated by good faith on the part of the employer, that are not trivial, arbitrary or capricious, unrelated to business needs or goals, or pretextual.” (Serri v. Santa Clara University (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 830, 872.) Furthermore, the relevant inquiry is whether the city manager properly found good cause for the reassignment, not Chief Berg.

As Petitioner agrees, the FTO is an important premium pay position with responsibility for training new officers in Department’s policies and procedures. The weight of the evidence supports that Petitioner did not comply with Department policies in his response time on May 16, 2018, or in his decision to stay in the car in the dark, early morning hours while his trainee conducted a search of a suspicious circumstance call. Based only on the two findings discussed above, City manager reasonably concluded that there was good cause to remove Petitioner as FTO. City manager reasonably concluded that Petitioner’s actions on May 16, 2018, did not meet the high standards of the FTO position and that Petitioner should not hold that premium pay position. While a different decision may have been possible based on Petitioner’s lack of prior discipline, commendations, long service history, and performance evaluations, that does not establish that the city manager’s decision was unreasonable or lacked good cause.

Respondents are ordered to lodge and serve a proposed form of judgment in accordance with local rule 3.231(n).

[1] For facts not challenged by either party, the court may cite only to the arbitrator’s Statement of Facts, which was adopted by the city manager in the final administrative decision. (AR 555, 601.)

[2] Even if it could be concluded that the city manager did not find a neglect of duty, the court reaches the same result in this writ petition based on the other finding that Petitioner did not perform his duties with “pride, integrity, compassion, and excellence.”