Judge: Mary H. Strobel, Case: 21STCP00924, Date: 2023-02-16 Tentative Ruling
Hon. Mary H. Strobel The clerk for Department 82 may be reached at (213) 893-0530.
Case Number: 21STCP00924 Hearing Date: February 16, 2023 Dept: 82
|
Pasadena City College Police Officers
Association, v. Pasadena Area Community College
District, |
Judge Mary
Strobel Hearing: February
16, 2023 |
|
21STCP00924 |
Tentative
Decision on Petition for Writ of Mandate |
Petitioner Pasadena City College
Police Officers Association (“Petitioner” or “PCCPOA”) petitions for a writ of mandate
directing Respondent Pasadena Area Community College District (“Respondent” or
“District”) “to comply with the terms of the Memorandum of Understanding
between the parties by immediately ceasing of its violation of Article 6.11 by
no longer offering shifts to non-union or part time employees when POA member’s
desire the shift as an overtime opportunity.”
(TAP Prayer ¶ 1)
Background and Procedural History
The Parties
Petitioner is
“the recognized employee organization,” which represents the following
classifications of employees employed by the District: “College Police/Safety
Officers, Parking and Security Officers, College Police/Safety Investigators,
Dispatchers, Parking Equipment Technicians, and Transportation
Assistants.” (DeSpain Decl. ¶ 3.)
Respondent is a community college
district governed by a board of trustees.
(See Educ. Code § 70902.) Among
other powers granted by the legislature, “the governing board of a community
college district shall employ persons for positions that are not academic
positions. The governing board … shall classify all those employees and
positions.” (Id. § 88003(a).) Exclusions from classified service include
employees designated as “substitute employee” and “short-term employee.” (Ibid.)
As relevant to this case, “substitute employee” is defined to mean “a person
employed to replace a classified employee who is temporarily absent from duty.”
(Educ. Code § 88003(b).)
The MOUs
Between Petitioner and District
Petitioner and District have
executed two Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) relevant to this action. The first MOU was entered between the
District and Petitioner on July 1, 2017, and was effective from July 1, 2017
through “midnight on June 30, 2019.” The
second MOU was entered between the District and Petitioner on February 19,
2020, and was retroactively effective from July 1, 2019 through “midnight on June
30, 2022.” (DeSpain Decl.¶¶ 5-6, Exh.
1-2.) District represents in its
opposition brief that “[n]o subsequent successor agreement, for a period
commencing on or after July 1, 2022, has been reached.” (Oppo. 12:8-9.) Petitioner has not submitted evidence that a
new MOU has been executed for the period commencing July 1, 2022.
Writ Proceedings
On March 23, 2021, Petitioner filed a verified
petition for writ of mandate pursuant to CCP sections 1094.5 and 1085. On September 30, 2021 the court sustained
Respondent’s demurrer with leave to amend.
In part, the ruling was based on Petitioner’s failure to allege that a
MOU was effective during the time any alleged breach occurred.
On
October 20, 2021, Petitioner filed its second amended petition for writ of
mandate (“SAP”). On April 5, 2022 the
court sustained Respondent’s demurrer to the second amended petition with leave
to amend. The court’s ruling was based
in part on the fact Petitioner was relying on a MOU that had expired by its own
terms.
On
April 26, 2022, Petitioner filed the operative third amended petition
(“TAP”). The TAP includes a single cause
of action for writ of mandate pursuant to CCP sections 1085 and 1094.5. The
third amended petition alleged that a second MOU had been negotiated, and its
terms were retroactive to the expiration of the first MOU. On August 18, 2022, after a hearing, the
court overruled Respondent’s demurrer to the TAP. The court noted in its ruling
on the demurrer that Respondent had not developed any argument related to the
fact the second MOU had also expired. Footnote
2 to the August 18, 2022 ruling on demurrer states: “Nor has Respondent
developed any argument regarding the effect of alleged expiration of the second
MOU on available remedies. This issue may also be addressed at trial.” (8/18/22
min. order.)
Neither party has addressed that
threshold issue - the effect of expiration of the second MOU on this court’s
ability to issue writ relief. The
potential effect of the expiration of the MOU raises many issues. Do the terms of the MOU remain binding
pending negotiation of a new MOU? If so,
are the terms enforceable through a writ of mandate or only as an unfair labor
practice claim? If Petitioner has proven
a breach of the expired MOU, can damages be awarded “incident” to the writ, if
no prospective relief could be granted? The
parties need to address these issues before the court can analyze whether any
writ relief should be granted. The court
will discuss with the parties further briefing on these issues and set a future
hearing date.