Judge: Mary H. Strobel, Case: 21STCP02149, Date: 2023-01-31 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCP02149    Hearing Date: January 31, 2023    Dept: 82

            Petitioner Eric L. Wright (“Petitioner”) petitions for a writ of mandate directing Respondent District Attorney of the County of Los Angeles (“Respondent”) to produce to Petitioner all documents requested in Petitioner’s request made pursuant to the California Public Records Act (“CPRA”).                                         

Judicial Notice

Respondent’s Request for Judicial Notice Exhibits 1-8 – Granted.

Background and Procedural History

Petitioner’s Conviction

Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder on March 13, 2007 in People v. Wright, Los Angeles Superior Court, Case No. BA237500.  He was sentenced to 50 years to life in prison.  Witnesses Manuel Espino and Rebecca Figueroa testified that the district attorney’s office had threatened to take their children away if they refused to testify, and they recanted their prior identification of the shooter.  On appeal, Petitioner argued that there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict because the evidence consisted largely of prior inconsistent statements.  The Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner’s substantial evidence challenge and affirmed the judgment, noting that several other witnesses made affirmative eyewitness identifications of Petitioner.  (RJN Exh. 1, 8.)  The California Supreme Court denied review.  (Id. Exh. 2.)   

            Petitioner subsequently filed petitions for writ of mandate in the Court of Appeal related to the conviction and criminal proceedings.  All were denied.  (RJN Exh. 3-5.)  In 2019, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, which was denied.  (Id. Exh. 6.) 

            On April 21, 2022, Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal, apparently in connection with the underlying criminal matter.  It appears that appeal is still pending.  (RJN Exh. 7.)

CPRA Request

            On March 4, 2021, Petitioner submitted to Respondent a request under the CPRA (hereafter “CPRA Request” or “Request”) for 40 categories of records related to the underlying criminal matter, including juvenile court records, arrest records, and police reports related to Manuel Espino, and arrest, conviction, and other records related to Rebecca Figueroa.  Petitioner also sought various records related to several other prosecution witnesses; 911 records; all documents related to the felony complaint for his arrest and subsequent arrest; and all documents related to the month, day, and year Petitioner was first documented as a gang member.  (Wright Decl. filed 6/14/21 (“Wright Decl.”) ¶ 3 and Exh. A.)

            On April 8 and May 5, 2021, Petitioner sent follow-up letters regarding his March 4 request.  (Id. ¶¶ 7-8, Exh. B, C.) 

On May 27, 2021, the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office responded to Petitioner’s correspondence of May 5, 2021. (Id. ¶ 9, Exh. D.) The District Attorney’s Office advised it had not received Petitioner’s March 4 request or April 8 letter. The District Attorney’s Office objected to Petitioner’s Request on grounds it seeks disclosure of records associated with Petitioner’s criminal case, which is subject to discovery procedures set forth at Penal Code section 1054 et seq. In addition, the District Attorney’s Office identified the following specific statutory exemptions for the records themselves: Government Code sections 6254(a), 6254(c), 6254(f), and 6254(k); Penal Code sections 841,5, 1054.6, 11140, and 13300; and rules against disclosure of third-party juvenile records.  (Ibid.) 

Writ Proceedings

            On June 14, 2021, Petitioner, in pro per, filed his verified petition for writ of mandate “to obtain an order for the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office to comply with the previously submitted California Public Records Act Request made by the Petitioner under authority of California Public Records Act, Section 6259.”  (Pet. p. 1.)

            On July 7, 2021, the action was reassigned to Department 82, a writs and receivers department pursuant to Los Angeles Superior Court, Local Rules 2.8(d) and 2.9.

            On March 24, 2022, the court set the petition for hearing on January 31, 2023, and set a briefing schedule.  The opening brief was due 60 days before the hearing; the opposition 30 days; and the reply 15 days.

            On December 14, 2022, Petitioner filed his opening brief in support of the petition.  The attached proof of service states that Petitioner timely served the opening brief on Respondent on November 28, 2022.

            On December 30, 2022, Respondent timely filed and served its opposition.

            On January 20, 2023, Petitioner filed his reply.  The proof of service states that the reply was timely served on January 15, 2023. 

Analysis

Discovery Procedures under Penal Code Section 1054, et seq.

            Respondent argues that “Petitioner’s requests constitute an improper attempt to evade the procedures mandated by Penal Code section 1054.9, because they expressly seek post-conviction discovery related to alleged constitutional infirmities in his trial supporting a petition for habeas corpus.”  (Oppo. 8.)  Relatedly, Respondent contends that Petitioner should have sought relief under section 1054.9 in the criminal court.  (Oppo. 9:8-9.) 

            Penal Code section 1054.9(a) states: “In a case in which a defendant is or has ever been convicted of a serious felony or a violent felony resulting in a sentence of 15 years or more, upon the prosecution of a postconviction writ of habeas corpus or a motion to vacate a judgment, or in preparation to file that writ or motion, and on a showing that good faith efforts to obtain discovery materials from trial counsel were made and were unsuccessful, the court shall, except as provided in subdivision (b) or (d), order that the defendant be provided reasonable access to any of the materials described in subdivision (c).” 

            Section 1054.9(c) states that “[f]or purposes of this section, ‘discovery materials’ means materials in the possession of the prosecution and law enforcement authorities to which the same defendant would have been entitled at time of trial.”

            In his opening brief and reply, Petitioner concedes that, by his petition for writ of mandate brought pursuant to the CPRA, he seeks to compel discovery pursuant to Penal Code section 1054.9.  In the opening brief, Petitioner argues that if the showing required by section 1054.9 “is made, the defendant is entitled to discovery.”  (Opening Brief (“OB”) 2.)  Petitioner states that “he has attempted to obtain these documents from his trial counsel on numerous occasions, all to no avail.”  (OB 3, citing Exh. E.)  Petitioner further states that “the requested information will prove his innocence, by showing that the L.A.P.D. and the (then) L.A. County D.A.'s Office engaged in unlawful, illegal and corrupt practices and tactics in the investigation and prosecution of criminal case number BA237500. The requested information will highlight in particular the coercion of key state witnesses, namely: Mr. Manuiel Espino and Rebecca Ann Figueroa.”  (OB 3, citing Exh. F.)

In reply, in a section titled “Argument,” Petitioner asserts that he “has established a [right] to post-conviction discovery under Penal Code Section 1054, et seq.”  (Reply 2.)  Later in reply, Petitioner argues that he seeks criminal discovery materials to expose “corrupt law enforcement officer’s conduct concerning him" and because Petitioner seeks to “exonerate himself” in court based on such materials.  (Reply 5-6.) 

The court may reasonably rely on Petitioner’s admissions in his briefs to conclude that Petitioner seeks to use his CPRA Request and this CPRA writ petition to obtain discovery materials that he otherwise would need to obtain pursuant to Penal Code section 1054, et seq. 

As further support for this conclusion, Petitioner’s CPRA Request is addressed to the District Attorney’s Office and references People v. Wright, Ct. No. BA237500.  As argued by Respondent, and not disputed by Petitioner in reply, the CPRA Request seeks “discovery materials” within the meaning of section 1054.9 that may be in the possession of the District Attorney’s Office, including records related to prosecution witnesses and records related to Petitioner’s arrest, conviction, and gang affiliation.   (See Oppo. 6-7 and 8:21-27.)  Thus, as examples, Petitioner seeks juvenile court records, arrest records, gang affiliations, video and audio recorded interviews, and police reports and notes related to Manuel Espino, a key prosecution witness.  He seeks records related to Rebecca Figueroa, Luz Garcia, Martha Solis, and other persons who appear, from the record and reasonable inferences from it, to be prosecution witnesses or otherwise connected with the criminal case.  (See e.g. Pet. Exh. A and RJN Exh. 8 [Court of Appeal decision affirming judgment].)  Notably, in his opening brief and reply, Petitioner has not argued that any of the CPRA requests are not related to the underlying criminal case or not intended to obtain discovery materials within the meaning of section 1054.9 from the District Attorney’s Office.

            Petitioner is a convicted felon subject to Penal Code section 1054.9 and he admittedly seeks to use the materials sought in the CPRA Request for “the prosecution of a postconviction writ of habeas corpus or a motion to vacate a judgment, or in preparation to file that writ or motion.”  Thus, a preliminary issue is whether Petitioner can use the CPRA to obtain discovery subject to Penal Code section 1054, et seq.  Neither party cites a case directly on point.  However, In re Steel (2004) 32 Cal.4th 682, cited by Respondent, provides some guidance.  In that case, a defendant convicted of first degree murder filed a motion with the Supreme Court for postconviction discovery pursuant to section 1054, et seq.  Our Supreme Court held, as follows:

The nature of the discovery the statute permits makes the trial court generally the appropriate place to first file the motion. As discussed below, the statute covers specific discovery that the prosecutor did provide but has become lost to petitioner, that the prosecution should have provided but failed to do so, and to that to which the defense would have been entitled had it requested it. The trial court that rendered the judgment is far better positioned than an appellate court to make these determinations and then decide what specific new discovery, if any, it should order. Moreover, we agree with the HCRC that “section 1054.9 should be interpreted to promote informal, timely discovery between parties prior to seeking court enforcement.” Beginning the process at the trial level encourages the settlement of disputes at that level and maximizes the possibility that any discovery issues can be resolved with a minimum of court involvement.

…. Thus, we conclude that when no execution is imminent, a person seeking specific discovery under section 1054.9 should first file the motion in the trial court that rendered the judgment. 

(In re Steele, supra, 32 Cal.4th at 692 [bold italics added].)

Because Petitioner admittedly seeks discovery pursuant to section 1054.9, under the holding of In re Steele Petitioner should have filed a motion for discovery in the trial court that rendered the judgment in his criminal case, or at least in the criminal court. 

The Supreme Court in In re Steele did not consider whether a criminal defendant could seek “discovery materials” from a District Attorney’s Office pursuant to section 1054.9 in a request made under the CPRA.  Neither party cites another case that has addressed that issue, and neither party adequately briefs that statutory issue.   

Significantly to the court, Penal Code section 1054.5(a) states: “No order requiring discovery shall be made in criminal cases except as provided in this chapter. This chapter shall be the only means by which the defendant may compel the disclosure or production of information from prosecuting attorneys, law enforcement agencies which investigated or prepared the case against the defendant, or any other persons or agencies which the prosecuting attorney or investigating agency may have employed to assist them in performing their duties.”  (Bold italics added.)

As stated by our Supreme Court, “Section 1054.9 is part of the general discovery provisions of Penal Code section 1054 et seq. Those provisions limit trial discovery to materials the prosecutor possesses or knows ‘to be in the possession of the investigating agencies....’ (Pen.Code, § 1054.1, italics added.) They also provide that the statutory provisions are the only means for the defendant to compel discovery ‘from prosecuting attorneys….”  (In re Steele, supra, 32 Cal.4th at 696; see also Rutter, Cal. Crim. Procedure, § 16:11 [“These provisions are the only means by which the defendant may compel the disclosure or production of information from prosecuting attorneys”].) 

Here, Petitioner admittedly seeks the disclosure of “discovery materials” within the meaning of section 1054.9 from “prosecuting attorneys.”  Section 1054.5(a) is strong evidence of legislative intent that a convicted person may only compel such discovery through a motion filed pursuant to section 1054, et seq.  Accordingly, the court denies the writ to the extent it is attempting to use the Public Records Act as a means of obtaining post-conviction discovery covered by Penal Code section 10954.9.  To the extent Petitioner claims any of his requests are outside of the post-conviction discovery procedures contained in Penal Code section 1054.9, he should identify those requests at the hearing.

Compliance with Penal Code Section 1054, et seq.

Respondent contends that Petitioner has not complied with the mandatory requirements of section 1054.9, including “good faith efforts to obtain discovery materials from trial counsel were made and were unsuccessful.”  (Oppo. 9; see Penal Code § 1054.9(a).)  In reply, Petitioner argues and presents evidence that he has complied.  The court does not resolve this issue because the petition or motion must be heard in the criminal court.

CPRA Exemptions

In response to the CPRA Request, the District Attorney’s Office also identified some specific statutory exemptions it contends apply to the records requested: Government Code sections 6254(a), 6254(c), 6254(f), and 6254(k); Penal Code sections 841,5, 1054.6, 11140, and 13300; and rules against disclosure of third-party juvenile records.  (Pet. Exh. D.) However neither party has adequately analyzed these exemptions as they specifically pertain to the 40 CPRA requests at issue.  Given the court’s preliminary conclusion that the request is governed by Penal Code section 1054.9, the court does not further analyze whether any exemptions would apply to the documents requested.

Timing of District Attorney’s Response to CPRA Request

            Petitioner argues that Respondent did not timely respond to his CPRA Request.  (OB 2:10-23 and Reply 6.)  On May 27, 2021, the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office responded to Petitioner’s correspondence of May 5, 2021. (Pet. Exh. D.) The District Attorney’s Office advised it had not received Petitioner’s March 4 request or April 8 letter.  (Ibid.)  The court has insufficient basis to disbelieve that statement.  (See Evid. Code § 664.)  Moreover, even if the response was untimely, that violation of the CPRA would not, in itself, entitle Petitioner to production of the requested records.  Nor did Petitioner plead a claim for declaratory relief related to the timing of the response.   

In Camera Review

Petitioner requests in camera review of the records sought in the CPRA Request.  (OB 4:1-4.)  Based on the court’s conclusion that the entire writ petition should be heard in the criminal court pursuant to Penal Code section 1054, et seq., in camera review is denied.

Conclusion

The petition is denied without prejudice to Petitioner filing a request under Penal Code section 1054.9 in the criminal court.  The request should indicate it is being made pursuant to Penal Code section 1054.9, and should be filed in the Clara Shortridge Foltz courthouse, room 100.