Judge: Mary H. Strobel, Case: 21STCP04149, Date: 2022-12-08 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCP04149 Hearing Date: December 8, 2022 Dept: 82
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Ben Eilenberg, v. The City of Los
Angeles, |
Judge
Mary Strobel Hearing:
December 8, 2022 |
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21STCP04149 |
Tentative
Decision on Petition for Writ of Mandate
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Petitioner Ben Eilenberg (“Petitioner”) petitions
for a writ of mandate directing Respondent City of Los Angeles (“Respondent” or
“City”) to disclose to Petitioner all records that are responsive to 25
requests made by Petitioner pursuant to the California Public Records Act
(“CPRA”).
Relevant Background and
Procedural History
Petitioner manages the Stanford
Neighborhood Association, which addresses issues in the area of Stanford Avenue
at Gage in the City of Los Angeles.
(Eilenberg Decl. ISO Motions to Compel Filed 4/25/22 ¶¶ 2-3.) “Two of these issues that the Stanford
Neighborhood Association is currently addressing are: a. The property located
at 6510, 6600 and 6622 Stanford Avenue, Los Angeles, CA is currently operating
in defiance of a shut-down order issued by the City of Los Angeles. b. The
owners of the property located at 6535 Stanford Avenue, Los Angeles, CA are
allegedly being discriminated against by Dexter Jackson, Tim Griffith, and the
Los Angeles Department of Building and Safety’s Plumbing Department regarding
the permits necessary to open a food truck commissary at their property.” (Ibid.; see also Pet. ¶¶ 1-2.)
On December 8, 2021, as part of his investigation
into these issues, Petitioner sent 25 requests for records under the California
Public Records Act (“CPRA”) to Respondent’s Department of Building and Safety
(“LADBS”). Specifically, Petitioner
requested the following records:
1. All permits issued regarding 6535 Stanford
Avenue, Los Angeles, CA.
2. All communications regarding 6535 Stanford
Avenue, Los Angeles, CA from any City of Los Angeles employee from 2018 to the
present.
3. All communications regarding 6535 Stanford
Avenue, Los Angeles, CA to any City of Los Angeles employee from 2018 to the
present.
4. Dexter Jackson's personnel file.
5. All communications regarding Dexter Jackson
to any City of Los Angeles employee from 2018 to the present.
6. All communications regarding Dexter Jackson
from any City of Los Angeles employee from 2018 to the present.
7. All permits issued after an inspection was
performed by Dexter Jackson from 2018 to the present.
8. All complaints against Dexter Jackson.
9. All regulations applying to commercial food
truck commissaries in the City of Los Angeles from the Department of Building
and Safety that have been active at any time from 2018 to the present.
10. All regulations regarding the ability of
Los Angeles Department of Building and Safety inspectors to rescind permits
that have been previously issued that have been active at any time from 2018 to
the present.
11. All regulations regarding the ability of
Los Angeles Department of Building and Safety inspectors to rescind permits
that have been previously finalized that have been active at any time from 2018
to the present.
12. All permits ordered rescinded by Dexter
Jackson from 2010 to the present. 13. All documents supporting the basis for
any permits ordered rescinded by Dexter Jackson from 2010 to the present.
14. All documents supporting the basis for
rejection of any permits for 6535 Stanford Avenue, Los Angeles, CA.
15. Tim Griffith's personnel file.
16. All communications regarding Tim Griffith
to any City of Los Angeles employee from 2018 to the present.
17. All communications regarding Tim Griffith
from any City of Los Angeles employee from 2018 to the present.
18. All permits issued after an inspection was
performed by Tim Griffith from 2018 to the present.
19. All complaints against Tim Griffith.
20. All documents setting forth the basis for
the City of Los Angeles not shutting down operations at 6510 Stanford Avenue,
Los Angeles, CA after the operators refused to comply with the order to
discontinue use issued on March 3, 2021.
21. All documents setting forth the basis for
the City of Los Angeles not shutting down operations at 6600 Stanford Avenue,
Los Angeles, CA after the operators refused to comply with the order to
discontinue use issued on March 3, 2021.
22. All documents setting forth the basis for
the City of Los Angeles not shutting down operations at 6622 Stanford Avenue,
Los Angeles, CA after the operators refused to comply with the order to
discontinue use issued on March 3, 2021.
23. All correspondence addressing 6510 Stanford
Avenue, Los Angeles, CA from 2018 to the present.
24. All correspondence addressing 6600 Stanford
Avenue, Los Angeles, CA from 2018 to the present.
25. All correspondence addressing 6622 Stanford
Avenue, Los Angeles, CA from 2018 to the present. (Pet. ¶ 13.)
(hereafter “CPRA Requests”).
Respondent’s
initial deadline to respond was December 20, 2021. (Pet. ¶ 15.)
On December 17, Michael Van Do, LADBS’s Custodian of Records, began
drafting a letter requesting additional time pursuant to Govt. Code §
6253(c). (Van Do Decl. ¶ 2.) Van Do declares that “because of the enormous
volume of requests I handle, I inadvertently did not send the letter on its due
date of December 20.” (Ibid.)
On December 21,
2021, Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of mandate pursuant to the
CPRA. That same date, Petitioner emailed
Van Do a copy of the petition and reminded him of City’s duties under the CPRA. (Id. ¶ 3, Exh. A.)
On January 3, 2022,
Respondent produced 190 pages of documents in response to the CPRA
Requests. For many of the CPRA Requests, Respondent
did not produce responsive records and stated exemptions or other reasons it
could not produce records. (Id. ¶ 4,
Exh. B.)
On January 4, 2022, Petitioner sent Van Do an
email asserting that Respondent’s stated exemptions and other reasons did not
justify non-disclosure of records.
(Hagan Decl. Exh. A.)
On January 21, 2022, Van Do provided another
response to the CPRA Requests, produced an additional 1,700 pages of documents,
and requested additional time to locate and produce records for certain of the
CPRA Requests. Respondent also
maintained that its stated reasons for not producing records was “satisfactory”
with respect to certain CPRA Requests.
(Van Do Decl. ¶ 5, Exh. C.) For
Requests 7 and 18, Respondent supplemented its response to state that the
document search of LADBS’s database would require a Systems Analyst and
approximately (5) hours of programming time (per request) to create, test and
run a query to obtain the responsive data. (Van Do Decl., Exh. C.) The City
estimated the cost of that programming time (per request) as $383.40, and
requested payment of that estimate pursuant to California Government Code
section 6253.9(b) before proceeding with the search. (Ibid.)
Van Do declares, as follows: “I did not receive any correspondence from
Petitioner objecting or responding to my January 21, 2022 supplemental
response.” (Id. ¶ 5.)
On January 26, 2022, Respondent filed its
answer, which asserts multiple affirmative defenses, including waiver and
estoppel, lack of standing, unclean hands, failure to exhaust administrative
remedies, and mootness.
On February 18, 2022, Respondent further
supplemented its response to the CPRA Requests.
Van Do explains this supplemental response as follows: “I supplemented
the City’s response to Petitioner again, this time providing 12,353 pages of
responsive documents to requests 5, 6, 16, and 17. To prepare this response, I
conducted a search (using Google Vault) of the email accounts of Dexter
Jackson's and Tim Griffith's; and after reviewing the emails for any
non-privileged material, I found 13,353 pages to be responsive.” (Van Do Decl. ¶ 6.) Van Do further declares, “I again did not
receive any correspondence from Petitioner objecting or responding to the
City’s February 18, 2022 supplemental response.” (Ibid.)
On March 10, 2022, the court held a trial
setting conference, which was attended by counsel for Petitioner and
Respondent. The court set the petition
for hearing on December 8, 2022, and set a briefing schedule. Petitioner’s opening brief was due 60 days
prior to the hearing.
On April 22, 2022, Respondent produced about
159 pages of records in response to CPRA Requests Nos. 4 and 15, which seek the
personnel file of Dexter Jackson and Tim Griffith. (Id. ¶ 7, Exh. E.) Van Do declares that Respondent “offered to
produce the non-confidential material within those files (employment
agreements, salary-related documents, etc.) subject to the copying cost
recovery provisions of the PRA.”
(Ibid.) He further declares that
“[t]o date, Petitioner has not remitted payment for the copying costs.” (Ibid.)
Petitioner has not filed an opening brief or
any evidence in support of the petition.
On October 26, 2022, Respondent timely filed and served an opposition
brief. No reply has been received.
Summary of CPRA; Burden
of Proof; and Standard of Review
Pursuant to the
CPRA (Gov. Code § 6250, et seq.), individual citizens have a right to access
government records. In enacting the
CPRA, the California Legislature declared that “access to information
concerning the conduct of the people's business is a fundamental and necessary
right of every person in this state.”
(Gov. Code, § 6250; see also County
of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 57, 63.) The CPRA defines “public records” as follows:
(e) “Public
records” includes any writing containing information relating to the conduct of
the public's business prepared, owned, used, or retained by any state or local
agency regardless of physical form or characteristics. (Gov. Code § 6252(e).)
Government Code section 6253(b) states that
“each state or local agency, upon a request for a copy of records that reasonably
describes an identifiable record or records, shall make the records promptly
available.” (See also Id. § 6253(c)
[subject to extension in unusual circumstances, agency shall respond to CPRA
request within 10 days].)
Petitioner bears
the burden of proof and persuasion in a mandate proceeding brought under CCP
section 1085. (California Correctional
Peace Officers Assn. v. State Personnel Bd. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1133, 1154.) “To establish an agency has a duty to disclose under [the CPRA], the
petitioner must show that: (1) the record ‘qualif[ies] as [a] ‘public record[
]’ within the meaning of section 6252, subdivision (e); and (2) the record is
‘in the possession of the agency.’” (Anderson-Barker
v Sup.Ct. (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 528, 538.)
“Whether a record falls within the statutory definition of a ‘public
record’ involves a ‘distinct inquiry’ from whether the agency is in possession
of that record…. The duty to
disclose applies only when the petitioner has satisfied both elements.” (Id. at 539.)
CPRA exemptions
must be narrowly construed and the agency bears the burden of showing that a
specific exemption applies. (Sacramento County Employees’ Retirement
System v. Superior Court (2013) 195 Cal.App.4th 440, 453.)
Analysis
Petitioner Has Not Filed an Opening
Brief, and Has Not Met His Initial Burden of Proof
An agency is presumed to have regularly
performed its official duties. (Evid.
Code § 664.) As applied in a CPRA
action, “[g]overnment agencies are, of course, entitled to a presumption that
they have reasonably and in good faith complied with the obligation to disclose
responsive information.” (American
Civil Liberties Union of N. Cal. v. Superior Court (2011) 202 Cal App 4th
55, 85.)
Petitioner bears
the burden of proof and persuasion in a mandate proceeding brought under CCP
section 1085. (California Correctional
Peace Officers Assn. v. State Personnel Bd. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1133, 1154.) A reviewing court “will not act as counsel for
either party … and will not assume the task of initiating and prosecuting a
search of the record for any purpose of discovering errors not pointed out in
the briefs.” (Fox v. Erickson (1950)
99 Cal.App.2d 740, 742.)
A memorandum of points and authorities is
required for a noticed mandamus motion. (See CCP § 1094; CRC
3.1113(a).) The absence of a memorandum
is an admission that the motion is not meritorious and may be denied. (CRC 3.1113(a).) “The memorandum must contain a statement of
facts, a concise statement of the law, evidence and arguments relied on, and a
discussion of the statutes, cases, and textbooks cited in support of the
position advanced.” (CRC 3.1113(b); Quantum
Cooking Concepts, Inc. v. LV Associates, Inc. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 927,
934 [Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1113 “rests on a policy-based allocation of
resources, preventing the trial court from being cast as a tacit advocate for
the moving party's theories”].)
Here, Petitioner has
not filed an opening brief or any evidence in support of his writ
petition. Accordingly, he has not met
his initial burden to show that Respondent did not comply with its duties under
the CPRA. On that basis alone, the petition
is DENIED.
Respondent Submits Evidence of Compliance with the
CPRA, Which Petitioner Does Not Rebut
In
its opposition brief, Respondent contends that the petition is moot because Respondent
has fully responded to each of Petitioner’s CPRA requests. (Oppo. 9-11.)
Respondent submits evidence that it has substantively responded to all
25 CPRA requests and made available all nonexempt documents that have been
requested of it (including 14,000 pages already produced to Petitioner),
subject to the cost-recovery provisions of the CPRA. (Van Do Decl. ¶¶ 5-8, Exhs. B, C, D, E.) Respondent further submits evidence that
Petitioner has not objected to, responded to, or identified any deficiencies in
Respondent’s January 21, February 18, and April 22 supplemental responses. (Ibid.)
Nor has Petitioner paid the copying costs described in the April 22
letter. (Ibid.)
Since
Petitioner did not file an opening brief, the burden of proof never shifted to
Respondent to prove its compliance with the CPRA. Nonetheless, Respondent has submitted
evidence that it complied with the CPRA as to all 25 CPRA requests at
issue. Petitioner has not responded to
or opposed this evidence. (Sehulster Tunnels/Pre-Con v. Traylor Brothers, Inc. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th
1328, 1345, fn. 16 [failure to address point is “equivalent to a concession”].) Nor does Petitioner make any argument that
Respondent’s supplemental responses are deficient. In these circumstances, a writ will not issue. (See Zagoren v. Hall (1932) 122
Cal.App. 460, 462 [a writ is an equitable remedy and will not issue if it is
unnecessary].)
For these additional reasons, the petition is
DENIED.
Conclusion
The petition is DENIED.
Because a motion for attorney’s fees is not
presently before the court, the court does not reach Respondent’s argument that
Petitioner is not entitled to attorney’s fees.
(Oppo. 11-13.)