Judge: Mary H. Strobel, Case: 22STCP01617, Date: 2022-08-23 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCP01617 Hearing Date: August 23, 2022 Dept: 82
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Equitas
Academy Charter School, Inc., v. Los Angeles
Unified School District, et al., |
Judge Mary
Strobel Hearing: August
23, 2022 Tentative
Decision on Petition for Writ of Mandate
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Case No. 22STCP01617 |
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Petitioner Equitas Academy Charter School, Inc.
(“Petitioner”) petitions for a writ of ordinary mandate directing Respondents
Los Angeles Unified School District (“LAUSD” or “District”), Board of Education
of LAUSD (“Board”), and Superintendent Albert Carvalho (collectively
“Respondents”) to receive Petitioner’s petition for the establishment of a
charter school, as submitted to the District on March 30, 2022, in accordance
with Education Code section 47605(b) and commence the statutory timelines for
Board to hold a hearing on the petition and either grant or deny the
charter.
Judicial Notice
Respondents’ Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”) Exhibit A –
Granted. (Evid. Code § 452(c); Pacific
Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 563, 578,
fn. 13 [taking judicial notice of a Senate committee report].)
Petitioner’s objections to the RJN are overruled. Petitioner’s objections go to the weight to
be given the Senate Committee report in a statutory analysis of section
47605(b), not the propriety of judicial notice.
Respondents’ Evidentiary Objections to
Declaration of Margaret Ford
(1)
– (10) Overruled.
Respondents’ Evidentiary Objections to
Reply Declaration of Kevin Davis
(1)-(15) Sustained.
Background and Procedural History
Education Code Section 47605(b)
This petition concerns
the statutory process by which the governing board of a school district
“receives” and acts upon a petition for establishment of a charter school
within the school district. The central
statutory provision is found in Education Code section 47605(b), which provides
in pertinent part:
(b) No later than 60 days after receiving a
petition, in accordance with subdivision (a), the governing board of the school
district shall hold a public hearing on the provisions of the charter, at which
time the governing board of the school district shall consider the level of
support for the petition by teachers employed by the school district, other
employees of the school district, and parents. Following review of the petition
and the public hearing, the governing board of the school district shall either
grant or deny the charter within 90 days of receipt of the petition, provided,
however, that the date may be extended by an additional 30 days if both parties
agree to the extension. A petition is deemed received by the
governing board of the school district for purposes of commencing the timelines
described in this subdivision on the day the petitioner submits a petition to
the district office, along with a signed certification that the petitioner deems
the petition to be complete. (bold italics
added.)
“[S]ection 47605 establishes a comprehensive
process for approval of charter petitions, spelling out precisely what is
expected of a charter applicant.” (United
Teachers of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2012) 54
Cal.4th 504, 526.)
LAUSD Refuses to “Receive” Petitioner’s Charter School Petition
Petitioner is a nonprofit public benefit corporation
that operates the Equitas Academy Charter Schools, a group of six public
charter schools located in Los Angeles and authorized by LAUSD in accordance
with Education Code section 47605. (Ford
Decl. ¶ 2.) Petitioner planned to open Equitas
Academy 7 (“EQ7”) as its seventh school in time for the 2022-2023 school year. Petitioner’s charter petition for EQ7 is the
subject of this action. (Id. ¶ 5.)
Petitioner met with
LAUSD staff on March 30, 2022, at an intake appointment, and submitted its
petition to establish EQ7 as a charter school within LAUSD (“EQ7 Petition” or
“petition”). Petitioner submitted a
signed certification of completeness stating that Petitioner deemed the
petition to be complete. Petitioner also
submitted thousands of pages of additional documentation in support of the
petition. (Ford Decl. ¶ 4; see AR 324 [certificate
of completeness]; AR 146-12329 [entire petition].) Petitioner utilized a LAUSD-required template
for the certificate of completeness.
(Ford Decl. ¶ 4.)
LAUSD staff conducted the March 30 intake
appointment via Zoom. Over several
hours, LAUSD staff assessed the completeness or sufficiency of the EQ7
Petition. Ultimately, LAUSD staff
notified Petitioner (via Zoom) that, in staff’s opinion, a portion of the
submittal supporting the EQ7 Petition was incomplete. Therefore, LAUSD staff informed Petitioner
that the EQ7 Petition was not “received” by LAUSD or the Board. (Ford Decl. ¶¶
4-5; Aguilar Decl. ¶¶ 9-15.)
After the March 30 intake appointment concluded,
LAUSD staff sent Petitioner a copy of its “2021-2022 New Independent Charter
School Petition Application Intake Checklist” (the “Checklist”) concerning the
EQ7 Petition. The Checklist states that
the EQ7 Petition was deemed an “Incomplete petition – not accepted for review.”
(Ford Decl. ¶ 6; AR 10.)
Luis Aguilar, a LAUSD specialist in the LAUSD
Charter School Division (“CSD”), was assigned to the team that reviewed the EQ7
Petition. (Aguilar Decl. ¶ 15.) The Checklist states that Aguilar conducted
the “intake” for the EQ7 Petition. (AR
10.) In a declaration, Aguilar describes
LAUSD’s determination that the petition was incomplete, as follows: [T]he EQ7
Petition submission did not completely address the requirement to include
evidence of community engagement with all required stakeholder groups.
Therefore, pursuant to the District’s Charter School Policies, the EQ7 Petition
did not include all required components for a complete charter petition
submission to the District, thus the statutory timelines described in Education
Code section 47605, subdivision (b) did not commence on March 30, 2022.” (Aguilar Decl. ¶ 15.)
In his declaration, Aguilar also describes the LAUSD
policies and procedures that apply to LAUSD’s review of charter school
petitions. He further summarizes certain
communications between Petitioner and LAUSD staff, starting March 15, 2022,
related to Petitioner’s EQ7 Petition.
Where relevant, this evidence is discussed in the Analysis section
below. (Aguilar Decl. ¶¶ 1-9.)
LAUSD Confirms Refusal to Receive EQ7 Petition in Legal Correspondence
On April 4, 2022,
through counsel, Petitioner requested that LAUSD reconsider its position and
confirm that the EQ7 Petition was “received” and will be acted upon by the
District Board pursuant to Education Code section 47605(b). (AR 13.)
On
April 8, 2022, LAUSD’s General Counsel, Devora Navera Reed, responded to
Petitioner and reiterated LAUSD’s position that the EQ7 Petition was “not
considered received for purposes of starting the statutory timelines outlined
in Education Code section 47605(b).” (AR 15.) Reed explained LAUSD’s legal position as
follows:
Contrary
to the assertions made in the Equitas Letter, the Policy intake appointment
requirements adopted by the LAUSD Board of Education are consistent with all
applicable legal requirements including the Charter Schools Act (Ed. Code §
47600 et seq.) and made pursuant to the District’s discretionary control over
the adoption and implementation of the policies and procedures governing
charter schools.
The
Policy enshrined specific intake requirements, among other things and as
referenced below, for all LAUSD authorized and prospective charter schools to
ensure that LAUSD consistently, effectively and meaningfully considered and
processed each petition application accordingly.
(AR 14-15.)
Reed quoted an LAUSD policy, which
states in pertinent part: “At the intake appointment, CSD staff will determine
if the petition is complete…. If the petition is deemed complete at the intake
appointment, the CSD will commence its review and analysis of the petition in
accordance with the standards and criteria set forth in the Charter Schools Act.
(Ed. Code, § 47605.).” (AR 15 [bold
italics in original].)
Reed then explained LAUSD’s staff’s
decision not to receive the EQ7 Petition as follows:
Consistent
with the authority above that empowers the District with control of the
application approval process, the District’s Charter Schools Division reviewed
Equitas 7’s petition application at the intake appointment and made an
appropriate determination regarding the petition’s completeness for purposes of
proceeding with the review and analysis under Education Code section 47605. The
District’s Charter Schools Division specifically determined that Equitas 7’s
petition application was deemed incomplete because Equitas 7
failed to include all the necessary components of the Community Impact
Assessment section of the New Independent Charter School Petition
Application Intake Checklist (“Checklist”).
(AR 15 [bold italics and italics in original].)
Writ Proceedings
On April 29, 2022,
Petitioner filed its verified petition for writ of mandate. Respondents have answered. On July 8, 2022, Petitioner filed its opening
brief in support of the petition and supporting declaration. The court has received Respondents’
opposition brief and supporting declarations, Petitioner’s reply, the joint
administrative record (hereafter cited as “AR”), and the joint appendix.
Standard of Review; and Summary of
Applicable Law
The
petition for writ of mandate is brought pursuant to CCP section 1085. There are two essential requirements to the
issuance of an ordinary writ of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section
1085: (1) a clear, present, and ministerial duty on the part of the respondent,
and (2) a clear, present, and beneficial right on the part of the petitioner to
the performance of that duty. (California
Ass’n for Health Services at Home v. Department of Health Services (2007)
148 Cal.App.4th 696, 704.) “An action in ordinary mandamus is proper where …
the claim is that an agency has failed to act as required by law.” (Id. at
705.)
“Generally, mandamus is
available to compel a public agency's performance or to correct an agency's
abuse of discretion when the action being compelled or corrected is
ministerial.” (AIDS Healthcare Foundation v. Los
Angeles County Dept. of Public Health (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 693, 700.) “Mandamus does not lie to compel a public
agency to exercise discretionary powers in a particular manner, only to
compel it to exercise its discretion in some manner.” (Ibid.)
“A ministerial act is an act that a public
officer is required to perform in a prescribed manner in obedience to the
mandate of legal authority and without regard to his own judgment or opinion
concerning such act's propriety or impropriety, when a given state of facts
exists.” (Kavanaugh v. West Sonoma County Union High School Dist. (2003) 29
Cal.4th 911, 916.)
"Even
if mandatory language appears in [a] statute creating a duty, the duty is
discretionary if the [public entity] must exercise significant discretion to
perform the duty."' (AIDS
Healthcare Foundation v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Public Health (2011)
197 Cal.App.4th 693, 701.) “While a writ
of mandate may issue to compel compliance with a ministerial duty - an act the
law specifically requires - it may not issue to compel an agency to perform
that legal duty in a particular manner, or control its exercise of discretion
by forcing it to meet its legal obligations in a specific way." (Marquez v. State Dept. of Health Care
Services (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 87, 118-119.)
“‘On
questions of law arising in mandate proceedings, [the court] exercise[s]
independent judgment’…. Interpretation of a statute or regulation is a question of
law subject to independent review.”
(Christensen v. Lightbourne (2017)
15 Cal.App.5th 1239, 1251.)
Petitioner bears the burden of proof and
persuasion in a mandate proceeding brought under CCP section 1085. (California Correctional Peace Officers Assn.
v. State Personnel Bd. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1133, 1154.)
Analysis
Petitioner contends that LAUSD’s
Board has a ministerial duty to “receive” a charter petition “on the day the
petitioner submits a petition to the district office, along with a signed certification
that the petitioner deems the petition to be complete.” (Opening Brief (“OB”) 13, citing §
47605(b).) Because Petitioner submitted the
EQ7 Petition to LAUSD and a signed certification that it deemed the petition to
be complete (Ford Decl. ¶ 4; AR 324), Petitioner contends that Respondents had
no discretion to refuse to receive the EQ7 Petition. (OB 13-14.)
Respondents contend that the relevant language from section 47605(b) is
not mandatory and that “District retains some discretion over charter petition
receipt—namely, what constitutes a complete charter petition application to
LAUSD.” (Oppo. 12.) The court agrees with Petitioner that section
47605(b) imposed a mandatory duty on Respondents to deem the EQ7 Petition
“received” on March 30, 2022, the date it was submitted to LAUSD with a signed
certificate of completeness. The court
will grant the petition.
Rules of Statutory
Interpretation
The
petition raises questions of statutory interpretation. “The rules governing statutory construction
are well settled. We begin with the fundamental premise that the objective of
statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent.
[Citations.] To determine legislative intent, we turn first to the words of the
statute, giving them their usual and ordinary meaning. [Citations.] When the
language of a statute is clear, we need go no further. However, when the
language is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation, we look to
a variety of extrinsic aids, including the ostensible objects to be achieved,
the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy,
contemporaneous administrative construction, and the statutory scheme of which
the statute is a part.” (Nolan v. City of Anaheim (2004) 33
Cal.4th 335, 340.)
The Plain
Language of Section 47605(b)
Section 47605(b) imposes timelines by which a
governing board “shall” hold a public hearing and “shall” either grant or deny
a charter petition. These timelines are
triggered by the date the governing board receives a petition. The statute specifies when a charter petition
is considered received. “A
petition is deemed received by the governing board of the school district for
purposes of commencing the timelines described in this subdivision on the day
the petitioner submits a petition to the district office, along with a signed
certification that the petitioner deems the petition to be complete.”
The statute defines when a charter petition is
“deemed received.” The Legislature
identified only two requirements for a petition to be deemed received: (1) the
petitioner submits the petition to the district office; and (2) the petitioner
submits a signed certification that the petition deems the petition to be
complete. Notably, the Legislature did
not state that the district board or district office may determine whether a petition
is complete. Nor did the Legislature set
forth any factors or legal standard for a district board to apply to determine
whether a petition is “complete.”
Rather, the Legislature only required a signed certification of
completeness from the petitioner.
The only reasonable
interpretation of this statutory language is that a charter petition is
conclusively presumed to have been received by the district board on the day
the petitioner submits the petition to the district office, along with a signed
certificate of completeness. “[C]ases
construing the term ‘deemed’ have held … that the meaning of ‘deemed’ is that
the deemed state of affairs is conclusively presumed to exist.” (Parmett v. Sup.Ct. (1989) 212
Cal.App.3d 1261, 1266.)
Respondents contend
that section 47605(b) is ambiguous in that the Legislature used the verb “is”
rather than “shall be” or “may be” prior to the word “deemed.” Respondents point out that the Legislature
used the mandatory verb “shall” in the same subdivision at issue, but not in
the sentence defining when a petition is complete. (Oppo. 12.) The court is not persuaded by either
argument.
Unlike the auxiliary verb “may,” the auxiliary verb
“is” does not express the possibility of an event or action. Rather, “is” connotes a present or existing
condition. Thus, the phrase “is deemed
received” connotes a conclusive standard of completeness if the two statutory
requirements discussed above are met. The
Legislature’s use of the mandatory verb “shall” to define certain duties of the
district board, but the phrase “is deemed received” to trigger the timelines
for board action, does not suggest that the Legislature intended to create a
discretionary duty to determine the date on which a petition was filed. Rather, the statutory language shows that the
Legislature sought to establish a clear and consistent standard of when a
charter petition is “received” “for purposes of
commencing the timelines” under which the board must act on the petition.
As argued persuasively by Petitioner, Respondents’
interpretation of section 47605(b) improperly ignores language in the statute
and inserts language not present. (Reply
3-6; see also OB 9-13.) “When
interpreting statutory language, we may neither insert language which has been
omitted nor ignore language which has been inserted.” (See People
v. National Auto. and Cas. Ins. Co. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 277, 282.) Respondents contend that, pursuant to section 47605(b), “the District must logically exercise
discretion, per the Act and its Charter School Policies, to determine whether a
charter petition application does, in fact, contain all necessary components,
before commencing to process it.” (Oppo.
13.) Respondents make clear that they
believe school district staff have such discretion. (See Oppo. and Aguilar Decl. generally.) However, section 47605(b) includes no
language imposing duties or conferring discretion on school district
staff. The statute speaks exclusively of
the mandatory duties of the “governing board.”
Moreover, the statute includes no language suggesting that the even the
board may “exercise discretion” with respect to the date of receipt of a
charter petition.
Respondents
also construe section 47605(b) in a manner that would render statutory language
superfluous. If school districts have
discretion under section 47605(b) to determine whether a charter petition is
“compete,” that would
render the second requirement in section 47605(b)—the petitioner’s
certification of completeness—meaningless.
As discussed below, the Legislature specifically amended the statute in
2019 to add the requirement of a certification of completeness. “[I]nterpretations which render any part of a
statute superfluous are to be avoided.” (Young v. McCoy (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th
1078, 1083.)
Based on the foregoing, the court
finds the plain language of section 47605(b), as applied to this case, to be
unambiguous. The
Legislature identified only two requirements for a petition to be deemed
received: (1) the petitioner submits the petition to the district office; and
(2) the petitioner submits a signed certification that the petition deems the
petition to be complete. The statute
confers no discretion on the district board or district staff to determine
whether the petition is “complete” or to refuse to receive the petition if the
statutory requirements are met. It is
undisputed that Petitioner satisfied these two requirements when it submitted
the EQ7 Petition and a signed certificate of completeness to LAUSD on March 30,
2022. (See Ford Decl. ¶
4; Aguilar Decl. ¶ 14; AR 324 [certificate of completeness]; AR 146-12329
[entire petition].) Pursuant to statute,
the EQ7 Petition is conclusively “deemed received” on that date. Respondents lacked discretion to refuse to
receive the petition.
Legislative
History of Section 47605(b) and Public Policy
“If the statutory language is unambiguous, we
presume the Legislature meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the
statute controls.” (Conservatorship
of Whitley (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1206, 1214; see also Friends of Juana Briones House v. City of Palo Alto
(2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 286, 303-304 [“If the language “is clear and unambiguous our
inquiry ends”.]) Because section
47605(b) is unambiguous as applied to this case, the plain language controls
and the court need not consider extrinsic aids, including legislative
history.
LAUSD’s
Policy Conflicts with Section 47605(b) and is Preempted
Despite
the mandatory duty imposed by state law to deem the EQ7 Petition received on
March 30, 2022, Respondents contend that LAUSD has promulgated lawful policies
and procedures governing the “receipt” of charter petitions and that LAUSD
complied with those policies in this case.
(Oppo. 14-16.) Respondents
contend that these policies are not preempted by state law, including section
47605(b). (Id. 16-20.) Petitioner contends that any contrary
policies of LAUSD are preempted by state law.
(OB 11-14.)
“‘Under article
XI, section 7 of the California Constitution, '[a] county or city may make and
enforce within its limits all local, police, sanitary, and other
ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general laws.' If otherwise
valid local legislation conflicts with state law, it is preempted by such law
and is void. A conflict exists if the
local legislation duplicates, contradicts, or enters an area fully occupied by
general law, either expressly or by legislative implication. Local legislation
is 'duplicative' of general law when it is coextensive therewith. Similarly, local legislation is
'contradictory' to general law when it is inimical thereto. Finally, local legislation enters an
area that is 'fully occupied' by general law when the
Legislature has expressly manifested its intent to 'fully occupy' the
area, or when it has
impliedly done so in light of one of the following indicia of intent: '….” (San
Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of Carlsbad (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 785,
792-793.)
Similarly,
Education Code section 35160 states: “On and after January 1, 1976, the
governing board of any school district may initiate and carry on any program,
activity, or may otherwise act in any manner which is not in conflict with or
inconsistent with, or preempted by, any law and which is not in conflict with
the purposes for which school districts are established.”
“A local
ordinance contradicts state
law when it is inimical to or cannot be reconciled with state law.” (O’Connell v. City of Stockton (2007)
41 Cal.4th 1061, 1068.)
For
the specific issue raised by this writ petition, the preemption analysis is
straightforward and requires only a brief discussion. As discussed above, section 47605(b) imposed
a mandatory duty on Board to deem the EQ7 Petition received on March 30, 2022. Contrary to Respondents’ assertion, section
47605(b) conferred no discretion on LAUSD staff to determine if the EQ7
Petition was complete or to refuse to “receive” the petition. Respondents cite LAUSD Policy and Procedures
for Charter Schools, last amended January 25, 2022. (Oppo. 15, citing AR 27.) The Policy and Procedures state, inter
alia, that “[a]t the intake appointment, CSD staff will determine if the
petition is complete.” (AR 27.) To the extent the Policy and Procedures can
be interpreted to confer discretion on LAUSD staff to refuse to receive a
charter petition that satisfies the two requirements of section 47605(b)
discussed above (i.e., submission to district office and signed certificate of
completeness), the Policy and Procedures directly contradict section 47605(b)
and are inimical thereto. Section
47605(b), as interpreted by the court, cannot be reconciled with a LAUSD policy
that confers discretion on CSD staff to refuse to “receive” a charter petition
that complies with the two submission requirements discussed above. “If otherwise valid local legislation
conflicts with state law, it is preempted by such law and is void.” (San
Diego Gas & Electric Co., supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at 792-793.)
Respondents
contend that the relevant part of the LAUSD Policy and Procedures is
“reasonable”; that the Policy and Procedures were lawfully promulgated; and the
Charter Schools Act did not fully occupy the field with respect to the
application process for charter schools.
(Oppo. 16-19.) The court need not
analyze these contentions. As discussed,
section 47605(b) imposes a mandatory duty on Board to deem the EQ7 Petition
received on March 30, 2022. Any contrary
policy of LAUSD under which LAUSD did not have a mandatory duty to deem the
petition received conflicts with state law and is preempted.
Based
on the foregoing, section 47605(b) imposed a mandatory duty on Board to deem
the EQ7 Petition received on March 30, 2022.
Any contrary local policy of LAUSD is preempted and void.
Remedy
Writ Directing Board to Receive
Petition and Commence Statutory Process
Board
has a clear, present, and ministerial duty to deem the EQ7 Petition received as
of March 30, 2022, and to hold a hearing on the EQ7 Petition, to grant or deny the
charter, and perform other duties within the deadlines specified in section
47605(b). Since the petition was deemed
received on March 30, 2022, the court agrees with Petitioner that Respondents
should be ordered to immediately commence the statutory process and timelines
set forth in section 47605(b). (OB
14-15.) The statutory timelines will
commence on the date the writ is issued by the court. Accordingly, the court will grant the
requested relief in paragraph 1(a)-(c) of the prayer and at page 15 of the
opening brief. (See OB 15:10-18.)
Writ
Directing Respondents to Set Aside a Policy
In addition to the writ requiring Respondents to
receive the EQ7 Petition, Petitioner also requested in the prayer a writ
directing Respondents to “[s]et aside any District-promulgated requirement,
restriction or limitation inconsistent with or contrary to the mandate of
Education Code section 47605(b) requiring that a charter petition is received
by the District Board in accordance with that statute.” (Pet. Prayer ¶ 1.)
However, Petitioner did not address this prayer for
relief in the opening brief or reply. The
court considers the issue forfeited for purposes of this writ petition. (Nelson
v. Avondale HOA (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 857, 862-863 [argument waived if not
raised or adequately briefed]; Pfeifer v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.
(2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1282 [same].)
Conclusion
The
petition is GRANTED IN PART. The court will grant the requested relief in
paragraph 1(a)-(c) of the prayer and page 15 of the opening brief. Specifically, the court will grant a writ
directing Respondents to “(1) receive Equitas’s EQ7 Petition and certification
of completeness in accordance with Education Code section 47605(b); (2)
commence the 60-day timeline for the District Board to hold a public hearing on
the provisions of the charter, and in fact hold that public hearing in
accordance with Education Code section 47605; and, (3) commence the 90-day
timeline for the District Board to either grant or deny the charter, and in
fact take that action one way or the other in accordance with Education Code
section 47605.” (OB 15:10-18.) The
statutory timelines in section 47605(b) will commence on the date the writ is
issued by the court.
Petitioner is directed to lodge and serve a
proposed form of judgment and a proposed form of writ after meeting and
conferring with Respondent regarding any objections as to form. Petitioner is to lodge a declaration along
with the proposed judgment and proposed writ in accordance with LASC local
rules, Rule 3.231(n).