Judge: Mary H. Strobel, Case: 22STCV23489, Date: 2022-12-19 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV23489    Hearing Date: December 19, 2022    Dept: 82

            Plaintiff Whistle Sports, Inc. (“Plaintiff” or “Whistle”) moves for a writ of attachment against Defendant MJ Pictures, LLC (“Defendant” or “MJ”) in the amount of $711,129.24.

Defendant’s Evidentiary Objections

Declaration of Jordan Hill

(1)  – (5) Overruled. 

Declaration of Michael McGarry

(1)  – (2) Overruled. 

Relevant Procedural History

             On July 20, 2022, Plaintiff filed a complaint for damages against Defendant.  On August 26, 2022, Plaintiff filed the operative first amended complaint. 

            On August 26, 2022, Plaintiff filed a motion for writ of attachment. 

            On September 29, 2022, Defendant MJ Pictures and two individual defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration and stay this action. 

            On October 28, 2022, Plaintiff filed its amended motion for writ of attachment, which addresses the requirements of CCP section 1281.8(b) for issuance of a writ of attachment in light of the parties’ arbitration agreement.

            On November 22, 2022, Defendant filed an opposition to Plaintiff’s amended motion for writ of attachment. 

On November 29, 2022, the court continued the hearing on the application for writ of attachment to December 19, 2022.

            On December 13, 2022, Plaintiff filed a reply, a response to evidentiary objections, and two reply declarations. 

On December 15, 2022, the court (Judge Bachner) granted the motion to compel arbitration and stayed the case.

Summary of Applicable Law

“Upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter, the plaintiff may apply pursuant to this article for a right to attach order and a writ of attachment by filing an application for the order and writ with the court in which the action is brought.”  (CCP § 484.010.)

The application shall be executed under oath and must include: (1) a statement showing that the attachment is sought to secure the recovery on a claim upon which an attachment may be issued; (2) a statement of the amount to be secured by the attachment; (3) a statement that the attachment is not sought for a purpose other than the recovery on the claim upon which the attachment is based; (4) a statement that the applicant has no information or belief that the claim is discharged or that the prosecution of the action is stayed in a proceeding under the Bankruptcy Act (11 U.S.C. section 101 et seq.); and (5) a description of the property to be attached under the writ of attachment and a statement that the plaintiff is informed and believes that such property is subject to attachment.  (CCP § 484.020.)

“The application [for a writ of attachment] shall be supported by an affidavit showing that the plaintiff on the facts presented would be entitled to a judgment on the claim upon which the attachment is based.”  (CCP § 484.030.) 

The Court shall issue a right to attach order if the Court finds all of the following:

(1) The claim upon which the attachment is based is one upon which an attachment may be issued.

(2) The plaintiff has established the probable validity of the claim upon which the attachment is based.

(3) The attachment is not sought for a purpose other than the recovery on the claim upon which the attachment is based.

(4) The amount to be secured by the attachment is greater than zero.

CCP § 484.090.

“A claim has ‘probable validity’ where it is more likely than not that the plaintiff will obtain a judgment against the defendant on that claim.”  (CCP § 481.190.)

“The Attachment Law statutes are subject to strict construction.” (Epstein v. Abrams (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1168.) 

Analysis 

1.    No Verified Application

Plaintiff has not filed an application for writ of attachment that complies with the relevant statutory requirements.

CCP section 484.040 states: “No order or writ shall be issued under this article except after a hearing. At the times prescribed by subdivision (b) of Section 1005, the defendant shall be served with all of the following: … (c) A copy of the application  ….”  (bold italics added.) 

CCP section 484.020 states in full:

The application shall be executed under oath and shall include all of the following:

(a) A statement showing that the attachment is sought to secure the recovery on a claim upon which an attachment may be issued.

(b) A statement of the amount to be secured by the attachment.

(c) A statement that the attachment is not sought for a purpose other than the recovery on the claim upon which the attachment is based.

(d) A statement that the applicant has no information or belief that the claim is discharged in a proceeding under Title 11 of the United States Code (Bankruptcy) or that the prosecution of the action is stayed in a proceeding under Title 11 of the United States Code (Bankruptcy).

(e) A description of the property to be attached under the writ of attachment and a statement that the plaintiff is informed and believes that such property is subject to attachment. Where the defendant is a corporation, a reference to “all corporate property which is subject to attachment pursuant to subdivision (a) of Code of Civil Procedure Section 487.010” satisfies the requirements of this subdivision. Where the defendant is a partnership or other unincorporated association, a reference to “all property of the partnership or other unincorporated association which is subject to attachment pursuant to subdivision (b) of Code of Civil Procedure Section 487.010” satisfies the requirements of this subdivision. Where the defendant is a natural person, the description of the property shall be reasonably adequate to permit the defendant to identify the specific property sought to be attached.

(bold italics added.) 

The court interprets sections 484.020 and 484.040 to be mandatory requirements for an application for writ of attachment.  “Ordinarily, the term ‘shall’ is interpreted as mandatory and not permissive. Indeed, ‘the presumption [is] that the word ‘shall’ in a statute is ordinarily deemed mandatory and ‘may’ permissive.’”  (People v. Standish (2006) 38 Cal.4th 858, 869.)   Moreover, “[t]he Attachment Law statutes are subject to strict construction.” (Epstein v. Abrams (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1168.) 

Normally, the requirements of section 484.020 are satisfied by a verified application on form AT-105.  However, Plaintiff has not filed a verified application on that form or a declaration that includes all of the information required by section 484.020.  Because Plaintiff has not complied with the mandatory requirements of section 484.020, the application is denied for this reason and for other reasons discussed below.

2.    Probable Validity of Plaintiff’s Claim

The application is based on Plaintiff’s cause of action for breach of contract.  To establish a claim for breach of contract, a plaintiff must generally prove: (1) existence of a contract; (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance; (3) defendant’s breach of the contract; and (4) damages incurred by plaintiff as a result of the breach.  (Durell v. Sharp Healthcare, (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1367.) 

Plaintiff submits evidence that it entered into a Production Services Agreement (“Agreement”) with Defendant in or about October 2021.  The Agreement contemplated that Plaintiff, as the “Producer,” would render “production services” for seven episodes of a series entitled “Send Help” (hereafter “Project”).  (Hill Decl. Exh. A.)  In section 1 of the Agreement, Plaintiff agreed “to render such services in a first-class manner upon the terms herein specified, including without limitation, all production, post-production services and the delivery of all Project deliverables in accordance with the Buyer's delivery schedule.”  (Id. § 1(a).)  Plaintiff also agreed, that during the term of the contract, it would provide Defendant “with full access to Producer's books and records in connection with the Project, including cost reports on a weekly basis.”  (Id. § 1(e).) 

For its part, Defendant agreed that if Plaintiff “is not in uncured, material breach” that it would pay Plaintiff a production fee of $161,000 “(i.e. … $23,000…per Episode … on a guaranteed pay or play basis … payable on a cash flow schedule to be mutually approved by Company and Producer …. ”  (Id. § 2(b).)  Defendant also agreed to reimburse Plaintiff “for 100% of such Producer cash flowed Production Costs within seven (7) business days of Company's receipt of any portion of the Approved Budget, or other funds, from Buyer [AMC].”  (Id. § 2(c).)

            Plaintiff acknowledges that Defendant “has paid $1,620,000.00 of the production costs to date.”  (Hill Decl. ¶ 8; Mot. 6.)  However, Plaintiff contends that Defendant has failed to pay $538,616.26 in incurred production costs or any part of the $161,000 production fee.  (Mot. 7.)  Defendant disputes that Plaintiff performed its obligations or that Plaintiff was damaged in the amount stated in the application.  (Oppo. 8-10 and 12-16; see Guayo Decl. ¶¶ 4-11 and Stennis-Mixon Decl. ¶¶ 3-10.)

“In determining the probable validity of a claim where the defendant makes an appearance, the court must consider the relative merits of the positions of the respective parties and make a determination of the probable outcome of the litigation.”  (See Loeb & Loeb v. Beverly Glen Music, Inc. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 1110, 1120.)

On this record, Plaintiff does not sufficiently show its performance of the Agreement so that Defendant was obligated to pay the full $161,000 production fee.  While acknowledging “there were some issues” in the production, “such as failing to timely pay some cast and crew members and double paying a few contractors,” (see Mot. 7:8-15 and Hill Decl. ¶ 6), Plaintiff contends that it sufficiently performed its obligations because it “completed principal photography on the Project and provided the necessary production materials to [Defendant] to complete post-production.”  (Hill Decl. ¶ 9.)  However, Plaintiff agreed to perform “all production, post-production services and the delivery of all Project deliverables in accordance with the Buyer's delivery schedule.”  (Hill Decl. Exh. A § 1(a) [bold italics added].)  Defendant submits evidence that Plaintiff “abandoned the Project and never finished its work,” requiring Defendant to incur additional expenses to complete the Project.  (Gauyo Decl. ¶ 11.)  Plaintiff concedes that it did not complete the Project.  (Hill Decl. ¶ 9; McGarry Decl. ¶ 6.) 

Defendant also submits evidence that Plaintiff breached the Agreement by failing to timely pay its crew; that Plaintiff never provided the weekly cost reports required by section 2 of the Agreement, that Defendant needed to hire “certified public accountant, Gladys Stennis-Mixon, to help get the production accounting in order”; and Stennis-Mixon discovered certain financial irregularities in Plaintiff’s accounting records.  (Oppo. 8-10 and 12-16; see Guayo Decl. ¶¶ 4-11 and Stennis-Mixon Decl. ¶¶ 3-10.)  When combined with the evidence that Plaintiff abandoned the Project, this evidence supports a conclusion that Plaintiff was in “uncured, material breach” at the time of abandonment justifying the suspension of the $161,000 production fee.  Plaintiff has not provided any calculation of the amount of production fee that was incurred before it abandoned the Project.  Nor does Plaintiff provide evidence of the “cash flow schedule to be mutually approved by Company and Producer” for the payment of the production fee.  (Hill Decl. Exh. A, § 2(b).)  Thus, on this record, Plaintiff does not show a probably valid claim for any specific amount of the production fee.

Plaintiff seems to contend that it was excused from performance because Defendant failed to pay $538,616.26 in unreimbursed expenses.  (See McGarry Decl. ¶¶ 6-7.)  However, Plaintiff has not, on this record, shown the probable validity of this claim.  Plaintiff acknowledges that Defendant “has paid $1,620,000.00 of the production costs to date.”  (Hill Decl. ¶ 8; Mot. 6.)  Plaintiff contends that it “delivered a cost report with all payment records, accounting, and bank statement records for backup to [Defendant].”  (Hill Decl. ¶ 6.)  Plaintiff has not submitted any of this evidence in support of its application or provided a summary of this evidence.  Plaintiff’s representative, Jordan Hill, declares that “based on my calculations, the total amount [Defendant] owes is [Plaintiff] as of yesterday’s date is $550,129.24.”  (Id. ¶ 8.)  Hill does not explain how he made this calculation.  In opposition, Defendant also submits evidence that CPA Stennis-Mixon found financial irregularities in Plaintiff’s accounting records, including payment of “Whistle Sports employees who were not working on the Project with MJ Pictures’ funds for production of the Project” and double-billing of production costs.  (Stennis-Mixon Decl. ¶¶ 3-10.)  Given the conclusory nature of Plaintiff’s calculation of damages, and the testimony of Stennis-Mixon about financial irregularities in Plaintiff’s bookkeeping, and Plaintiff’s admissions that “there were financial irregularities” (Reply 7), the court finds that Plaintiff has not proven that Defendant failed to reimburse any specific amount of expenses.  Accordingly, Plaintiff does not prove it was excused from performance as a result of any alleged non-payment by Defendant.  Alternatively, even if Plaintiff had proven generally that Defendant failed to pay certain expenses, Plaintiff has not proven damages under the probably valid standard in any specific amount. 

In a reply declaration, Hill purports to authenticate “the accounting workbook I gave to Ms. Stennis-Mixon regarding all the production costs Whistle incurred regarding the SEND HELP project.”  (Reply Hill Decl. ¶ 2, Exh. B.)  Exhibit B is a set of emails, not accounting records.  Hill may have been referring to Exhibit A, which appears to be accounting records. 

This reply evidence is procedurally improper.  “The salutary rule is that points raised in a reply brief for the first time will not be considered unless good cause is shown for the failure to present them before.”  (Balboa Ins. Co. v. Aguirre (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 1002, 1010.)  Plaintiff does not show good cause to submit new evidence for the first time in reply to prove its damages.  This is Plaintiff’s second motion for attachment, the first one being filed August 26, 2022.  The accounting records should have been in Plaintiff’s possession and submitted into evidence with the motion if Plaintiff intended to rely on them to prove its damages.  Accordingly, the court does not consider the accounting records submitted as Exhibit A to the reply Hill declaration.  Even if considered, Hill provides no explanation for how these accounting records were prepared or how they support the calculation of damages provided in the motion. Substantial parts of the accounting records submitted as Exhibit A are also redacted, without explanation by Hill.  Thus, even if considered, Exhibit A to the reply Hill declaration does not prove probably valid damages in any specific amount. 

Plaintiff’s other reply arguments and evidence also do not show a probably valid claim.  Plaintiff states that it “provided the necessary production materials to MJ for it to complete post-production” and “[t]he proof lies in the fact that the series was premiered on AMC on August 11, 2022 on AMC’s ALLBLK streaming service.”  (Reply 7.)  However, Plaintiff does not persuasively address the evidence that it abandoned the Project, requiring Defendant to incur additional expenses to complete the Project.  (Gauyo Decl. ¶ 11.)  This evidence suggests that the premier on AMC was the result, in part, of work performed after Plaintiff stopped working on the Project.  Nor does Plaintiff explain its alleged performance in light of its contractual commitment to perform “all production, post-production services.”  (Hill Decl. Exh. A § 1(a) [bold italics added].)  With respect to the production fee, Plaintiff does not explain in reply the “cash flow schedule” upon which the parties agreed.  Even assuming partial performance, Plaintiff does not provide sufficient information for the court to determine how much of the production fee accrued before Plaintiff stopped working on the Project. 

Finally, Hill’s reply evidence concerning meetings on April 28, 2022 ,and May 3, 2022, with Defendant’s representatives does not prove damages in any specific amount.  (Reply Hill Decl. ¶¶ 3-4.)  Relatedly, Hill’s testimony that “MJ has never provided Whistle with an alternative to Whistle’s accounting” is not persuasive, as Plaintiff does not show that Defendant had a contractual obligation to provide an accounting.  (Id. ¶ 7.)

Having considered the relative merits of the parties’ positions, the court concludes that Plaintiff has not proven a probably valid contract claim against Defendant for any specific amount of damages. 

3.    Basis of Attachment

“[A]n attachment may be issued only in an action on a claim or claims for money, each of which is based upon a contract, express or implied, where the total amount of the claim or claims is a fixed or readily ascertainable amount not less than five hundred dollars ($500) exclusive of costs, interest, and attorney's fees.”  (CCP § 483.010(a).)  “An attachment may not be issued on a claim which is secured by any interest in real property arising from agreement ….”  (CCP § 483.010(b).) 

Here, Plaintiff’s application for writ of attachment is based on a contract where the total amount allegedly due is in excess of $500.  The contract claim is not secured by real property. 

Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s damages are not fixed and readily ascertainable.  (Oppo. 12-13.)  “It is a well-recognized rule of law in this state that an attachment will lie upon a cause of action for damages for a breach of contract where the damages are readily ascertainable by reference to the contract and the basis of the computation of damages appears to be reasonable and definite. [Citations.] The fact that the damages are unliquidated is not determinative. [Citations.] But the contract sued on must furnish a standard by which the amount due may be clearly ascertained and there must exist a basis upon which the damages can be determined by proof.’ ” (See CIT Group/Equipment Financing, Inc. v. Super DVD, Inc. (2004) 115 Cal.App. 4th 537, 541.)  

While it is possible that damages could be fixed and readily ascertainable by reference to the contract, Plaintiff has not provided any calculation of the amount of production fee that was incurred before it abandoned the Project.  The production fee was “payable on a cash flow schedule to be mutually approved by Company and Producer …. ”  (Hill Decl. Exh. A, § 2(b).)  Plaintiff acknowledges that Defendant has paid $1,620,000.00 to date and Plaintiff provided no persuasive evidence of how those payments were allocated.  (Hill Decl. ¶ 8; Mot. 6.) 

Plaintiff also does not show how it calculated that unpaid production costs of  $538,616.26.  Plaintiff “agree[d] that the Approved Budget includes all production costs, charges and all other fees, including without limitation, any and all third party fees and participations all payroll, taxes, guild/union payments, liability insurance bonding, clearance, legal and rights payments that relate to the Initial Cycle (collectively ‘Production Costs’).”  (Hill Decl. Exh. A at § 2(a).)   Plaintiff also agreed, that during the term of the contract, it would provide Defendant “with full access to Producer's books and records in connection with the Project, including cost reports on a weekly basis.”  (Id. § 1(e).)  Plaintiff also agreed to deliver to Defendant, upon completion of the project, “a verified final accounting report and final cost report, trial balance, and general ledger (together with all supporting documents, including, without limitation, receipts, invoices and contracts),” among other “bookkeeping records.”  (Ibid.)  The Agreement necessarily contemplated an accounting of Plaintiff’s production costs based on cost reports and other bookkeeping records. 

As discussed above, Plaintiff has not submitted into evidence, or meaningfully summarized, any of the cost reports or other supporting records upon which it bases its claim for damages.  (See Hill Decl. ¶ 6.)  Hill does not explain how he made the calculations set forth in his declaration and Exhibit B.  CPA Stennis-Mixon also found financial irregularities in Plaintiff’s accounting records, which further raises questions about Hill’s calculation of damages.  (Stennis-Mixon Decl. ¶¶ 3-10.) 

Plaintiff’s reply arguments are not persuasive.  (Reply 6-8.)  Plaintiff acknowledges that the Agreement contemplated an accounting of Plaintiff’s costs from books and records submitted to Defendant.  (Hill Decl. Exh. A at § 1(e).)  Plaintiff’s evidence about this accounting is conclusory and does not show readily ascertainable damages.

4.    Court’s Jurisdiction to Grant Pre-Judgment Writ of Attachment

 Defendant contends that the court lacks jurisdiction to issue a pre-judgment writ of attachment because “[t]he parties agreed in the Agreement to grant to the arbitrator the full power and authority provided to arbitrators under the JAMS rules, including over issues of interim relief.”  (Oppo. 11.)  Defendant cites JAMS Rule 24(e), which authorizes the arbitrator to grant “whatever interim measures are deemed necessary, including … for the protection or conservation of property….”  (Koo Decl. Exh. D.)

The court is not persuaded by Defendant’s jurisdictional argument in light of CCP section 1281.8(b), discussed below, which expressly authorizes a trial court in California to issue a pre-judgment writ of attachment even if the parties have an agreement to arbitrate.  Defendant cites no published appellate decision interpreting section 1281.8 and holding that a trial court lacks jurisdiction to grant provisional relief if the parties agreed to arbitration rules similar to JAMS Rule 24(e).  The federal decisions cited by Defendant are not binding on this court and, in any event, did not interpret section 1281.8.  “‘It is axiomatic that language in a judicial opinion is to be understood in accordance with the facts and issues before the court. An opinion is not authority for propositions not considered.’”  (People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 154-55.)

The court has jurisdiction over this attachment motion pursuant to CCP section 1281.8.  In light of this conclusion, the court need not reach Plaintiff’s reply argument that attachment is a form of equitable relief that falls within the scope of Section 15 of the Agreement.  (Reply 4.) 

5.    Arbitration Writ

CCP § 1281.8(b) states in pertinent part:

A party to an arbitration agreement may file in the court in the county in which an arbitration proceeding is pending, or if an arbitration proceeding has not commenced, in any proper court, an application for a provisional remedy in connection with an arbitrable controversy, but only upon the ground that the award to which the applicant may be entitled may be rendered ineffectual without provisional relief.   (emphasis added.)

The court cannot grant an attachment if this showing has not been made.  (See also California Retail Portfolio Fund GMBH & Co. KG v. Hopkins Real Estate Group (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 849, 856-857.)

In California Retail Portfolio Fund, supra at 857, the Court of Appeal held “the apparent insolvency of a party to an arbitration agreement, or other evidence showing that the party was experiencing severe financial difficulties, is sufficient to satisfy the ineffectual relief requirement.” The California Retail California Retail Portfolio Fund, court concluded there was sufficient evidence of insolvency where the defendant’s CFO wrote in an email that he was concerned about the defendant’s overall liquidity, that there was a risk of defaulting on certain notes, that income was down, that revenue was not covering overhead costs, and that assets would need to immediately be sold off. (Id. at 860.) The California Retail Portfolio Fund court reached this conclusion after relying on a federal case, China National Metal Products Import/Export Co. v. Apex Digital Inc. (C. D. Cal. 2001) 155 F.Supp.2d 1174, in which evidence of “the company's unwillingness to pay its debts, threats by its customers for claims of indemnification in the millions of dollars, and a statement from the company's president that the company was having financial difficulties, thus making it hard to meet its obligations,” was sufficient to satisfy the ineffectual relief requirement.

“The term ‘insolvency’ has two generally accepted definitions: (1) where there is an excess of liabilities over assets; and (2) where one is unable to meet his obligations as they mature in the ordinary course of business.”  (California Retail Portfolio Fund, supra at 859-860.)  “[T]he inability to pay damages is an alternative to insolvency” and can also satisfy section 1281.8.  (Id. at 862.) 

Plaintiff fails to submit evidence to satisfy the ineffectual relief requirement of section 1281.8.  Plaintiff states that Defendant was formed “solely for the development and production of the Project”; that “any capital acquired by MJ is attributed to the Project and the company itself is not financially independent outside of the funds provided by AMC”; and that “MJ is not in good standing with the Delaware Secretary of State’s office.”  (Mot. 9, citing Said Decl. Exh. A.)  The only evidence cited for these assertions is a printout from the Delaware Secretary of State’s website, which Plaintiff inaccurately refers to as an “Articles of Incorporation.”  This printout provides no evidence that Defendant was formed solely for production of the Project; that it lacks financial resources to pay any judgment to Plaintiff; or that it is not in good standing with the Delaware Secretary of State.  (See also Oppo. 17 and Koo Decl. ¶ 5, Exh. C [noting that all entity search reports from Delaware Division of Corporations website state: "THIS IS NOT A STATEMENT OF GOOD STANDING."].)  Plaintiff cites no other evidence to support its position. 

Plaintiff next contends that “the Agreement emphasized that any costs incurred by Whistle will be reimbursed within seven days of MJ receiving funds from AMC” and, therefore, suggested that Defendant “was experiencing liquidity issues at the outset of the relationship.”  (Mot. 9.)  This argument is speculative, lacks evidentiary support, and does not prove that Defendant is insolvent or otherwise unable to pay any judgment obtained by Plaintiff.

Plaintiff contends that Defendant missed two payments under the Agreement and “it is apparent that MJ did not have enough funds to pay its debts.”  (Mot. 9-10.)  However, as discussed, Defendant disputes that it missed payments and Plaintiff does not prove its contract claim under the probable validity standard.  Also, California Retail Portfolio Fund does not stand for the proposition that a contractual dispute concerning missed payments, in itself, establishes that a defendant is insolvent or that an arbitration award will be rendered ineffectual without provisional relief. 

Finally, Plaintiff contends that it “has reason to believe that MJ received all of its milestone funding from AMC pursuant to the Exclusive Production Financing and Distribution Agreement and Option on October 15, 2021” and “[t]here is a higher chance that the funds are still available now than that they will be available after Whistle secures an arbitration award.”  (Mot. 10, citing Said Decl. Exh. B.)  Plaintiff does not explain how Exhibit B to the Said declaration supports this assertion.  In any event, even if true, this assertion contradicts Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant is presently insolvent.

Plaintiff does not satisfy the ineffectual relief requirement of section 1281.8.  For that additional reason, the application is denied.

6.    Purpose and Amount of Attachment

Code of Civil Procedure section 484.090 states that the Court shall issue a right to attach order if “the attachment is not sought for a purpose other than the recovery on the claim upon which the attachment is based . . . [and] the amount to be secured by the attachment is greater than zero.”

Plaintiff seeks to attach an amount that is greater than zero.  However, Plaintiff has not submitted a declaration or verified application stating that attachment is not sought for a purpose other than the recovery on Plaintiff’s claim, as required by CCP section 484.020(c). 

7.    Subject Property

Plaintiff has not filed an application specifying the property that it seeks to attach, as required by CCP section 484.020(e).  For that additional reason, the application is denied.

Conclusion

The application is DENIED.