Judge: Mary H. Strobel, Case: 22STCV30789, Date: 2022-12-15 Tentative Ruling
Hon. Mary H. Strobel
The clerk for Department 82 may be reached at (213) 893-0530.
Case Number: 22STCV30789 Hearing Date: December 15, 2022 Dept: 82
Shana Levin, et al., v. Marci Clapkin Weiser, et al. |
Judge Mary
Strobel Hearing: December
15, 2022 |
22STCV30789 and Related
Cases |
Tentative
Decision on Motion to Appoint Receiver and for Preliminary Injunction |
|
|
Plaintiffs Shana Levin and Tamara Levin,
individually and as Trustees of The Michael Arnold Levin Irrevocable Trust,
Dated February 13, 2007 (“Plaintiffs”) move for appointment of a receiver over
nominal defendant JosLevin Realty Corp. of L.A. (“JosLevin” or “JLR”). Defendants Andrew Clapkin, Dina Marshall, and
Marci Clapkin Weiser (“Defendants”) oppose the motion.[1] Through different attorneys, JosLevin has both
joined the motion and opposed it.
Judicial Notice
Plaintiffs’ Reply Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”) A-C – Granted.
Plaintiffs’ Objection to Opposition
Filed by Valensi Rose PLC On Behalf of JosLevin
Plaintiffs’ objection to the opposition brief filed by Valensi Rose PLC
is OVERRULED. Valensi Rose’s ex parte
application to affirm itself as counsel was denied by Judge Teresa Beaudet on
December 2, 2022, without prejudice to the filing of a regularly noticed
motion. At the ex parte hearing, Judge Beaudet stated that she intended
to hear the issues on which firm should represent JosLevin as a noticed motion,
and that everyone who believed they should file a response to Plaintiffs'
motion to appoint a receiver should file their papers. (Reply Cohen Decl. Exh. A.) Considering
that ruling and also this court’s limited assignment over receivership matters,
the court does not rule upon the dispute as to legal representation of JosLevin
for this receivership motion. For this
motion, the court will consider the legal briefs filed by both Polsinelli LLP
and also Valensi Rose PLC.
Defendants’ Evidentiary Objections to
Declarations of Shana Levin, Noel Cohen, and Ann Lee
Levin Declaration
10, 11, 15, 22, 28, 39, 61, 66: Sustained
48: Sustained as to “I learned
from Mr. Miranda that the authorized signers on JLR’s account were now Andrew,
Manuel Castillo and Guy Marshall. I also learned that on August 8, 2022, the
$250,000 in funds I placed in a business CD had been withdrawn and JLR’s account
had been closed.” Overruled as to remainder.
49: Sustained as to: “After
further communications with FCB, I learned that from Mr. Grossi, that JLR’s
funds were withdrawn by Andrew, Dina and/or Marci in the form of a cashier’s
check in the sum of $249,000, on August 9, 2022.” Overruled as to remainder.
62: Sustained
as to “on or about August 8, 2022, I spoke to Ms. Guillen and she confirmed
that Marci and Dina were the ‘two women’ that came into PPB to attempt to
change the signers on the JLR account.”
Overruled as to remainder.
Remaining
objections: Overruled.
Cohen
Declaration
(70)-(78) Overruled.
Lee
Declaration
(79)-(85) Overruled.
Background and Procedural History
JosLevin’s Business and Ownership
Formed in 1959, JosLevin
is a family owned corporation that owns nine
separate parcels of industrial and commercial real property located in
Huntington Park, California, none of which is mortgaged. JosLevin leases the property to approximately
17 tenants. JosLevin has cash, some of
which includes tenants’ security deposits, of about $1,000,000. JosLevin earned gross revenues of
approximately $870,000 in 2021. (Shana
Levin Decl. (“Levin Decl.”) ¶¶ 7-8; see also Andrew Clapkin Decl. ¶¶ 13-14.)
Plaintiffs Shana and Tamara Levin
each own 3.7% shares in JosLevin. In 2022,
they also inherited the 37% shares of Michael Levin, their father, which are
held in trust. Accordingly, Plaintiffs effectively
control 44.4% shares in JosLevin. (Levin
Decl. ¶ 12, Exh. 2; Andrew Clapkin Decl. ¶¶ 5-6.)
Sheila Clapkin, Plaintiffs’ aunt,
owns 37% of the shares of JosLevin. Her
five children – Andrew Clapkin, Marci Clapkin Weiser, Dina Marshall, Karen
Callan and Sheri Clapkin – each own 3.7% shares in JosLevin. (Levin Decl. ¶ 12.) Defendants submit evidence that Sheila
Clapkin’s 37% shares are held by the Irwin Babbitt Clapkin and Sheila Clapkin
Grantor Trust, of which Sheila’s five children are all co-trustees. (Andrew Clapkin Decl. ¶ 3.) Defendants submit evidence that “the trust
instrument provides that three of the five co-Trustees have authority and power
to vote the Irwin/Sheila Trust’s shares in Joslevin.” (Id. ¶ 3.)
Plaintiffs represent, and Defendants do not dispute, that non-party
Karen Callan has aligned with Defendants such that Sheila Clapkin, Defendants,
and Karen Callan as a group (hereafter the “Clapkins”) control a majority of
the shares (51.8%). (Mot. 2:18-21.)
JosLevin is an S-corporation that
elects to pass income, losses, deductions, and credits through to their
shareholders. (Id. ¶ 13.)
The Clapkins
Managed JosLevin from 2008-February 2022
From
about 2008 to February 2022, the Clapkins were elected directors and officers
of JosLevin and made all financial decisions for the company. (Levin Decl. ¶¶ 14-27.) During this time, the company paid
“consultant fees” to shareholders. (Id.
¶ 15.) Some of the Clapkins and their
spouses also worked as employees for JosLevin.
(Id. ¶¶ 14-21; Guy Marshall Decl. ¶ 7 [property management and other
services]; Andrew Clapkin Decl. ¶¶ 7-14 [summarizing Clapkins’ management of
the company].)
Plaintiff
Shana Levin declares that, under Clapkins’ management, the consultant fees were
not proportionate to the shareholders’ ownership interests. (Levin Decl. ¶¶ 15-17.) She also asserts that Sheila Clapkin’s
husband, Irwin Clapkin; (2) Andrew Clapkin; (3) Dina Marshall’s husband, Guy
Marshall; and (4) Andrew Clapkin’s husband, Manual Castillo all earned salaries
for working for JosLevin that exceeded the market rates for managing real
property and, in some cases, used company credit cards to pay for personal
expenses such as iPhones, Apple watches, and meals. (Id. ¶¶ 37-41.)
Defendants
dispute these contentions. They contend
that it was company policy for JosLevin to buy iPhones and employee vehicles for
employees and directors, and that they used the company credit cards to pay for
business-related expenses. (Guy Marshall
Decl. ¶ 8; Andrew Clapkin Decl. ¶¶ 39-45.)
They contend that employee payroll was $148,648 in 2021. (Andrew Clapkin Decl. ¶ 14.) Defendant Andrew Clapkin declares that “[a]ll
shareholders were consultants, and total consultant fees were $100,000.” (Ibid.)
“The amount of the consultants’ fees was never tied to the amount of
shares held by a particular shareholder because the consultants’ fees were
never intended to be a benefit of share ownership. Rather, they were intended
to compensate the consultants for providing Joslevin with their ideas for
growing and improving the company. Each grandchild, whether on the Clapkin side
of the family or the Levin side of the family, received the exact same
consultants’ fee. From time to time over the years, the Board would vote to
increase the monthly consultant fees. In those instances, each 3.7% shareholder
would receive the same increase, and so would Sheila and Michael (whose
consultants’ fees were higher than those of the grandchildren).” (Id. ¶ 38.)
Defendants
submit evidence that Plaintiffs did not attend any shareholder’s meetings from
2012 until February 2022, when their father, Michael Levin, died and gave his
shares to Plaintiffs. (Id. ¶¶ 5-6, 21.)
Dividends
Related to Michael Levin’s Hospice Care
In 2021 and early 2022, JosLevin’s
Board of Directors voted to issue dividends to shareholders at the request of
Plaintiff Tamara Levin to help pay for Michael Levin’s hospice care and
medical-related financial needs. Defendants
submit evidence that these dividends totaled more than $160,000. (Andrew Clapkin Decl. ¶¶ 22-25.) Plaintiffs acknowledge that the dividends
were issued but contend that the dividends should have been higher. Plaintiff Shana Levin states that “at the end
of my father’s life, the Clapkins paid him approximately $10,000 a month in
dividends, which not only fell short of the $20,000 a month he needed to pay
for his cost of care, but also far less than what my father should have
received from JLR” given his large shareholder interest. (Levin Decl. ¶ 21; Mot. 3-4.)
Marci
Clapkin Weiser’s Letter to Then-President Andrew Clapkin
In addition to serving as a
managerial employee, Andrew Clapkin served as a Board member from February 2006
to February 8, 2022, and as President of JosLevin from February 2019 to
February 8, 2022. (Andrew Clapkin Decl.
¶¶ 11-12.) In September 2021, Defendant
Marci Clapkin Weiser sent a letter about mismanagement to her brother, Andrew
Clapkin, who was then-President of JosLevin. In particular, Marci questioned
whether Andrew’s husband, Manuel Castillo, performed any services for
JosLevin. Marci also questioned why
Sheila Clapkin was on the board when she lacked mental capacity. (Levin Decl. ¶¶ 23-25, Exh. 3.) Marci submitted a declaration in opposition
to this motion in which she claims Shana has taken the letter out of context,
and that she never believed Andrew engaged in self-dealing with respect to the
employment of Manuel or the placement of Sheila on the board.
Shana Levin
is Elected President/CEO in February 2022; and Board Makes Management Changes
JosLevin held its annual
shareholder’s meeting on February 8, 2022.
At that meeting, Dina Marshall, Marci Weiser, and Shana Levin were
elected to the three-person Board of Directors.
Shana Levin was elected president, chief executive officer, and treasurer. Multiple other officers were appointed,
including Sheri Clapkin as secretary. (Levin Decl. ¶ 27; Andrew Clapkin Decl.
¶¶ 29-30 and Exh. 13.)
The new Board of Directors made
several significant changes to the management of JosLevin. Among others, the Board hired a professional
property management firm, MGMT Group, to manage the company’s real property; fired
JosLevin’s three employees (Andrew, Manuel Castillo, and Guy Marshall); and
hired outside counsel Jason Stone to advise Board on corporate governance and
employment matters. Board member Dina
Marshall voted against several of these changes. JosLevin also hired bookkeeper Ronda
Burke. (Levin Decl. ¶¶ 27-35, Exh. 5-6;
Clapkin Decl. ¶ 30, Exh. 13.)
May 2022
Special Board Meeting
Plaintiff Shana Levin declares that
she requested that Board members Marci Weiser and Dina Marshall attended a
Board meeting on May 20, 2022, but “they refused.” (Levin Decl. ¶ 42.) Defendants contend that it was Shana that
refused to call a Board meeting on May 20, 2022. (See Weiser Decl. ¶ 18.) Defendants assert that Marci and Dina “called
and duly noticed a special meeting of the Board for May 20, 2022 at 4:30 p.m.
to be held by Zoom.” (Id. ¶ 19.) Shana did not attend that meeting. Minutes from that special meeting state Marci
and Dina constituted a quorum of the Board.
The minutes state that, among other matters, Marci and Dina voted to
remove several officers, including secretary Sheri Clapkin; to appoint Andrew
Clapkin as secretary; to fire attorney Jason Stone and bookkeeper Rhonda Burke;
and to “stop all investigations against previous management and
employees.” (Levin Decl. ¶¶ 42-43, Exh.
7.)
June 2,
2022, July 29, 2022, and October 26, 2022, Special Board Meetings
Marci and Dina assert that they
noticed and called special meetings of the Board for June 2, July 29, and
October 26, 2022. Marci and Dina assert
that Shana refused to attend these meetings, while Shana states that Marci and
Dina refused her reasonable requests to reschedule the meetings at times she
could attend. Shana does not explain why
she could not attend the meetings at the scheduled times. Nor does she develop an argument that the
meetings were improperly noticed or lacked a quorum. Minutes from the June 2 and July 29 meetings
state that quorums were present and Marci and Dina voted to remove Shana as
President, CEO, and Treasurer of JosLevin, and to “delegate” those functions to
other persons. (See Levin Decl. ¶¶
44-45, Exh. 8; Dina Marshall Decl. ¶¶ 5-10, Exh. 18-19, 22-23; Weiser Decl. ¶
23.)
Marci submits a declaration
explaining that, while she voted to appoint Shana as President and CEO in
February 2022, she disapproved of Shana’s management of the company for various
reasons and thus voted for her removal from management positions in subsequent
Board meetings. (Weiser Decl. ¶¶ 5-9,
14-17.)
As discussed below, Defendants also
submit evidence that Shana has refused to recognize the Board’s actions
starting from the May 20, 2022, Board meeting, including Shana’s purported
removal from the positions of President, CEO, and Treasurer of JosLevin. (See e.g. Dina Marshall Decl. ¶¶ 12-32.)
Plaintiffs’
Allegations of Looting
Plaintiffs allege that, starting in
August 2022, the Clapkins “looted or attempted to loot” JosLevin’s bank
accounts for their personal benefit.
(Mot. 6-7.) Those allegations are
discussed in detail infra.
Plaintiffs’
Lawsuit
On
November 10, 2022, the court (Judge Strobel) granted Plaintiffs’ ex parte
application for leave to file a first amended motion to appoint receiver and
for preliminary injunction. The court
set a hearing on the motion to appoint receiver for December 15, 2022, and set
a briefing schedule. Any opposition was
due December 2, 2022, and any reply by December 8, 2022.
On
November 14, 2022, Plaintiffs filed the operative first amended complaint for
derivative claims for conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, and to invalidate
interested director transactions; and direct claims for removal of directors
and accounting. On November, 22, 2022,
Polsinelli LLP filed an answer for JosLevin.
On
November 21, 2022, Plaintiffs filed their amened motion to appoint receiver and
supporting papers. On November 22, 2022,
Polsinelli LLP filed a joinder in the motion on behalf of JosLevin. On December 5, 2022, Defendants filed an
opposition, and Valensi Rose, PLC filed an opposition on behalf of JosLevin.[2] On December 8, 2022, Plaintiffs filed a
reply, and Polsinelli LLP filed a reply on behalf of JosLevin.
On
December 12, 2022, Valensi Rose PLC filed a response to objections and a
sur-reply on behalf of JosLevin. The
court has considered the response to objections, but not the sur-reply. The sur-reply was not authorized by this
court. JosLevin’s objection to the
sur-reply, filed by Polsinelli LLP on December 13, is sustained.
On
December 14, 2022, at approximately 5:49 pm the day before the hearing,
Defendants filed supplemental declarations of Andrew Clapkin and Dina Marshall
and a supplemental appendix of evidence.
Defendants did not request, and the court did not grant leave to file
this supplemental evidence. The court
disregards these declarations and exhibits.
Fire
Destroys Building at 5830 Soto St.
On November 22, 2022, one day after
Plaintiffs filed this motion, a fire destroyed JosLevin’s building located at
5830 Soto St., Los Angeles, one of JosLevin’s “most valuable assets.” The cause of the fire is still under
investigation. An incident report of the
Los Angeles County Fire Department states “arson investigators at scene” and
the matter is “under investigation.” (Andrew
Clapkin Decl. ¶ 50; Suppl. Levin Decl. ¶¶ 3-5, 15 and Exh. 35.)
Shareholder Vote to Dissolve JosLevin
Defendants submit
evidence that, on November 30, 2022, a majority of JosLevin’s shareholders
elected to voluntarily wind up and dissolve JosLevin. On
November 30, 2022, a Certificate of Election to Wind Up and Dissolve Joslevin
("Certificate") was submitted for filing with the California
Secretary of State. Defendants submit
evidence that a Notice of Commencement of Voluntary Dissolution of Joslevin
Realty Corp. of L.A. was then mailed to all shareholders of Joslevin and all
currently known creditors and tenants of Joslevin. (Andrew Clapkin Decl. ¶¶ 50,
53-56, Exh. 28, 30, 31; see also Weiser Decl. ¶ 25; Dina Marshall Decl. ¶ 33.)
Defendants File Petition for Judicial Supervision of Winding Up of
JosLevin
On November 30, 2022,
Defendants, as trustees of three different trusts, filed a petition for
supervision of voluntary winding up of JosLevin, including appointment of
Stephen J. Donnell as receiver to conduct winding up. The petition has been assigned to Department
82, Judge Mary Strobel. (RJN Exh. A; see
Case No. 22STCP04239.)
Other Pending Lawsuits
Several other lawsuits
are pending between the parties and have been related before Department 50,
Judge Teresa Beaudet. Where relevant,
these other lawsuits are discussed infra. (See Mot. 7-8.)
Summary of Applicable Law
Plaintiffs move for appointment of a receiver
pursuant to CCP section 564(b)(1) and (9), which provides in relevant part:
“(b) A
receiver may be appointed by the court in which an action or proceeding is
pending … in the following cases:
(1) In an
action … between partners or others jointly owning or interested in any
property or fund, on the application of the plaintiff, or of any party whose
right to or interest in the property or fund, or the proceeds thereof, is
probable, and where it is shown that the property or fund is in danger of being
lost, removed, or materially injured.
[¶¶]
(9) in all
other cases where necessary to preserve the property or rights of any party.”
“In this state a receiver may be appointed only as
permitted by Code of Civil Procedure section 564.” (Barclays Bank of California v. Sup.Ct. (1977)
69 Cal.App.3d 593, 597.)
Appointment
of a receiver is a drastic provisional remedy that the court should only grant
when facts are presented by admissible evidence that clearly establish a
receiver is necessary to protect the property and maintain the status quo. (Barclays,
supra, 69 Cal. App. 3d at 597; City
and County of San Francisco v. Daley (1993) 16 Cal.App. 4th 734,
744). The appointment of a receiver is
an equitable remedy and should be used only when necessary and where other
legal remedies are unavailable. (Rogers v. Smith (1946) 76 Cal.App.2d 16,
21.)
“The
court may appoint a receiver in a stockholder's suit if the directors and
majority of the stockholders are so managing or disposing of its business or
assets in their own interest that they will probably be lost or destroyed
before a decree can be rendered, or where there are such dissensions within the
corporation that its business cannot be honestly or properly managed, or
if for any other reason it clearly appears to the court that the appointment of
a receiver pending the suit is necessary to preserve the assets of the
corporation, and protect the rights of the complaining stockholders.” (Misita v. Distillers Corp. (1942) 54
Cal.App.2d 244, 250-251.)
However,
“[a]ppointment of a receiver may well result in serious injury to the name and
good will of a solvent, going concern, and that if there is any other
adequate remedy, which is less severe and which will protect the rights of the
parties, a court should not take the drastic step of appointing a
receiver.” (In re Jamison Steel Corp. (1958) 158 Cal.App.2d 27, 36.) “Ordinarily, if there is any other remedy,
less severe in its results, which will adequately protect the rights of the
parties, a court should not take property out of the hands of its owners.” (Golden State
Glass Corp. v. Sup. Ct. (1939) 13 Cal.2d 384, 393.)
Analysis
As holders of shares in
JosLevin, Plaintiffs have a probable interest in the corporation and have
standing to seek appointment of a receivership pursuant to section 564(b)(1)
and (9). The issue is whether Plaintiffs
have shown that JosLevin is in danger of being lost, removed, or materially
injured or that a receiver is otherwise necessary to protect Plaintiffs’
property rights in JosLevin.
Scope of Receivership and Related
Issues
The court first
discusses several issues related to the scope of receivership sought by
Plaintiffs and also Defendants’ petition for supervision of voluntary winding up of
JosLevin.
While Plaintiffs move
for appointment of a “limited purpose receiver,” the scope of receivership
proposed by Plaintiffs is broad. According
to their four-page proposed order, Plaintiffs seek a receivership that would
take possession and control of all of JosLevin’s cash, stocks, and financial
assets; oversee Board meetings and “determine whether a director can vote or
must abstain from voting”; review all corporate records and “undertake an
accounting of JLR and prepare a report and recommendations regarding the
Receiver’s findings”; oversee property manager MGMT Group; employ and terminate
employees; hire lawyers and other professionals; and “institute any court
proceedings in this State or other States as is necessary involving JLR,” among
other duties. (Mot. 1-5.) Plaintiffs also seek a preliminary injunction
that would enjoin the Clapkins from, among other things, “[c]alling, noticing or holding regular
or special board of directors or shareholder meetings” or “[c]ommencing,
prosecuting, continuing or enforcing any suit or proceeding in the name of JLR.” (Mot. 6-7.)
Given
the scope of receivership requested by Plaintiffs, the court rejects
Plaintiffs’ argument that “the parties all agree a receiver is necessary.” (Reply 1.)
Plaintiffs seek a broad receivership to manage JosLevin, including its
financial assets, litigation, and property business. In contrast, Defendants seek a receiver to
wind up JosLevin, a purpose not remotely similar to the one proposed by
Plaintiffs. (See RJN Exh. A.) The parties are not in agreement on the scope
of any receivership. The court decides
on this motion only whether Plaintiffs are entitled to the receivership
requested in their motion, not whether to appoint a receiver to wind up
JosLevin.
Defendants
contend that Plaintiffs’ motion to appoint a receiver is moot because JosLevin
shareholders have elected to voluntarily wind up the corporation. (Oppo. 6-7.)
“A case is considered moot when ‘the question addressed was at one time
a live issue in the case,’ but has been deprived of life ‘because of events
occurring after the judicial process was initiated.’” (Wilson & Wilson v. City Council of
Redwood City (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1559, 1574.) In reply, Plaintiffs state the election to
wind up JosLevin was “invalid” and that they “will be challenging it.” (Reply 7.)
An election to voluntarily wind up a corporation requires a “vote of
shareholders holding shares representing 50 percent or more of the voting
power.” (Corp. Code § 1900(a).) Plaintiffs appear to contend that the 37%
shares of Sheila Clapkin were not properly voted by the co-trustees and,
therefore, at least 50% of the shares did not vote for the election. The court does not decide that fact-intensive
issue for this motion to appoint receiver.
Defendants’ petition for supervision of voluntary winding up of
JosLevin has not yet been set for hearing.
(RJN Exh. A; see Case No. 22STCP04239.)
Accordingly, because Plaintiffs challenge the election to wind up
JosLevin, Defendants do not show that the instant motion to appoint a receiver
is moot.
However, Defendants are correct that the
shareholders’ purported election to wind up JosLevin changes the status quo and
weighs against appointing the broad receivership sought by Plaintiffs at this
time. “When a voluntary proceeding for
winding up has commenced, the corporation shall cease to carry on business
except to the extent necessary for the beneficial winding up thereof and except
during such period as the board may deem necessary to preserve the
corporation's goodwill or going-concern value pending a sale of its business or
assets, or both, in whole or in part.”
(Corp. Code § 1903(c).) While a
receiver could be appointed to help wind up the company, Plaintiffs do not seek
a receiver for that purpose. Unless
Plaintiffs can show in the petition for dissolution that the election was not
voted on by at least 50% of the shareholders, it could be counterproductive and
inefficient to appoint a receiver for the broad purposes sought by
Plaintiffs.
In reply, Plaintiffs contend that the election to
dissolve JosLevin is a “ruse” and the shareholders could revoke the consent
upon defeating this motion. (Reply
7-8.) While revocation of the election
is possible (see Corp Code § 1902(b) [discussing revocation of election],) the
argument seems speculative given the discord with Plaintiffs over management of
the corporation and the steps JosLevin has taken to commence dissolution
proceedings. On this record, the court
has insufficient basis to view the election to dissolve as a ruse.
While the election to wind up and dissolve JosLevin
weighs against appointment of the receivership sought by Plaintiffs at this
time, the court denies the motion for additional reasons discussed below.
Are JosLevin’s Assets in Danger of Being Lost,
Removed, or Materially Injured?
To justify a receivership under section
564(b)(1), Plaintiffs must show that JosLevin’s assets are “in danger of being
lost, removed, or materially injured.” Plaintiffs make two primary arguments to prove
this requirement: (1) that a receivership is necessary to protect JosLevin’s
cash and property from Defendants’ looting; and (2) a receiver is necessary to
oversee Board meetings and functions.
Plaintiffs’
Allegations of Looting
JosLevin owns nine separate parcels of industrial and
commercial real property located in Huntington Park, California, none of which is
mortgaged. JosLevin has cash, some of
which includes tenants’ security deposits, of about $1,000,000. JosLevin earned gross revenues of
approximately $870,000 in 2021. Shana
Levin represents that JosLevin’s rents are projected to total $930,000 this
year. (Levin Decl. ¶¶ 7-8; Andrew
Clapkin Decl. ¶¶ 13-14.) Defendants
submit evidence that employee payroll was $148,648 in 2021. (Andrew Clapkin Decl. ¶ 14.) Plaintiffs state that the operational costs
of new property manager MGMT are approximately $55,000 a year, well below
revenues. (Levin Decl. ¶ 30.) Thus, JosLevin is a profitable company. Plaintiffs do not submit any evidence that
JosLevin is at risk of bankruptcy or losing assets to creditors as a result of
debt or mismanagement. Defendants also
submit evidence that JosLevin has been operated as a viable business for many years,
has no mortgages on its properties, and could be expected to continue to earn
substantial revenues from its property business under present circumstances. (See generally Andrew Clapkin Decl.; Dina
Marshall Decl.; and Marci Clapkin Decl.)
However, it is not necessary for Plaintiffs to
establish that JosLevin is insolvent or unprofitable to obtain a receivership
over the corporation. “Official breaches of trust, mismanagement and waste, are
generally regarded as grounds, according to usages of equity, for a
receivership to protect rights.” (Misita v. Distillers Corp. (1942) 54
Cal.App.2d 244, 250-251.)
Plaintiffs contend that “[a]bsent a receiver,
there is a substantial risk that the Clapkins, who have for years deprived the
Levins of their fair share of the profits and now refuse to recognize Shana as
the duly elected President/CEO and Treasurer/CFO, will dissipate JLR’s cash
before the Court can determine the parties’ rights and claims in this
derivative action.” (Mot. 10.) Plaintiffs do not sufficiently support this
argument.
Plaintiffs’
allegations that Defendants improperly paid salaries, consultant fees, or other
benefits to family members in the past, or failed to declare dividends in the
past, do not justify appointment of a receiver. Defendants
dispute these allegations. While Plaintiffs
could reasonably disagree with decisions of past management, including the
hiring of family members as employees, the evidence for this motion, on the
whole, does not show a past pattern or history of Defendants’ “looting” the
company for their personal benefits. (See
generally Andrew Clapkin Decl. ¶¶ 11-46; see also Guy Marshall Decl.) Significantly, Plaintiffs did not attend any shareholder’s
meetings from 2012 until 2022, and they apparently did not previously file
derivative actions for alleged looting or mismanagement. (Id.
¶¶ 5-6, 21.) On this record, Plaintiffs
do not show that JosLevin as an entity was materially harmed by the prior
management’s practice of employing certain family members or paying “consultant
fees.” In any event, these actions of prior
management do not present any present risk of harm to JosLevin.
Plaintiffs
submit evidence that, starting in August 2022, the Clapkins sought to take
control of certain financial assets of JosLevin. These alleged actions occurred after a
majority of the Board (Marci and Dina) voted to remove Shana Levin as
President, CEO, and Treasurer in June and July 2022. (Oppo. Exh. 19, 23.)
Specifically,
on or about August 9, 2022, Marci and Dina closed a $250,000 CD held by
JosLevin at First Citizens Bank. (Levin
Decl. ¶¶ 55-58; Dina Marshall Decl. ¶ 27.)
Defendants submit evidence, which Plaintiffs do not rebut in reply, that
the “funds were transferred to a new FDIC-insured account held in the name of
Joslevin” and “[t]he only authorized signers on that account are Marci and I,
both of whom are officers (President/Vice-President and Treasurer,
respectively) and directors comprising the majority of the Board.” (Dina Marshall Decl. ¶ 28.) Dina also explains that she and Marci took
this step “out of concern that Joslevin’s business operations would be
negatively impacted if any more of its accounts were frozen or emptied of their
funds by Shana.” (Id. ¶ 27.)
Plaintiffs
submit evidence that Andrew Clapkin is the authorized signer on JosLevin’s
Merrill Lynch brokerage account, which holds approximately $314,000. (Levin Decl. ¶¶ 59-62, Exh. 16.) Plaintiffs contend that he has wrongfully
“refused to transfer control of this account to Shana who is the duly elected
Treasurer.” (Mot. 7.) Andrew Clapkin declares that he “never
received a request from Merrill Edge (or Shana) to transfer my signing
authority over Joslevin’s Merrill Edge brokerage account to Shana.” (Andrew
Clapkin Decl. ¶ 47.) He points out that
the Board purported to remove Shana as treasurer on July 29, 2022, as discussed
further below. He also declares that he
“never used any of Joslevin’s funds for my own personal benefit” and “[a]ll of
the funds once held in the First Citizens Bank and Merrill Edge accounts are
now being safely held in accounts owned by Joslevin, not by me
personally.” (Id. ¶ 48.) Dina Marshall similarly declares that the
Clapkins “moved the assets held in the Merrill Edge account to another account
held in Joslevin’s name at a different financial institution on October 5,
2022. The only authorized signers on that account are me and Marci.” (Dina Marshall Decl. ¶ 30.) She further declares: “I have never used any
of Joslevin’s funds for my own personal benefit. All of the funds once held in
the First Citizens Bank and Merrill Edge accounts are now being safely held in
accounts owned by Joslevin, not by me personally. Those funds were moved to new
accounts solely to protect those funds from the unlawful and improper actions
by Shana.” (Id. ¶ 32.)
Also
during this time period of August 2022, and in the midst of the alleged removal
of Shana Levin as CEO, President, and Treasurer, the Clapkins sought to
withdraw funds or change the authorized signers for JosLevin’s accounts with
Bank of America, Bank of Hope, and Pacific Premier Bank. (Mot. 7; Levin Decl. ¶¶ 63-79.) In part due to efforts of Shana Levin, the
Clapkins were not able to withdraw funds from these accounts. (Ibid.)
The Bank of America account remains active and Shana Levin is the
authorized signer. (Levin Decl. ¶¶ 63-69.) The Bank of Hope account, which has a
$240,000 balance, has been frozen as a result of the dispute over control
between factions of JosLevin shareholders.
(Levin Decl. ¶¶ 70-71; Dina Marshall Decl. ¶¶ 18-21.) The account at Pacific Premier Bank was
closed and Shana Levin withdrew all funds from that account. Shana Levin declares that $250,016.95 of the
funds were deposited with MGMT Group to pay for JosLevin’s operational costs.
Another $64,294.13 was transferred to the JosLevin Bank of America
account. (Levin Decl. ¶ 79.) Defendants contend that Shana Levin’s
withdrawal of funds from Pacific Premier Bank was unauthorized because she had
been removed as treasurer prior to that time.
(See Dina Marshall Decl. ¶¶ 14-17.)
In
the motion, Plaintiffs characterize the Clapkins’ actions as “looting” and “bad
faith” efforts to take control of JosLevin’s financial assets. Plaintiffs assert that the Clapkins
wrongfully removed $250,000 from First Citizens Bank and attempted to take
other assets “for their personal use and benefit.” (Mot. 10.)
The court finds insufficient evidence of “looting” or that the Clapkins
took the $250,000 from First Citizens Bank for their personal use and
benefit.
As
summarized above, the undisputed evidence shows that Marci and Dina withdrew
the $250,000 from First Citizens Bank in early August 2022, shortly after they
voted to remove Shan Levin from her positions as CEO, President, and Treasurer
on July 29, 2022. Defendants submit
evidence, which Plaintiffs have not rebutted, that the financial assets
controlled by Defendants are being held in the name of JosLevin and are not
being used for personal benefit of the Clapkins. (Dina Marshall Decl. ¶¶ 30-32; Andrew Clapkin
Decl. ¶¶ 47-48.) The minutes for the
July 29, 2022, Board meeting corroborate this evidence, and state as follows:
“The board of directors discussed Shana Levin's position as Treasurer, and her
failure to cooperate with the board to provide access to bank accounts, by
refusing to update the board with recent bank account statements, by refusing
to answer questions about unusual money contributions to the property
management company…. Marci Weiser made a motion to remove Shana Levin as
Treasurer of the Joslevin Realty Corp. of L.A., Dina Marshall seconded the
motion…. Marci Weiser made a motion to nominate Dina Marshall as Treasurer of
the Joslevin Realty Corp. of L.A., Dina Marshall seconded the motion. Official
Vote: Marci Weiser - Yes; Dina Marshall - Yes; Shana Levin - Absent. The motion
passed and Dina Marshall is Treasurer of the Joslevin Realty Corp. of L.A.” (Oppo. Exh. 23.) Weighing the evidence, the court finds that
Plaintiffs do not prove that Defendants’ withdrawal of funds from First
Citizens Bank was “looting” or a bad faith attempt to use JosLevin funds for
their personal benefits.
For
all other financial accounts, Plaintiffs do not show any present risk of danger
to JosLevin’s financial assets. The
Merrill Edge account is held in JosLevin’s name and Plaintiffs do not submit
evidence of any withdrawals or that Defendants have taken action to use funds
from that account for their personal benefit.
Shana Levin controls the Bank of America account and withdrew the funds
from Pacific Premier Bank. The $240,000
in the Bank of Hope account has been frozen and is held in the name of JosLevin.
Plaintiffs
argue that Defendants “are wrongfully using JLR’s funds to pay the Valensi Rose
law firm under the guise it represents JLR.”
(Reply 4.) As discussed, the legal representation of JosLevin is a
disputed issue that this court does not resolve for this motion. Further, while Plaintiffs challenge Valensi
Rose’s authorization to represent JosLevin, Plaintiffs acknowledge that Valensi
Rose has performed legal work purportedly for the benefit of JosLevin. Plaintiffs do not show use of the JosLevin
funds for Valensi Rose’s representation of Defendants personally.
The
division of JosLevin’s financial assets between the two factions does theoretically
raise a risk that JosLevin may not have sufficient accessible funds to
operate. However, Defendants, who
control the board, have not sought a receivership on that basis. Plaintiffs,
who seek a receivership, do not submit evidence of a present danger that
JosLevin’s assets will lost, removed, or materially injured as a result of such
circumstances. For instance, none of the
properties is mortgaged. Accordingly,
Plaintiffs do not show that JosLevin is at risk of defaulting on a loan or that
any of the properties are at risk of foreclosure. Also, while Plaintiffs vaguely state that
some of the $250,000 controlled by Defendants is for “tenants’ security
deposits,” Plaintiffs cite no evidence of the amounts of the security deposits,
that tenants have demanded the return of same, that Defendants would not return
security deposits from the $250,000, or that other financial assets are
insufficient to return any security deposits that could be sought by
tenants. (Mot. 1:3-8, 2:9-10, 7:4-6;
Levin Decl. ¶¶ 55-58.) Plaintiffs also
do not show that JosLevin cannot pay property manager MGMT or other employees
under present circumstances. Indeed,
Plaintiffs state that $250,016.95 of the funds were deposited with MGMT Group
to pay for JosLevin’s operational costs. (Levin Decl. ¶ 79.)
Plaintiffs
do not show grounds to appoint a receiver based on their allegations of “looting”
against Defendants.
Corporate
Deadlock; and Alleged Need for Receiver to Oversee Board Meetings and Functions
“A court of equity has
power to appoint a receiver of a going corporation upon a showing that there
are such dissensions in its governing body as to create a virtual suspension of
its business” (See Golden State
Glass Corp. v. Sup. Ct. (1939) 13 Cal.2d 384, 393; accord Misita, supra, 54
Cal.App.2d at 250-251 [“court may appoint a receiver “where there are
such dissensions within the corporation that its business cannot be honestly or
properly managed”].)
Plaintiffs contend that
“both sides agree that the
board cannot function because each side claims to be in rightful control of
JLR, which threatens irreparable damage to JLR’s property and business pending
this litigation.” (Mot. 11.) At first blush, the argument appears wholly untenable
because the Clapkins control two of the three seats on the Board of
directors. At least for Board decisions
for which Dina and Marci are disinterested, there is no evidence of deadlock on
the Board because a majority of the three Board members can vote on corporate decisions.
However,
the deadlock issue is somewhat more involved than who controls the Board. Plaintiffs contend that: (1) Shana is the
only “disinterested director” and therefore effectively controls the Board; (2)
Dina and Marci are “interested directors” and “should abstain from voting” as
Board members; (3) a provisional director cannot be appointed because there is
not an even number of directors (Corp. Code § 308); and (4) preliminary
injunctive relief preventing Shana from serving as President, CEO, and
Treasurer would not benefit the shareholders and lead to a multiplicity of
lawsuits. (Mot. 10-12.) Relatedly, Plaintiffs contend that Dina and
Marci were not authorized by the bylaws to remove Shana as President, CEO, and
Treasurer, and that such actions cannot be taken until the annual Shareholder’s
meeting scheduled for February 14, 2023.
(Mot. 4, fn. 4 and 10:5-19; Reply 2-3.)
The
court has considered all of Plaintiffs’ contentions. While there is evidence of conflict between
two different shareholder factions, the evidence does not preponderate in
support of a finding that JosLevin is presently in danger of being lost or
materially injured as a result of corporate deadlock or dissension. The Board has three directors and is not
deadlocked in any general sense. To the
extent Shana Levin is still the CEO, President, and Treasurer, she cannot
obtain an equitable remedy of receivership for refusing to comply with lawful decisions
and resolutions of the Board of Directors.
Plaintiffs also admit that a Shareholder’s meeting is scheduled for
February 14, 2023, and that the primary point of disagreement – whether Shana
should be President, CEO, and Treasurer – could be decided at that
meeting. Given that there is less than
two months before the Shareholder’s meeting, and no evidence of imminent danger
to JosLevin’s business or assets from corporate dissension, it would not be
equitable at this time to take the drastic step of placing the corporation in
receivership.
The
court further analyzes Plaintiffs’ contentions that Marci and Dina are
interested directors, and that Shana was not properly removed as CEO,
President, and Treasurer, as follows:
Interested Directors.
Corporations Code section 310
requires directors interested in a transaction to either abstain from voting or
prove the transaction was just and reasonable to the corporation. (Corp. Code §
310(a)(2) and (3).) In reply, Plaintiffs
contend that the term “transaction” is construed broadly and “may cover
situations which go beyond the traditional contract or agreement, such as a
board decision to decline a business opportunity in which one or more of the
directors is interested.” (Reply
6.) However, Plaintiffs do not show that
Marci and Dina are interested directors for any significant number of Board
decisions or any decisions that could place JosLevin in imminent danger of
being harmed or materially injured.
Plaintiffs state that “Marci and Dina are interested directors concerning
the board’s investigation into prior management and employees, as that
investigation directly implicates them or members of their immediate family.” (Mot. 11.)
However, Plaintiffs do not show a receivership is needed to the extent
Marci and Dina improperly voted to cease investigations into family
members. Even if their votes on such
matter was improper (which the court does not decide), Plaintiffs do not show
that it presents an imminent danger to JosLevin’s business. Plaintiffs also
have less drastic remedies to address their concern that Marci and Dina
improperly voted to cease investigations.
While Plaintiffs suggest in reply that Marci and Dina are interested
directors with respect to certain lawsuits, they do not fully brief the issue
or show that any improper vote on such matters cannot be addressed through less
drastic remedies. (Reply 6.) To the extent Plaintiffs argue that Marci and
Dina must abstain from all Board decisions (see Mot. 11:15), the
argument is unsupported and unpersuasive.
Removal of Shana as CEO,
President, and Treasurer
Plaintiffs contend that Dina and Marci were not authorized
by the bylaws to remove Shana as President, CEO, and Treasurer, and that such
actions cannot be taken until the annual Shareholder’s meeting scheduled for
February 14, 2023. (Mot. 4, fn. 4 and
10:5-19; Reply 2-3.) The court finds it
unnecessary to decide whether Shana was properly removed from such
positions. Plaintiffs do not show that
the dispute concerning her authority to act as President, CEO, and Treasurer
justifies appointment of a receiver until either the Shareholder’s meeting on
February 14, 2023, or a decision on the petition to dissolve JosLevin, which is
also pending before this court.
Under California law, “the business
and affairs of the corporation shall be managed and all corporate powers shall
be exercised by or under the direction of the board.” (Corps. Code § 300(a).) “California has recognized the rule that the board cannot
delegate its function to govern. As long as the corporation exists, its affairs
must be managed by the duly elected board. The board may grant authority to
act, but it cannot delegate its function to govern. If it does so, the contract
so providing is void.” (Kennerson
v. Burbank Amusement Co. (1953) 120 Cal.App.2d 157, 173- 174.)
Plaintiffs
cite certain provisions from the bylaws that state that the CEO, president, and
treasurer shall hold office until the next annual Shareholder’s meeting, which Petitioners
state will occur on February 14, 2023.
(Mot. 4, fn. 4 and 10:5-19; Reply 2-3.)
However, Plaintiffs do not address Kennerson, supra or cite any
authority to support a position that an appointed president or CEO may
supersede or refuse to comply with decisions of the corporate board. (Sehulster
Tunnels/Pre-Con v. Traylor Brothers, Inc. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1328,
1345, fn. 16 [failure to address point is “equivalent to a concession”].) The bylaws state that the president “shall
see that all orders and resolutions of the Board are carried out.” (Oppo. Exh. 1 at § VIII.) Section X states that “in the absence of
disability or refusal to act of both the President and the
Vice-President, the Board may appoint a President Pro Tem.” (Ibid. [bold italics added].) Section XII states that “unless
otherwise provided by resolution of the Board of Directors, the
Treasurer shall have custody of the funds and securities of the
corporation.” (bold italics added.) Section XIII states that “in the case of the
absence or disability of any officer of the corporation, or for any other
reason deemed sufficient by a majority of the Board, the Board of
Directors may delegate … the powers or duties of any officer ….” (Ibid. [bold italics added].)
For
purposes of this motion, the court need not decide whether Shana was properly
removed as CEO, President, and Treasurer by Dina and Marci. Assuming arguendo that Shana was not
removed, she is required by the bylaws to “see that all orders and resolutions
of the Board are carried out.” (Oppo.
Exh. 1 at § VIII.) If she is unable or refuses to perform that duty, the
majority of the Board may delegate Shana’s duties to another person. To the extent Shana is still the CEO,
President, and Treasurer, she cannot obtain an equitable remedy of receivership
for refusing to comply with lawful orders of the Board of Directors. “One
who seeks equity must do equity.” (Dickson, Carlson & Campillo v. Pole (2000)
83 Cal.App.4th 436, 445-446.)
If
the court in the petition for dissolution finds that at least 50% of the shareholders
elected to wind up JosLevin, then the business must cease operations in any
event. Furthermore, Plaintiffs concede
that a Shareholder’s meeting must be held by February 14, 2023, at which time
Shana could be removed as CEO, President, and Treasurer. In these circumstances, and at present time, there
is insufficient evidence of a danger to JosLevin to grant the broad
receivership sought by Plaintiffs in this motion.
Receivership to Manage Counsel and Stay Lawsuits
Plaintiffs contend that “[a] limited
purpose receiver is also necessary to manage counsel purporting to represent JLR
in the four (4) pending actions.” (Mot. 13.) Plaintiffs state: “The Clapkins’ actions
authorizing suit in JLR’s name against Shana are invalid as interested director
transactions under Corporations Code § 310, or breach of their fiduciary duty
as majority directors/shareholders. The Clapkins have a material financial
interest in removing Shana as President/CEO, seizing control of JLR’s bank
accounts and stopping the board’s investigation into past management and
employees.” (Mot. 13.) Plaintiffs also contend that “the Clapkins
may not shift the cost of their defense of this derivative action to JLR” and “[t]his
is what the Clapkins seek to do by hiring Laurie Murphy of Valensi Rose to ‘represent’
nominal defendant, JLR.” (Ibid.)
As discussed above, the parties’
contentions regarding legal representation of JosLevin are more appropriately
litigated in the main legal action before Department 50, Judge Teresa Beaudet.
Furthermore, while a multiplicity of lawsuits does increase the legal
expenses of JosLevin, the court cannot conclude on this record that such
expenses justify appointment of a receiver, which in itself would be expensive
and further increase the corporation’s legal costs. Plaintiffs have provided the court no
evidence concerning the legal costs being incurred by JosLevin, and Plaintiffs
concede that some of the legal actions were filed either by Plaintiffs or by
JosLevin “at Shana’s direction.” (Mot.
7.) In the circumstances discussed at
length above, including the existence of a three-person Board that can make
decisions with respect to pending litigation, it would not be equitable to
appoint a receiver to stay litigation or manage counsel.
The Fire at
5830 Soto St.; and JosLevin’s Insurance Claim
In reply, Plaintiffs
argue that “Board dysfunction” jeopardizes JosLevin’s insurance claim for the
fire at 5830 Soto St. and requires appointment of a receiver. (Reply 4-5.)
Plaintiffs did not move for a receivership on that basis because the
fire did not occur until after the motion was filed. While Plaintiffs may raise this issue in
reply, Plaintiffs do not show any Board “dysfunction” related to the insurance
claim that requires appointment of a receiver.
As discussed, Defendants control two of the three Board seats and are
not deadlocked. Plaintiffs cite no persuasive
evidence that Marci or Dina is an interested director with respect to the
insurance claim.
Plaintiffs contend that
the Clapkins have put the insurance proceeds at risk because “Marci accused the
Levins of failing to remove transients from the property as the reason for the
fire.” (Reply 4.) Plaintiffs apparently rely on an email
stating Marci’s opinion that Shana and others are to blame for the fire and
that presumably would not have been made public to the insurer except for
Plaintiffs’ disclosure. (Sheri Clapkin
Decl. ¶ 7, Exh. 30.) Plaintiffs do not
explain how Marci’s opinion could reasonably place the insurance claim at
risk. In any event, the email does not
show “Board dysfunction.”
Plaintiffs assert that
“the Clapkins apparently seek to hijack JLR’s insurance proceeds just like they
hijacked its bank accounts.” (Reply
5.) Plaintiffs fail to support this
claim.
The parties agree that 5830 Soto St. is a valuable asset of
JosLevin. (Oppo. 6.) They also agree that the property was
insured. Because the three-person Board
of Directors can make decisions related to the fire, including by directing
officers to pursue an insurance claim, Plaintiffs do not show that a receiver
is needed related to the fire.
Plaintiffs Have Adequate, Less Drastic Remedies
“Ordinarily, if there is any other remedy, less
severe in its results, which will adequately protect the rights of the parties,
a court should not take property out of the hands of its owners.” (Golden State
Glass Corp. v. Sup. Ct. (1939) 13 Cal.2d 384, 393.)
If Plaintiffs contend
that Marci and Dina improperly voted to cease Board investigations, took
control of JosLevin financial assets, hired or fired attorneys representing
JosLevin, filed legal actions, or have not properly pursued an insurance claim
for the fire at 5830 Soto St., those issues may be raised in an action for
damages or for injunctive relief.
Plaintiffs do not show that such alternative remedies are
inadequate.
Request for Continuance
Defendants request a continuance of this motion on
the grounds that “Plaintiffs still refuse to turn over Joslevin’s corporate
records to its other board member.”
(Oppo. 17, citing Heller Decl. ¶¶ 2-8.)
Defendants do not identify any specific requests for records that was
unfulfilled or any specific records that are needed to oppose the motion. The request for continuance is denied.
Preliminary Injunction; Nomination of Receiver; and Undertaking
Because the court
denies the motion, the court need not address the parties’ arguments concerning
the preliminary injunctive relief sought by Plaintiffs; the parties’
nominations for receiver; or the amount of undertaking.
Conclusion
The motion is DENIED.
[1] At times in this
ruling, the court may refer to Plaintiffs, Defendants, and certain non-parties
by their first names. No disrespect is
intended.
[2] Defendants and Valensi Rose filed
declarations explaining that the oppositions could not be filed on December 2,
2022, due to maintenance of the court’s e-filing system. The oppositions were timely served on
December 2, 2022, and Plaintiffs were not prejudiced by the late filing.