Judge: Matthew C. Braner, Case: 37-2019-00055847-CU-FR-CTL, Date: 2024-03-15 Tentative Ruling

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,

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HALL OF JUSTICE

TENTATIVE RULINGS - March 14, 2024

03/15/2024  09:00:00 AM  C-60 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

JUDICIAL OFFICER:Matthew C. Braner

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Civil - Unlimited  Fraud Demurrer / Motion to Strike 37-2019-00055847-CU-FR-CTL HATAMI TAJIK VS FARASATI [IMAGED] CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED:

Defendants Pouyan Farasati and Legacy Cruises and Events LLC's demurrer is OVERRULED.

Defendants' motion to strike is GRANTED in part, and DENIED in part.

Defendants' request for judicial notice is granted, but only as to the existence of those court records, and not as to the truth of the matters asserted in those records, none of which are a court judgment or findings by a trier of fact.

Demurrer A demurrer may be sustained if the pleading 'does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.' (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) To test the sufficiency of a cause of action, the court treats as true 'all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.' (Centinela Freeman Emergency Medical Associates v. Health Net of California, Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 994, 1010.) The court may also consider matters that have been judicially noticed. (Id.) It is not necessary to 'plead evidentiary facts supporting [an] allegation of ultimate fact,' and a pleading 'is adequate so long as it apprises the defendant of the factual basis for the claim.' (Birke v. Oakwood Worldwide (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1540, 1549.) In considering whether the complaint adequately states a claim, the court shall give the complaint a 'reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.' (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) Here, Defendants demur to all five causes of action in the third amended complaint ('TAC'). As to the first, second, and third causes of action for quantum meruit, breach of implied in fact contract, and common counts-services rendered, respectively, Defendants contend they are barred by the statute of frauds and uncertain. As to the fourth cause of action for fraud, Defendants contend it is time barred and uncertain. As to the fifth cause of action for promissory estoppel, Defendants contend it is somehow time barred because it was not included in the SAC but was included in the first amended complaint, and that it is uncertain. The court rejects these arguments; the TAC is sufficiently pled.

First, the court finds it necessary to emphasize that the TAC is not the second amended complaint ('SAC'), which was a form complaint that failed to include even the bare minimum of factual allegations to support Plaintiff's claims. Unlike the SAC, the TAC is rife with specific factual allegations directly relevant, applicable, and supportive of Plaintiff's claims. Thus, Defendant's repeated references to the lack of factual allegations in the TAC are disingenuous at best. The TAC is not uncertain.

Calendar No.: Event ID:  TENTATIVE RULINGS

3062625  19 CASE NUMBER: CASE TITLE:  HATAMI TAJIK VS FARASATI [IMAGED]  37-2019-00055847-CU-FR-CTL Second, the court is persuaded the face of the TAC does not show the statute of frauds applies. Unlike the SAC, which failed to include allegations related to the kind of work involved and the presence of subcontractors, the allegations of the TAC demonstrate the disputed factual nature of whether Plaintiff knew the work would take longer than one year to complete. As such, this determination is not appropriate on demurrer. The court recognizes that this same conclusion could have been reached in connection with the breach of oral contract claim in the SAC, had it included the requisite additional facts; leave to amend should therefore have been granted. Consequently, to the extent Plaintiff believes it necessary to reassert his claim for breach of oral contract in a fourth amended complaint, the court will allow him to do so.

As to the fraud cause of action, which is not uncertain, the face of the complaint does not show it is time barred. In fact, the face of the complaint plainly shows the opposite; Plaintiff could not have learned the facts constituting the fraud until, at the earliest, he was unwillingly removed from the job site in November 2018. (TAC, ¶¶ 64-69, 74-75; Code Civ. Proc., § 338, subd. (d).) If the three-year statute of limitations for fraud accrued no earlier than November 2018, Plaintiff filed this case (in October 2019) well within the applicable time limit.

Finally, as to the cause of action for promissory estoppel, which again is not uncertain, the court is not persuaded that failing to include it in the SAC somehow forecloses Plaintiff from asserting it now. The century-old case authority relied on by Defendants does not support their argument. Withdrawing and then reasserting a cause of action is dissimilar to effectively dismissing a defendant and then realleged claims against that defendant; so long as the cause of action arises from the same transaction or occurrence (and leave to amend is properly afforded), the claim will likely relate back to the original filing date.

Accordingly, Defendants' demurrer is overruled.

Motion to Strike As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff concedes that his request for attorney fees was inadvertent and should therefore be stricken. As such, the motion to strike is granted as to the request for attorney fees. (TAC, Prayer for Relief, ¶ 6.) A court may strike 'any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.' (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).) A claim for punitive damages must also be pled with specificity; conclusory allegations unsupported by facts showing malicious, fraudulent, or oppressive intentions will not suffice. (G.D.

Searle & Co. v. Superior Court (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 22, 32-33; Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1041-42.) An improper claim for punitive damages can be stricken. (Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 163-64.) Here, Defendants' motion is primarily founded on an oral 'agreement' between Defendants' counsel and Plaintiff's former counsel, attorney Michael McDonnell. However, Defendants have failed to provide any legal support for the idea that an oral agreement between attorneys can form the basis for treating content in a complaint as 'irrelevant, false, or improper' in the context of a motion to strike. The court also questions the propriety of holding Plaintiff and his new counsel to a purported agreement made by his former counsel, given the circumstances of this case (i.e., attorney McDonnell's conduct resulted in dismissal of this case, which he attested to in order to set aside the dismissal). Thus, the court rejects this argument.

Defendants also moved to strike Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages, arguing the TAC does not include sufficient facts related to malice, oppression, or an intent by Defendant Farasati to harm Plaintiff.

However, Defendants have wholly ignored Plaintiff's cause of action for fraud, upon which a claim for punitive damages may be based, and for which Defendants' demurrer was overruled.

Accordingly, the request for attorney fees in the Prayer is stricken, but the remainder of Defendants' Calendar No.: Event ID:  TENTATIVE RULINGS

3062625  19 CASE NUMBER: CASE TITLE:  HATAMI TAJIK VS FARASATI [IMAGED]  37-2019-00055847-CU-FR-CTL motion to strike is denied.

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