Judge Matthew C. Braner, Case 37-2022-00011281-CU-OE-CTL 2023-08-04 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Matthew C. Braner, Case: 37-2022-00011281-CU-OE-CTL, Date: 2023-08-04 Tentative Ruling

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,

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HALL OF JUSTICE

TENTATIVE RULINGS - July 06, 2023

07/07/2023 09:00:00 AM C-60 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

JUDICIAL OFFICER:Matthew C. Braner

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Civil - Unlimited Other employment Summary Judgment / Summary Adjudication (Civil) 37-2022-00011281-CU-OE-CTL WILLIAMS VS SAN DIEGO-IMPERIAL COUNTIES LABOR COUNCIL AFL-CIO CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED:

Defendants San Diego & Imperial Counties Labor Council ('Labor Council') and Partnership for a Better San Diego's ('Partnership') motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative summary adjudication, is DENIED.

The parties' evidentiary objections are overruled.

Summary Judgment Summary judgment is appropriate when all the papers submitted by the parties show there is no triable issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code of Civ.

Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) A defendant who moves for summary judgment has the initial burden of showing each alleged cause of action is without merit. (Ibid.; Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) A defendant can meet that burden by showing one or more elements of a cause of action cannot be established or that there is a complete defense to that cause of action. (Code of Civ.

Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) If the defendant meets this burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to produce evidence to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact as to the cause of action or affirmative defense. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 849-851.) If the plaintiff fails to meet that burden, the motion for summary judgment will be granted. (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 780-781.) A triable issue of material fact exists if the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying facts in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.) The court can grant summary judgment only if Defendants meet their burden to show that none of Plaintiff's causes of action have merit. As to the first, second, third, and fourth causes of action, Defendants argue there is no factual dispute that Plaintiff was an exempt employee. This argument is entirely dependent on the legal argument that Defendant Labor Council and Defendant Partnership are joint employers, and therefore the combined salary of Plaintiff from both employers must be used to determine whether she meets the statutory exemption requirements. Plaintiff disagrees and contends that Defendants argument lacks any meaningful or relevant legal support. The court agrees with Plaintiff.

Defendant's argument is not legally supported. Nearly all of the authority, both state and Federal, discussing the concept of 'joint employers' is specifically in the context of aggregating hours worked in order to prevent sufficiently intertwined employers from benefitting from employee overtime hours Calendar No.: Event ID: TENTATIVE RULINGS

2992363 7 CASE NUMBER: CASE TITLE: WILLIAMS VS SAN DIEGO-IMPERIAL COUNTIES LABOR COUNCIL 37-2022-00011281-CU-OE-CTL without paying the required overtime wages. The only case that arguably supports Defendants' position is Karr v. Strong Detective Agency, Inc., a Div. of Kane Services (7th Cir. 1986) 787 F.2d 1205, 1207-08, in which the Seventh Circuit found that one joint employer was entitled to take credit towards minimum wage and overtime requirements from payments made to the plaintiff by the other joint employer. The court is not persuaded that this single 30+ year old federal case, which conducts little analysis on the propriety of aggregating wages for the benefit of the employer, is sufficient to establish the broad joint employer theory advocated by Defendants, particularly California's policy that 'statutes governing conditions of employment are to be construed broadly in favor of protecting employees.' (Kirby v. Immoos Fire Protection, Inc. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1244, 1250.) Without application of their joint employer theory, Defendants cannot succeed on their motion.

Accordingly, their motion for summary judgment is denied.

Summary Adjudication Summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action is appropriate if 'the cause of action has no merit' and if adjudication will completely dispose of the cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd.

(f)(1).) A defendant who moves for summary adjudication has the initial burden of showing the alleged cause of action is without merit. (Ibid.; Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) A defendant can meet that burden by showing one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established or that there is a complete defense to that cause of action. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) As explained above, the court is not inclined to apply Defendants' joint employer theory, which is the sole basis for summarily adjudicating causes of action one through four. As such, their motion for summary adjudication is denied as to those causes of action.

Although less explicit, Defendants' argument on the fifth cause of action for unpaid vacation time is also reliant on their joint employer theory, at least in so far as it is purely an issue of law. As a factual matter, several issues remain disputed and in need of resolution by a factfinder, including: 1) whether the 2015 offer letter and OPEIU agreement setting forth the vacation cap policy was intended and understood to apply to Defendant Partnership's employees; 2) whether the failure of Defendant Labor Council to consistently enforce the vacation cap mislead its employees into believing they could accrue vacation beyond the cap without losing it (and thus, forgo using the days when they otherwise would have); and 3) whether the January 2021 Payroll Status Change Form established an overall cap of 4 weeks-vacation plus five days for both employers or separate caps for each employer. Consequently, the motion is denied as to the fifth cause of action.

Finally, Defendants' motion as to the sixth, seventh, and eighth causes of action was dependent on their success on the first five, as they are derivative claims. Because the motion is denied as to the underlying claims, so too is the motion denied as to the derivative claims.

Accordingly, Defendants' motion for summary adjudication is denied in its entirety.

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