Judge Matthew C. Braner, Case Number: 37-2022-00015568-CU-PO-CTL, Date: 2024-04-12 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Matthew C. Braner, Case: 37-2022-00015568-CU-PO-CTL, Date: 2024-04-12 Tentative Ruling

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,

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HALL OF JUSTICE

TENTATIVE RULINGS - April 11, 2024

04/12/2024 09:00:00 AM C-60 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

JUDICIAL OFFICER:Matthew C. Braner

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Civil - Unlimited PI/PD/WD - Other Demurrer / Motion to Strike 37-2022-00015568-CU-PO-CTL MONTGOMERY VS LUCKETT [IMAGED] CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED:

Defendant Rae'Ana Nicole Luckett's demurrer is SUSTAINED. Defendant Luckett's motion to strike is GRANTED.

Defendant Ford Motor Company ('FMC')'s demurrer is SUSTAINED.

Plaintiff Deseandra Montgomery did not file oppositions to Defendants' motions. Pursuant to this court's local rules, the court will exercise its discretion to deem such failure to respond as a concession the motions have merit. (San Diego Local Rule 2.1.19.B.) Demurrers A demurrer shall be sustained if the complaint 'does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.' (Code Civ. Proc., � 430.10(e).) To test the sufficiency of a cause of action, the court treats as true 'all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.' (Centinela Freeman Emergency Medical Associates v. Health Net of California, Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 994, 1010.) The court may also consider matters that have been judicially noticed. (Id.) The court shall give the complaint a 'reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.' (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) Defendant Luckett demurs to the fourth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, which Plaintiff alleges in her individual capacity and not as the representative of her mother's estate.

Defendant Luckett argues the claim is inadequately pled because it fails to allege outrageous conduct by Defendant Luckett directed at Plaintiff or in her presence. (See, e.g., Christensen v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 868, 903.) The court agrees. Plaintiff alleges only that she viewed footage of her mother's vehicle 'engulfed in flames,' which caused her severe emotional distress. This does not suffice to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Accordingly, Defendant Luckett's demurrer to the fourth cause of action is sustained.

Defendant FMC demurs to the first cause of action for motor vehicle negligence, and to the seventh and eighth causes of action for products liability (strict liability, negligence, breach of implied and express warranties). First, the seventh and eighth causes of action are duplicative, and duplicative causes of action are subject to demurrer. (Palm Springs Villas II Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Parth (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 268, 290 [duplicative cause of action may form the basis for sustaining a demurrer].) Consequently, the demurrer is sustained as to the eighth cause of action, without leave to amend.

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3106991 17 CASE NUMBER: CASE TITLE: MONTGOMERY VS LUCKETT [IMAGED] 37-2022-00015568-CU-PO-CTL Second, the remaining first and seventh causes of action are not adequately pled. As to the first cause of action, Plaintiff has wholly failed to allege facts to support the elements for what is effectively a general negligence claim against Defendant FMC. Indeed, the only reference to Defendant FMC in relation to this claim is a passing reference on page 3 of her form complaint in section MV-2(e), in which she alleges Defendant FMC (along with every other defendant) were 'the agent and employees of the other defendants and acted within the scope of the agency.' The complaint also lacks any facts to support Plaintiff's product liability and warranty claims. The complaint does not allege that Defendant Luckett's 1999 Lincoln Towncar was defective, nor does it allege facts relevant to the purported warranties, particularly facts relevant to Plaintiff's standing to bring such claims.

Accordingly, Defendant FMC's demurrer is sustained as to the first and seventh causes of action.

Motion to Strike A court may strike 'any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.' (Code Civ. Proc., � 436, subd. (a).) A claim for punitive damages must also be pled with specificity; conclusory allegations unsupported by facts showing malicious, fraudulent, or oppressive intentions will not suffice. (G.D.

Searle & Co. v. Superior Court (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 22, 32-33; Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1041-42.) An improper claim for punitive damages can be stricken. (Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 163-64.) Defendant Luckett seeks to strike the claim for punitive damages, and references to such claim in the complaint, on the basis that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts that, if true, would enable her to seek punitive damages.

In tort cases, a plaintiff may seek punitive damages when the defendant is guilty of 'oppression, fraud or malice.' (Civ. Code, � 3294, subd. (a).) Malice is defined as conduct that 'is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.' (Civ. Code, � 3294, subd. (c)(1).) Oppression means 'despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.' (Civ. Code, � 3294, subd. (c)(2).) Injuries that stem from drunk driving can constitute malice for purposes of punitive damages. (See Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 899 ['[O]ne who voluntarily commences, and thereafter continues, to consume alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication, knowing from the outset that he must thereafter operate a motor vehicle demonstrates, in the words of Dean Prosser, 'such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that his conduct may be called wilful or wanton.''].) Here, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Luckett was intoxicated at the time she caused the motor vehicle accident that resulted in her mother's death. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Luckett 'knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, that driving while intoxicated, at high speed & while distracted would create a dangerous condition & unreasonable risk of harm to others on the road.' (Complaint, p. 5.) This and the other allegations related to Defendant Luckett's driving are largely conclusory. Coupled with Plaintiff's failure to oppose the motion, which the court has deemed an admission the motion has merit, the court finds the claim for punitive damages is insufficiently pled.

Accordingly, Defendant Luckett's motion to strike is granted.

Plaintiff has leave to amend the complaint as to the fourth cause of action and prayer for punitive damages against Defendant Luckett, and as to the first and seventh causes of action against Defendant FMC. However, since June 2022, Plaintiff's counsel has represented to Defendants' counsel on multiple occasions, and to the court (ROA #115), that an amended complaint would be forthcoming. Given this history, the court will set an accelerated deadline for filing and serving an amended complaint.

Plaintiff has leave to serve and file an amended complaint no later than April 22, 2024.

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3106991 17 CASE NUMBER: CASE TITLE: MONTGOMERY VS LUCKETT [IMAGED] 37-2022-00015568-CU-PO-CTL The minute order is the order of the court.

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3106991 17