Judge: Matthew C. Braner, Case: 37-2023-00011941-CU-PO-CTL, Date: 2024-05-03 Tentative Ruling

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,

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HALL OF JUSTICE

TENTATIVE RULINGS - May 02, 2024

05/03/2024  09:00:00 AM  C-60 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

JUDICIAL OFFICER:Matthew C. Braner

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Civil - Unlimited  PI/PD/WD - Other Demurrer / Motion to Strike 37-2023-00011941-CU-PO-CTL M.E. VS COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO [IMAGED] CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED:

Defendant County of San Diego's demurrer is OVERRULED.

Defendant's request for judicial notice of the legislative history materials for AB 218 (ROA #61, Defendant's RJN, Ex. A) is granted. Plaintiff M.E.'s request for judicial notice of the assembly floor analysis for AB 218 is granted. (ROA #67, Ex. 11.) The court takes note of the existence of the various superior court orders and other court documents the parties request judicial notice of, but these requests are otherwise denied; they are not persuasive authority for the court's ruling. (San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. v. County of San Diego (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1163, 1184 ['A trial court judgment cannot properly be cited in support of a legal argument . . . .']; Santa Ana Hospital Medical Center v. Belshe (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 819, 831 ['[A] written trial court ruling has no precedential value.'].) A demurrer may be sustained if the pleading 'does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.' (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).) To test the sufficiency of a cause of action, the court treats as true 'all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.' (Centinela Freeman Emergency Medical Associates v. Health Net of California, Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 994, 1010.) The court may also consider matters that have been judicially noticed. (Id.) It is not necessary to 'plead evidentiary facts supporting [an] allegation of ultimate fact,' and a pleading 'is adequate so long as it apprises the defendant of the factual basis for the claim.' (Birke v. Oakwood Worldwide (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1540, 1549.) In considering whether the complaint adequately states a claim, the court shall give the complaint a 'reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.' (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) Defendant County demurs to each cause of action against it on the basis that Plaintiff did not timely present a claim pursuant to the Government Tort Claims Act. Plaintiff relied on Government Code section 905, subdivision (m), to file her complaint, which exempts the claim presentation requirement for '[c]laims made pursuant to Section 340.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault.' (See also Code Civ. Proc., § 340.1, subd. (q) ['Notwithstanding any other law, . . . a claim for damages described in paragraphs (1) through (3), inclusive, of subdivision (a), is not required to be presented to any government entity prior to the commencement of an action.'].) However, Defendant contends the California legislature's decision to make subdivision (m) retroactive constitutes an unconstitutional gift within the meaning of Article XVI, section 6 of the California Calendar No.: Event ID:  TENTATIVE RULINGS

3085768  15 CASE NUMBER: CASE TITLE:  M.E. VS COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO [IMAGED]  37-2023-00011941-CU-PO-CTL Constitution. (Cal. Const., art. XVI, § 6 ['The Legislature shall have no power . . . to make any gift or authorize the making of any gift, of any public money or thing of value to any individual, municipal or other corporation whatever . . . .']; Gov. Code, § 905, subd. (p) ['The changes made to this section by the act that added this subdivision are retroactive and apply to any action commenced on or after the date of enactment of that act, and to any action filed before the date of enactment and still pending on that date, including any action or causes of action that would have been barred by the laws in effect before the date of enactment.'].) The court disagrees.

First, the court does not believe the Legislature's decision to revive certain claims is an 'appropriation' of money or thing of value that might constitute a 'gift' within the meaning of the California Constitution.

Defendant's proffered case authority does not support its argument. The earliest cases are inapposite, as they each involved legislation to appropriate a specific monetary amount to compensate a particular individual or class of individuals for harm suffered or services rendered in situations in which they would otherwise have no legal claim. (Bourn v. Hart (1892) 93 Cal. 321; Conlin v. Board of Supervisors (1893) 99 Cal. 17; Powell v. Phelan (1903) 138 Cal. 271.) Estate of Cooke (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 595, 602-03, is similarly irrelevant, as it is limited to the specific issue of vested estate taxes. In short, none of these cases stand for the proposition that revival of a case for which the claims presentation deadline has passed constitutes an unconstitutional appropriation of money or thing of value akin to a gift.

Defendant's strongest support is nearly 100-year old-dicta found in Heron v. Riley (1930) 209 Cal. 507, 517: 'The legislature has not attempted to create a liability against the state for any past acts of negligence on the part of its officers, agents or employees-something it could not do, and the doing of which would, in effect, by the making of a gift-but has provided that 'hereafter' it shall be liable for certain things done which cause damage to its citizens, its liability to be first determined by an appropriate action at law.' This dictum, which is a wholly conclusory off-hand comment that has no bearing on the holding of the case, is neither binding nor persuasive.

Conversely, the recent decision of Coats v. New Haven Unified School District (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 415, directly considered the constitutional implications of the legislature's decision to make retroactive the removal of the claim presentation requirement for child sexual abuse cases. Although the Coats court did not consider the gift argument advanced by Defendant here, it is still highly persuasive authority because it confirmed '[l]egislation reviving the statute of limitations on civil law claims does not violate constitutional principles,' (id. at p. 425), and while acknowledging the distinction between a statute of limitation and the claim presentation requirement, concluded it was 'aware of no reason the Legislature should be any less able to revive claims in this context, as it expressly did in Assembly Bill 218.' (Id. at p. 428.; see also Shirk v. Vista Unified School Dist. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 201, 213 [commenting that if 'the Legislature intended to also revive in subdivision (c) the claim presentation deadline under the government claims statute, it could have easily said so.'].) Second, even if the court were persuaded the revival of claims previously barred by failure to comply with the claim presentation requirement was an appropriation, it still would not conclude it is an unconstitutional 'gift' within the meaning of the California Constitution. 'It is generally held that in determining whether an appropriation of public funds is to be considered a gift, the primary question is whether the funds are to be used for a 'public' or 'private' purpose; the benefit to the state from an expenditure for a public purpose is in the nature of consideration and the funds expended are therefore not a gift even though private persons are benefited therefrom.' (County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 745-46.) 'The determination of what constitutes a public purpose is primarily a matter for the Legislature to determine, and its discretion will not be disturbed by the courts so long as that determination has a reasonable basis.' (Id. at p. 746.) Here, the court has little trouble concluding the Legislature had primarily a public purpose in mind when it enacted AB 218. (See, e.g., Plaintiff's RJN, Ex. 11, p. 2 ['In an effort to allow more victims of childhood sexual assault to be compensated for their injuries and, to help prevent future assaults by raising the costs for this abuse, this bill extends the civil statute of limitations for childhood sexual assault by 14 years, revives old claims for three years, and eliminates existing limitations for claims against public Calendar No.: Event ID:  TENTATIVE RULINGS

3085768  15 CASE NUMBER: CASE TITLE:  M.E. VS COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO [IMAGED]  37-2023-00011941-CU-PO-CTL institutions.'].) 'The language of the retroactivity provision of section 340.1 indicates a clear legislative intent to maximize claims of sexual-abuse minor plaintiffs for as expansive a period of time as possible.

The public policy is manifest from the text of the law.' (Liebig v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 828, 834.) As emphasized by the court in Coats, 'the Legislature has consistently worked to expand the ability of victims of childhood sexual abuse to seek compensation from the responsible parties, on several occasions in direct response to restrictive judicial opinions.' (Coats v. New Haven Unified School District, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 430.) Accordingly, Defendant's demurrer is overruled.

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