Judge Matthew C. Braner, Case 37-2023-00012090-CU-BC-CTL 2023-12-08 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Matthew C. Braner, Case: 37-2023-00012090-CU-BC-CTL, Date: 2023-12-08 Tentative Ruling

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,

DEPT.:

EVENT DATE:

EVENT TIME:

HALL OF JUSTICE

TENTATIVE RULINGS - December 07, 2023

12/08/2023 09:00:00 AM C-60 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

JUDICIAL OFFICER:Matthew C. Braner

CASE NO.:

CASE CATEGORY:

EVENT TYPE:

CASE TITLE: CASE TYPE:

Civil - Unlimited Breach of Contract/Warranty Motion Hearing (Civil) 37-2023-00012090-CU-BC-CTL RIOS VS GENERAL MOTORS LLC [IMAGED] CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED:

Defendant General Motors LLC's demurrer is SUSTAINED.

Defendant's motion to strike is GRANTED.

A demurrer shall be sustained if the complaint 'does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.' (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10(e).) To test the sufficiency of a cause of action, the court treats as true 'all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.' (Centinela Freeman Emergency Medical Associates v. Health Net of California, Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 994, 1010.) The court may also consider matters that have been judicially noticed. (Id.) The court shall give the complaint a 'reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.' (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) First, Defendant's argument with respect to the statute of limitations fails to account for the Covid Emergency Rules. More specifically, Emergency Rule 9 tolls statute of limitations that exceed 180 days (as here) from April 6, 2020 until October 1, 2020. Thus, even if Defendant is correct that the statute of limitations on Plaintiff's fraudulent inducement-concealment claim accrued on the date of purchase, February 11, 2020, the addition of Covid tolling plainly brings Plaintiffs Jorge Rios and Magdalena Mayoral's complaint (filed March 23, 2023) within the three-year statute of limitations.

However, Plaintiff's allegations are not sufficient to support a claim for fraudulent concealment because Plaintiff has not adequately alleged a direct transaction between Defendant and Plaintiff that might trigger a duty of disclosure.

To succeed on a fraudulent concealment claim, Plaintiffs must prove: (1) Defendant concealed or suppressed a material fact; (2) Defendant was under a duty to disclose the fact to Plaintiffs; (3) Defendant intentionally concealed or suppressed the fact with the intent to defraud Plaintiffs; (4) Plaintiffs were unaware of the fact and would not have acted purchased the subject vehicle of they had known of the concealed or suppressed fact; and (5) as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact, Plaintiffs sustained damage. (Boschma v. Home Loan Center, Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 230, 248 [quoting Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 748].) A duty to disclose arises only when some kind of preexisting relationship exists between the plaintiff and the defendant, and as 'a matter of common sense, such a relationship can only come into being as a result of some sort of transaction between the parties.' (LiMandri v. Judkins (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 326, 337.) 'Thus, a duty to disclose may arise from the relationship between seller and buyer, employer and Calendar No.: Event ID: TENTATIVE RULINGS

3020516 7 CASE NUMBER: CASE TITLE: RIOS VS GENERAL MOTORS LLC [IMAGED] 37-2023-00012090-CU-BC-CTL prospective employee, doctor and patient, or parties entering into any kind of contractual agreement.' (Id.) 'Such a transaction must necessarily arise from direct dealings between the plaintiff and the defendant; it cannot arise between the defendant and the public at large.' (Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc.

(2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 276, 312.) Here, Plaintiffs have not adequately alleged a transaction between either of them and Defendant that is sufficient to trigger a duty of disclosure for purposes of a fraudulent concealment claim. Plaintiffs argue in opposition that the dealership with whom they directly dealt acted as the representative or agent of Defendant and therefore a sufficient transactional relationship has been established. However, Plaintiffs' allegations only establish an agency relationship between the dealership and Defendant for purposes of repairs; Plaintiffs do not in fact specifically allege the dealership was Defendant's agent for purposes of the sale.

Plaintiffs also argue that 'a vendor has a duty to disclose material acts not only to immediate purchasers, but also to subsequent purchasers when the vendor has reason to expect that the item will be resold.' (OCM Principal Opportunities Fund, L.P. v. CIBC World Markets Corp. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 835, 851.) However, the cases on which Plaintiffs rely for this proposition are distinguishable, given the facts as alleged in the FAC. In particular, this theory requires that the vendor (i.e., Defendant) mislead both purchasers. In other words, if Plaintiffs' claim was founded on a set of facts whereby Defendant misrepresented to the dealership the condition of the vehicle and the dealership then (unknowingly) passed that misrepresentation to Plaintiffs, then a duty of disclosure on the part of Defendant might trigger. But that is not Plaintiffs' claim; indeed, Plaintiffs have alleged the opposite, that Defendant disclosed certain information to its authorized dealerships and not to the public.

Accordingly, Defendant's demurrer to the fifth cause of action for fraudulent inducement-concealment is sustained with leave to amend.

As to the motion to strike, because Plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages is founded on their fraud claim, which does not survive demurrer, the motion is granted with leave to amend.

Plaintiffs have 30 days from entry of this order to file and serve a second amended complaint.

The minute order is the order of the court.

Calendar No.: Event ID: TENTATIVE RULINGS

3020516 7