Judge Matthew C. Braner, Case Number: 37-2023-00012090-CU-BC-CTL, Date: 2024-05-10 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Matthew C. Braner, Case: 37-2023-00012090-CU-BC-CTL, Date: 2024-05-10 Tentative Ruling

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,

DEPT.:

EVENT DATE:

EVENT TIME:

HALL OF JUSTICE

TENTATIVE RULINGS - May 09, 2024

05/10/2024 09:00:00 AM C-60 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

JUDICIAL OFFICER:Matthew C. Braner

CASE NO.:

CASE CATEGORY:

EVENT TYPE:

CASE TITLE: CASE TYPE:

Civil - Unlimited Breach of Contract/Warranty Demurrer / Motion to Strike 37-2023-00012090-CU-BC-CTL RIOS VS GENERAL MOTORS LLC [IMAGED] CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED:

Defendant General Motors LLC's demurrer is SUSTAINED. Defendant's motion to strike is GRANTED.

A demurrer shall be sustained if the complaint 'does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.' (Code Civ. Proc., � 430.10(e).) To test the sufficiency of a cause of action, the court treats as true 'all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.' (Centinela Freeman Emergency Medical Associates v. Health Net of California, Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 994, 1010.) The court may also consider matters that have been judicially noticed. (Id.) The court shall give the complaint a 'reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.' (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) First, it is apparent to the court that Plaintiffs Jorge Rios and Magdalena Mayoral, and Defendant (or more accurately, their counsel) have copied and pasted their briefing from other cases without sufficient regard for the particular facts of this case. Defendant has again grounded its demurrer in part on a statute of limitations defense the court previously rejected due to Emergency Rule 9 tolling, and has completely ignored both that rule and the court's prior order. But instead of simply referencing the rule and the court's prior order in their opposition, Plaintiffs spend the first six pages of their opposition discussing the delayed discovery rule and tolling based on fraudulent concealment and the repair doctrine, and completely ignore Emergency Rule 9. The court treats this conduct (particularly from Plaintiffs) as evidence Plaintiffs cannot allege facts to support their claim for fraud.

In any case, Defendant's argument with respect to the statute of limitations again fails to account for Emergency Rule 9, which tolls statute of limitations that exceed 180 days (as here) from April 6, 2020 until October 1, 2020. Thus, even if Defendant is correct the statute of limitations on Plaintiff's fraudulent inducement-concealment claim accrued on the date of purchase, February 11, 2020, the addition of Covid tolling brings Plaintiffs complaint (filed March 23, 2023) within the three-year statute of limitations.

Second, Plaintiffs have again failed to adequately allege a direct transaction between Defendant and Plaintiffs that might trigger a duty of disclosure sufficient to support a claim for fraudulent concealment.

In fact, Plaintiffs did not add any new allegations relevant to the duty of disclosure. Instead, it appears Plaintiffs' only additional allegations are related to discovery rule tolling, which is unnecessary in light of the Covid 19 Emergency Rules. (SAC, �� 28, 32, 35.) Rather than allege new facts, Plaintiffs simply repeat the arguments the court previously rejected in connection with Defendant's demurrer to the first amended complaint. The court again rejects these arguments.

To succeed on a fraudulent concealment claim, Plaintiffs must prove: (1) Defendant concealed or Calendar No.: Event ID: TENTATIVE RULINGS

3085861 10 CASE NUMBER: CASE TITLE: RIOS VS GENERAL MOTORS LLC [IMAGED] 37-2023-00012090-CU-BC-CTL suppressed a material fact; (2) Defendant was under a duty to disclose the fact to Plaintiffs; (3) Defendant intentionally concealed or suppressed the fact with the intent to defraud Plaintiffs; (4) Plaintiffs were unaware of the fact and would not have acted purchased the subject vehicle of they had known of the concealed or suppressed fact; and (5) as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact, Plaintiffs sustained damage. (Boschma v. Home Loan Center, Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 230, 248 [quoting Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 748].) A duty to disclose arises only when some kind of preexisting relationship exists between the plaintiff and the defendant, and as 'a matter of common sense, such a relationship can only come into being as a result of some sort of transaction between the parties.' (LiMandri v. Judkins (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 326, 337.) 'Thus, a duty to disclose may arise from the relationship between seller and buyer, employer and prospective employee, doctor and patient, or parties entering into any kind of contractual agreement.' (Id.) 'Such a transaction must necessarily arise from direct dealings between the plaintiff and the defendant; it cannot arise between the defendant and the public at large.' (Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc.

(2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 276, 312.) Here, Plaintiffs have not adequately alleged a transaction between either of them and Defendant sufficient to trigger a duty of disclosure for purposes of a fraudulent concealment claim. Plaintiffs argue in opposition that a direct transaction was made between them and Defendant because they entered a 'warranty contract' directly with Defendant. The court is not persuaded by Plaintiffs' effort to distance themselves from their purchase of the vehicle from a dealership and not directly from Defendant.

Plaintiffs also argue a direct transactional relationship is not required because 'a vendor has a duty to disclose material acts not only to immediate purchasers, but also to subsequent purchasers when the vendor has reason to expect that the item will be resold.' (OCM Principal Opportunities Fund, L.P. v. CIBC World Markets Corp. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 835, 851.) However, the cases on which Plaintiffs rely for this proposition are distinguishable, given the facts as alleged in the SAC. In particular, this theory requires that the vendor (i.e., Defendant) mislead both purchasers. In other words, if Plaintiffs' claim was founded on a set of facts whereby Defendant misrepresented to the dealership the condition of the specific vehicle Plaintiffs purchased and the dealership then (unknowingly) passed that misrepresentation to Plaintiffs, then a duty of disclosure on the part of Defendant might trigger. But that is not Plaintiffs' claim; indeed, Plaintiffs have alleged the opposite, that Defendant disclosed certain information to its authorized dealerships and not to the public.

Plaintiff's reliance on Dhital v. Nissan N. Am., Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 828 (review granted), is misplaced. Not only is that case nonbinding authority because review was granted by the California Supreme Court, but the Dhital court also provided no analysis on the issue of the buyer-seller relationship between the parties because there was an 'absence of a more developed argument by Nissan on this point.' (Id. at p. 844.) Given Plaintiffs' failure to allege new facts related to the duty of disclosure in the SAC, and the transparent regurgitation of (rejected or irrelevant) briefing drawn from other cases, the court is not inclined to afford Plaintiffs another opportunity to amend their complaint. Accordingly, Defendant's demurrer to the fifth cause of action for fraudulent inducement-concealment is sustained without leave to amend.

As to the motion to strike, because Plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages is founded on their fraud claim, which does not survive demurrer, the motion is granted without leave to amend.

The minute order is the order of the court.

Calendar No.: Event ID: TENTATIVE RULINGS

3085861 10