Judge: Matthew C. Braner, Case: 37-2023-00024430-CU-WT-CTL, Date: 2023-10-20 Tentative Ruling

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,

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HALL OF JUSTICE

TENTATIVE RULINGS - October 19, 2023

10/20/2023  09:00:00 AM  C-60 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

JUDICIAL OFFICER:Matthew C. Braner

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Civil - Unlimited  Wrongful Termination Motion Hearing (Civil) 37-2023-00024430-CU-WT-CTL CARRINGTON VS CHRISTIAN UNIFIED SCHOOLS OF SAN DIEGO [IMAGED] CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED:

Defendant Christian Unified Schools of San Diego ('CUSD')'s motion for sanctions pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7 is GRANTED.

Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7 applies only in limited circumstances and courts have broad discretion whether to impose sanctions. (Kumar v. Ramsey (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 1110, 1120-21.) The court must exercise restraint when deciding whether to award sanctions; they should not be routinely or easily awarded even for a claim that is arguably frivolous. (Id., at p. 1121.) Under section 128.7, the court must assess whether the document filed is frivolous, legally unreasonable, or without factual foundation. (Bockrath v. Aldrich Chemical Co., Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 71, 82.) A claim is factually frivolous if it is not well grounded in fact and it is legally frivolous if it is not warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. (McCluskey v. Henry (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 1197, 1205], reh'g denied (Nov. 13, 2020), review denied (Feb. 10, 2021), cert.

denied sub nom. Mogan v. Henry (2021) 211 L.Ed.2d 16 [142 S.Ct. 81].) In either case, to obtain sanctions, the moving party must show the party's conduct in asserting the claim was objectively unreasonable. A claim is objectively unreasonable if any reasonable attorney would agree it is totally and completely without merit. (Ibid.) The claims set forth in both the original complaint and the first amended complaint are objectively unreasonable. The evidence submitted, particularly the employment agreement itself and the payment summaries showing Plaintiff was fully paid through the end of the contract term, establishes that Plaintiff and her counsel have advocated for a complaint that is neither legally nor factually supportable. (Code Civ. Proc., § 128.7, subd. (a)(3).) The employment agreement plainly sets forth the term nature of Plaintiff's employment with Defendant. More importantly, the following paragraph is set forth on the first page of the agreement: Employee specifically acknowledges that the Agreement is for no specific duration for employment for the 2021/2022 school year. The parties agree that no rights of tenure or presumptions of continued or future employment are conferred or implied by this Agreement or by successive agreements over time.

(ROA #27, Ricardo Dec., Ex. A, Bates #CUSSD000131.) Susan Lanz, the Principal of Christian Junior High School and Christian Senior High School, where Plaintiff worked, attests that she informed Plaintiff in January 2022 that Plaintiff's employment agreement would not be renewed, and that Plaintiff was provided all employment benefits through the remaining term of the contract. (ROA #32, Lanz Dec., ¶ 4.) 'Decisional law does not allow a plaintiff to sue for wrongful termination in violation of public policy based Calendar No.: Event ID:  TENTATIVE RULINGS

3035531  18 CASE NUMBER: CASE TITLE:  CARRINGTON VS CHRISTIAN UNIFIED SCHOOLS OF SAN DIEGO  37-2023-00024430-CU-WT-CTL upon an employer's refusal to renew an employment contract.' (Touchstone Television Productions v. Superior Court (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 676, 680; see also Daly v. Exxon Corp. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 39, 42-43.) Thus, there is a key distinction between termination of a term employment contract before the term expires, and a decision not to renew a term employment contract. The court is not persuaded by Plaintiff's argument that she was terminated prior to expiration of the contract.

Plaintiff does not dispute she was paid through the remainder of the contract term, and the earning statements provided by Defendant also confirm she received full payment through June 30, 2022, the final day of the term. Plaintiff also does not dispute that she received all tangible benefits set forth in sections 7 through 11 of the employment agreement, which establish the obligations of Defendant pursuant to the contract. Instead, Plaintiff argues she was terminated before the end of the term because she was informed in March 2022 that her presence was no longer required on campus, and her last day was recorded as June 8, 2022. (FAC, ¶¶ 31, 34.) However, as explained above, Plaintiff's pay statements in fact reflect that she was fully paid through June 30, 2022, and the employment agreement did not impose an obligation on Defendant to have her perform any particular duties or tasks.

Plaintiff must have known she was paid through June 30, 2022, and that Defendant was not required to actually utilize her services through the remaining term of the contract. A bare minimum investigation by Plaintiff's counsel should have revealed these facts, and a bare minimum investigation of the applicable law would have revealed that actions founded on non-renewal of an employment contract are not cognizable in California. Similarly, the very nature of an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim means that additional facts concerning any allegedly extreme and outrageous conduct must be within the knowledge of the plaintiff. Here, Plaintiff's IIED claim is founded solely on Defendant's purported comments about 'culture,' which falls well short of the kind of outrageous conduct required to bring an IIED claim. (See, e.g., Yurick v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1116, 1128 ['It is generally held that there can be no recovery for mere profanity, obscenity, or abuse, without circumstances of aggravation, or for insults, indignities or threats which are considered to amount to nothing more than mere annoyances.'].) The fact that Plaintiff did not add any additional facts concerning outrageous conduct from the original to the first amended complaint strongly suggests no such facts exist.

For these reasons, Defendant's motion for sanctions is granted.

'A sanction imposed for violation of subdivision (b) shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of this conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated. Subject to the limitations in paragraphs (1) and (2), the sanction may consist of, or include, directives of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a penalty into court, or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of some or all of the reasonable attorney's fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation.' (Code Civ. Proc., § 128.7, subd. (d).) Here, Defendant requests as a sanction that Plaintiff's complaint be dismissed, and for a monetary sanction against Plaintiff and her counsel of $16,200. As to the monetary sanction, Plaintiff argues the amount is grossly overstated. The court has discretion to determine an appropriate sanction and believes the amount requested far exceeds an amount that 'is sufficient to deter repetition' of the sanctionable conduct. The court concludes that $5,000.00 is a sufficient sanction on these facts and at this very early stage of the case.

Accordingly, Plaintiff and her counsel of record, Dante Pride and The Pride Law Firm, are sanctioned $5,000.00 for violation of Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7, subdivision (b). Plaintiff and her prior counsel are jointly and severally liable for the sanction, and have 30 days from entry of this order to pay the sanction to Defendant.

As to the request for dismissal, the court is inclined to grant it and dismiss the case, as it does not appear the complaint can be amended to state a legally cognizable claim. Nonetheless, the court will hear from the parties on this issue.

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