Judge: Matthew C. Braner, Case: 37-2024-00003886-CU-BC-CTL, Date: 2024-04-12 Tentative Ruling

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA,

DEPT.:

EVENT DATE:

EVENT TIME:

HALL OF JUSTICE

TENTATIVE RULINGS - April 11, 2024

04/12/2024  09:00:00 AM  C-60 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

JUDICIAL OFFICER:Matthew C. Braner

CASE NO.:

CASE CATEGORY:

EVENT TYPE:

CASE TITLE: CASE TYPE:

Civil - Unlimited  Breach of Contract/Warranty Demurrer / Motion to Strike 37-2024-00003886-CU-BC-CTL YOUSIF VS FORD MOTOR COMPANY [IMAGED] CAUSAL DOCUMENT/DATE FILED:

Defendant Ford Motor Company's demurrer to the sixth cause of action for fraudulent inducement–concealment is SUSTAINED.

Defendant Sedano Lincoln's demurrer to the fifth cause of action for negligent repair is SUSTAINED.

A demurrer shall be sustained if the complaint 'does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.' (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10(e).) To test the sufficiency of a cause of action, the court treats as true 'all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.' (Centinela Freeman Emergency Medical Associates v. Health Net of California, Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 994, 1010.) The court may also consider matters that have been judicially noticed. (Id.) The court shall give the complaint a 'reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.' (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) Defendants demur to the sixth cause of action for fraudulent inducement–concealment on the grounds the claim fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, including that Defendant did not owe Plaintiffs a duty of disclosure, as Plaintiff has not adequately alleged a direct transaction between Defendant and Plaintiff. The court agrees the complaint lacks facts sufficient to establish a duty of disclosure.

To succeed on a fraudulent concealment claim, Plaintiffs must prove: (1) Defendant concealed or suppressed a material fact; (2) Defendant was under a duty to disclose the fact to Plaintiffs; (3) Defendant intentionally concealed or suppressed the fact with the intent to defraud Plaintiffs; (4) Plaintiffs were unaware of the fact and would not have acted purchased the subject vehicle of they had known of the concealed or suppressed fact; and (5) as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact, Plaintiffs sustained damage. (Boschma v. Home Loan Center, Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 230, 248 [quoting Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 748].) A duty to disclose arises only when some kind of preexisting relationship exists between the plaintiff and the defendant, and as 'a matter of common sense, such a relationship can only come into being as a result of some sort of transaction between the parties.' (LiMandri v. Judkins (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 326, 337.) 'Thus, a duty to disclose may arise from the relationship between seller and buyer, employer and prospective employee, doctor and patient, or parties entering into any kind of contractual agreement.' (Id.) 'Such a transaction must necessarily arise from direct dealings between the plaintiff and the defendant; it cannot arise between the defendant and the public at large.' (Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc.

(2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 276, 312.) Calendar No.: Event ID:  TENTATIVE RULINGS

3103120  10 CASE NUMBER: CASE TITLE:  YOUSIF VS FORD MOTOR COMPANY [IMAGED]  37-2024-00003886-CU-BC-CTL Here, Plaintiff has not adequately alleged a transaction between himself and Defendant sufficient to trigger a duty of disclosure. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Ford acquired knowledge of the purported inherent transmission defect through sources not available to Plaintiff, was in a 'superior position' to Plaintiff, received complaints from customers regarding prior to Plaintiff's purchase, and Plaintiff could not reasonably have discovered the purported defect prior to his purchase of the subject vehicle.

(Complaint, ¶ 69.) These allegations do not suffice to establish direct dealings between the plaintiff and defendant. A duty to disclose all material facts 'cannot arise between the defendant and the public at large,' and Plaintiff's generalized and conclusory allegations at best describe a 'relationship' between Defendant and the public at large, and not directly between Plaintiff and Defendant. As such, Plaintiff has failed to allege Defendant had a duty to disclose the alleged defect, and therefore has not adequately stated a claim for fraudulent concealment.

Plaintiff contends a transactional relationship is not required, because 'a vendor has a duty to disclose material acts not only to immediate purchasers, but also to subsequent purchasers when the vendor has reason to expect that the item will be resold.' (OCM Principal Opportunities Fund, L.P. v. CIBC World Markets Corp. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 835, 851.) However, the cases on which Plaintiff relies for this proposition are distinguishable because the theory requires that the vendor (i.e., Defendant) mislead both purchasers. In other words, if Plaintiff's claim was that Defendant misrepresented to the dealership by omission the condition of the particular vehicle Plaintiff purchased, and the dealership then (unknowingly) passed that same misrepresentation to Plaintiff in a manner Defendant knew or should have known was likely (i.e., intended that it be passed), then a duty of disclosure on the part of Defendant might trigger. But that is not Plaintiff's claim.

Plaintiff's reliance on Dhital v. Nissan N. Am., Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 828 (review granted), is misplaced. Not only is that case nonbinding authority because review was granted by the California Supreme Court, but the Dhital court also provided no analysis on the issue of the buyer-seller relationship between the parties because there was an 'absence of a more developed argument by Nissan on this point.' (Id. at p. 844.) Accordingly, Defendants' demurrer to the sixth cause of action is sustained with leave to amend.

Defendants also demur to the fifth cause of action for negligent repair on the ground it does not state facts sufficient to overcome the economic loss rule. The court agrees the claim for negligent repair, as pled, is barred by the economic loss rule.

'In general, there is no recovery in tort for negligently inflicted 'purely economic losses,' meaning financial harm unaccompanied by physical or property damage.' (Sheen v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

(2022) 12 Cal.5th 905, 922.) The economic loss rule 'functions to bar claims in negligence for pure economic losses in deference to a contract between litigating parties.' (Ibid.) Tort claims for monetary losses between contracting parties are barred by the economic loss rule 'when they arise from – or are not independent of – the parties' underlying contracts.' (Id. at p. 923.) Here, Plaintiff's fifth cause of action for negligent repair is necessarily supported only by the prior alleged facts concerning breach of warranty (i.e., related to contract duties). Moreover, the only 'damage' alleged in the complaint is to 'the product itself' (i.e., to Plaintiff's vehicle); there is no allegation of personal or other property damage. (See, e.g., Jimenez v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 473, 483 ['The law of contractual warranty governs damage to the product itself.'].) Thus, Plaintiff's claim for negligent repair, as pled, is barred by the economic loss rule.

Accordingly, Defendants' demurrer to the fifth cause of action is sustained with leave to amend.

Plaintiff has 30 days from entry of this order to file and serve an amended complaint.

The minute order is the order of the court.

Calendar No.: Event ID:  TENTATIVE RULINGS

3103120  10 CASE NUMBER: CASE TITLE:  YOUSIF VS FORD MOTOR COMPANY [IMAGED]  37-2024-00003886-CU-BC-CTL Calendar No.: Event ID:  TENTATIVE RULINGS

3103120  10