Judge: Maurice A. Leiter, Case: 18STCV00932, Date: 2023-01-09 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 18STCV00932    Hearing Date: January 9, 2023    Dept: 54

Hearing Date: January 9, 2023

Department 54, Judge Maurice A. Leiter

Motion for Summary Judgment

Moving Party: Defendant Southern California Regional Rail Authority, joined by Defendant Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority

Responding Party: Plaintiff B&S Property Management, LLC

T/R:    DEFENDANT SCRRA’s MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS DENIED.

            DEFENDANT to notice. 

If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the courtroom at¿SMCdept54@lacourt.org¿with notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:00 am on the day of the hearing. 

            The Court considers the moving papers and opposition.

BACKGROUND

            On November 16, 2021, Plaintiff B&S Property Management, LLC filed the operative second amended complaint against Defendants Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority and Southern California Regional Rail Authority, asserting one cause of action for negligence/dangerous condition of property. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants owned and/or maintained a property adjacent to Plaintiff’s property, which contained a homeless encampment in the alley. Plaintiff alleges that a fire started in the encampment on property in Defendants’ control and spread to Plaintiff’s property, causing damage.

ANALYSIS

The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Trial judges are required “to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (CCP § 437c(p)(2).) Once the defendant has met that burden, “the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Id.)  To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce “substantial responsive evidence.” (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

Defendant SCRRA moves for summary judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to timely file a claim with SCRRA and Plaintiff cannot establish the cause of action for dangerous condition.

A. Claim Presentation, Statute of Limitations and Delayed Discovery

Gov. Code § 911.2(a) provides, “[a] claim relating to a cause of action for death or for injury to person or to personal property or growing crops shall be presented as provided in Article 2 (commencing with Section 915) not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action. A claim relating to any other cause of action shall be presented as provided in Article 2 (commencing with Section 915) not later than one year after the accrual of the cause of action.”

SCCRA asserts Plaintiff failed comply with this section and the claims against it are barred. It is undisputed that the fire occurred on October 14, 2017. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant MTA on October 12, 2018. On March 23, 2021, Plaintiff filed a government tort claim against SCRRA. On July 8, 2021, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint that added SCRRA as a Defendant.

            SCRRA argues that Plaintiff’s causes of action “accrued” on October 14, 2017.

SCRRA asserts that Plaintiff’s March 23, 2021 claim is untimely and that any claim to SCRRA should have been brought within one year of the fire, or October 14, 2018 at the latest, per Gov. Code § 911.2(a). In opposition, Plaintiff contends the causes of action against SCRRA “accrued” when Plaintiff learned in discovery that SCRRA and MTA had a contract that required SCRRA to maintain the property where the fire was started.

            Gov. Code § 901 defines “accrual;” it provides, “[f]or the purpose of computing the time limits prescribed by Sections 911.2, 911.4, 945.6, and 946.6, the date of the accrual of a cause of action to which a claim relates is the date upon which the cause of action would be deemed to have accrued within the meaning of the statute of limitations which would be applicable thereto if there were no requirement that a claim be presented to and be acted upon by the public entity before an action could be commenced thereon.”

            For statute of limitations purposes, “a cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of action. (Fox v. Ethicon Endo–Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 807, 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 661, 110 P.3d 914 (Fox ).) A plaintiff has reason to discover a cause of action when he or she has reason to at least suspect a factual basis for its elements. Suspicion of one or more of the elements, coupled with knowledge of any remaining elements, will generally trigger the applicable limitations period. (Ibid.) This refers to the ‘generic’ elements of wrongdoing, causation, and harm. It does not require a hypertechnical approach. Instead, ‘we look to whether the plaintiffs have reason to at least suspect that a type of wrongdoing has injured them.’ (Ibid.)” (S.M. v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 712, 717.)

Generally, the delayed discovery rule does not apply when the Plaintiff is aware of the causes of action but ignorant of the identity of the defendant. (See Fox, supra 35 Cal.4th at 807.) Courts have made this distinction on the grounds that the identity of a defendant is not an element of a cause of action, plaintiffs usually have sufficient opportunity to identify a defendant before the limitations period, and if the plaintiff remains ignorant of the defendant’s identity, the plaintiff may file suit and add the defendant via Doe amendment. (Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 399.)

            SCRRA asserts that while Plaintiff may have been unaware of SCRRA’s identity, Plaintiff was aware of its causes of action on October 14, 2017. SCRRA argues that this precludes Plaintiff from relying on the delayed discovery rule. As noted, Gov. Code § 901 provides “[t]he accrual date for presenting a government tort claim is determined by the rules applicable to determining when any ordinary cause of action accrues.” (S.M., supra 184 Cal.App.4th at 712.) The statute requires the Court to determine the accrual date “which would be applicable thereto if there were no requirement that a claim be presented to and be acted upon by the public entity before an action could be commenced thereon.” Under SCRRA interpretation of this statute, Plaintiff’s cause of action accrued on October 14, 2017 and the causes of action against SCRRA should be time-barred.

            As discussed in the Court’s ruling on SCRRA’s demurrer to the second amended complaint, SCRRA’s interpretation is illogical and narrow. The law allows a Plaintiff to add fictitiously named Defendants up to three years after the complaint is filed. (CCP § CCP § 583.210(a); Higgins v. Superior Ct. (2017) 15 Cal. App. 5th 973, 982.) Again, the complaint was filed on October 12, 2018. The first amended complaint, which added SCRRA, was filed on July 8, 2021. SCRRA filed a demurrer to the first amended complaint on October 28, 2021. This complies with CCP § 583.210(a). The action would be timely against a Defendant if “there were no requirement that a claim be presented to and be acted upon by the public entity before an action could be commenced thereon.”

If the Court were to follow SCRRA’s interpretation, Plaintiff would be in an impossible situation. There would be no way Plaintiff could add a later-identified entity and also timely comply with the claim presentation requirement. This was not the intent of legislature in drafting section 901.

            Plaintiff timely filed its lawsuit against MTA and Does. Plaintiff alleges it timely complied with the claim presentation requirement after it learned of SCRRA’s potential involvement. Plaintiff disputes that it was not genuinely ignorant of SCRRA’s identity when it filed the complaint. Summary judgment cannot be granted on the grounds of untimeliness.

B. Dangerous Condition on Public Property

Government Code § 835 provides that “a public entity is liable for injury caused by a dangerous condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and that either: (a) [a] negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition; or (b) [t]he public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition under Section 835.2 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition.” (Gov. Code § 835; see, e.g., Mixon v. State (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 124, 130-31.)  

SCRRA asserts that Plaintiff cannot establish a claim for dangerous condition on public property against SCRRA because the MOU between SCRRA and LACMTA did not include homeless encampment remediation, the encampment was not a dangerous condition, and SCRRA did not have notice of open flames in the encampment. (UMF ¶¶ 43-58.) In opposition, Plaintiff presents evidence showing SCRRA was responsible for maintaining the area, and that SCRRA did assist in homeless encampment remediation and was aware of the encampment and its fires. (AUMF ¶¶ 61-85.) This is sufficient to create a triable issue of fact.

            SCRRA’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED.