Judge Maurice A. Leiter, Case 19STCV10849 2023-02-23 Tentative Ruling

T/R: DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT AS TO THE JURY’S AWARD OF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST IS GRANTED.

If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the courtroom at¿SMCdept54@lacourt.org¿with notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:00 am on the day of the hearing.

This is a lemon law action arising from Plaintiff’s purchase of a 2014 Land Rover Range Rover Sport, manufactured and distributed by Defendant Land Rover North America, LLC. On October 27, 2022, a jury found in favor of Plaintiff after trial.

The trial court has limited discretion to grant a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict; it may grant it only when there is no substantial evidence to support the verdict. (Teitel v. First Los Angeles Bank (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1593, 1603. Campbell v. Cal-Gard Surety Services, Inc. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 563, 570.) A judgment notwithstanding the verdict can be sustained only when it can be said as a matter of law that no other reasonable conclusion is legally deducible from the evidence, and that any other holding would be so lacking in evidentiary support that the reviewing court would be compelled to reverse it, or the trial court would be compelled to set it aside as a matter of law. (Moore v. City and County of San Francisco (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 728, 733–734.) The trial court renders judgment notwithstanding the verdict when a motion for directed verdict should have been granted if made (CCP § 629). (Hansen v. Sunnyside Products, Inc. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1510 [Rev. Den. 9/17/97]; Walton v. Magno (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1237, 1239–1240.) The trial judge cannot, therefore, reweigh the evidence, or judge the credibility of witnesses; if the evidence is conflicting or if several reasonable inferences may be drawn, the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict should be denied. (Teitel, supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at 1603.)

Defendant moves for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the jury’s award of prejudgment interest.

Defendant asserts that the issue of prejudgment interest should not have been submitted to the jury under Civ. Code § 3288. This statute provides, “[i]n an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, and in every case of oppression, fraud, or malice, interest may be given, in the discretion of the jury.” Defendant argues that lemon law actions arise from the contract of sale, and that section 3288 is inapplicable.

The Court of Appeal has stated that warranties under the Song-Beverly Act arise from the sales contract. (See Felisilda v. FCA US LLC (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 486, 496.) The Court of Appeal also has found that the remedies available under Song-Beverly “are limited to the same categories, and measured in the same manner, as those normally available to a buyer for a seller's breach of a contract for sale of goods.” (Kwan v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 174, 187.)

Defendant points out that no California case has applied section 3288 to a lemon law action, instead addressing interest under Civ. Code § 3287(a). (See Duale v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 718, 729.) Section 3287(a) provides, “[a] person who is entitled to recover damages certain, or capable of being made certain by calculation, and the right to recover which is vested in the person upon a particular day, is entitled also to recover interest thereon from that day, except when the debtor is prevented by law, or by the act of the creditor from paying the debt.” Defendant asserts that section 3287(a) is the only statutory mechanism for an award of prejudgment interest in a Song-Beverly case, and that a request for prejudgment interest under that section is a mixed question of fact and law which can be determined only by the Court. (Defendant’s motion at 6.)

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that express and implied warranties from a manufacturer who is not a party to the sales contract are not part of the sales contract. (See e.g. Ngo v. BMW of North America, LLC, 23 F.4th 942, 949 (9th Cir. 2022).) Plaintiff argues that the obligations at issue in this action are statutory, not contractual.

Before trial the parties’ briefing and argument were unclear on whether the issue of prejudgment interest was for the jury (under section 3288) or the Court (under section 3287(a)). The Court allowed the jury to address the issue. After considering the parties post-trial briefing, the Court finds that judgment notwithstanding the verdict is appropriate on the issue of prejudgment interest. As noted, California courts have held that warranties arise under the sales contract. The California cases addressing prejudgment interest do so under Civ. Code § 3287(a), not Civ. Code § 3288. (Duale, supra at 729; see also Doppes v. Bently Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1009-10.) Plaintiff presents no binding California authority which provides otherwise.[1]

The issue of prejudgment interest, questions 10, 11, and 12 on the verdict form, can easily be separated from the jury’s other conclusions, leaving the rest of the verdict intact. Neither side suggests otherwise.

Defendant also argues that prejudgment interest would be inappropriate under section 3287(a) because the amount of damages was uncertain. The Court expresses no view on the merits of a possible motion under Civ. Code § 3287(a); that issue is not before the Court.

Defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the award of prejudgment interest is GRANTED.

[1] The Court notes that Plaintiff asserts in this motion that express and implied warranties do not arise under the sales contract, but in a separate motion Plaintiff seeks prejudgment interest at a rate of 10%, the amount applicable to “contracts entered into after 1985,” arguing: “[a]s Plaintiff entered into a contract for her vehicle, the statutory 10% is the appropriate rate to apply.” Plaintiff’s motion for prejudgment interest at 3-4.