Judge: Maurice A. Leiter, Case: 19STCV30353, Date: 2022-10-12 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 19STCV30353    Hearing Date: October 12, 2022    Dept: 54

Hearing Date: October 12, 2022

Department 54, Judge Maurice A. Leiter

(2) Motions for Summary Judgment

Moving Party: Cross-Defendants Ziad Alhassen, et al.

Responding Party: Cross-Complainants Dighton America, Inc., Hassen Real Estate Partnership, et al.

T/R:     CROSS-DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ARE DENIED.

            CROSS-DEFENDANTS to notice.

If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the courtroom at¿SMCdept54@lacourt.org¿with notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:00 am on the day of the hearing.

            The Court considers the moving papers and oppositions.

BACKGROUND

            On August 26, 2019, Plaintiff Ziad Alhassen sued Defendants Tarek Alhassen, Mohammed Tarif Alhassen and twenty-three business entities, asserting causes of action for declaratory relief, involuntary dissolution and winding up of business entities, conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, constructive trust and accounting. Plaintiff filed the third amended complaint on May 26, 2021.

            On May 4, 2020, Dighton America, Inc., et al. filed a cross-complaint against Ziad. On June 17, 2020, Hassen Real Estate Partnership, et al. filed a cross-complaint against Ziad. Cross-Complainants assert causes of action for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty and conversion.

This action arises out of several family businesses owned by brothers Ziad, Tarek, and Mohammed Tarif Alhassen. Plaintiff alleges that Tarek and Mohammed Tarif Alhassen conspired to squeeze him out of a newly formed business entity.    

ANALYSIS

“The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Trial judges are required “to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (CCP § 437c(p)(2).) Once the defendant has met that burden, “the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Id.)  To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce “substantial responsive evidence.” (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

A. Cross-Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment of Dighton’s Cross-Complaint

Cross-Defendants move for summary judgment of Dighton’s cross-complaint on the ground that it is barred by the statutes of limitations, the longest of which is four years.

Cross-Defendants assert that Cross-Complainants became aware of any purported wrongdoing by Ziad as early as September 22, 2014, when Tarif emailed Ziad accusing him of creating his own business entity and funneling money to it without corporate resolution or partnership approval (UMF ¶ 8.); and no later than August 2015, when Tarif sent an email accusing Ziad of stealing money from Dighton and Cross-Complainant’s accountant resigned. (UMF ¶¶ 13, 14.) The original complaint in this action was filed on August 26, 2019.

In opposition, Cross-Complainants argue that Cross-Defendants are equitably estopped from asserting the claims are time-barred. For equitable estoppel to apply, there must be some showing that Defendants induced Plaintiff to refrain from bringing a timely action by fraud, misrepresentation, or deception. (See Ateeq v. Najor (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1356.) Cross-Complainants present evidence showing Ziad denied accusations of wrongdoing and assured Cross-Complainants that any transfers were loans that would be repaid from 2014-2018. (AUMF ¶¶ 182-185, 192, 201-202.) Cross-Complainants represent that they trusted and believed Ziad. (AUMF ¶ 203.) Cross-Complainants also assert they did not discover the true extent of wrongdoing until 2017. (AUMF ¶ 215.) This is sufficient to create a triable issue of fact.

Cross-Defendants’ motion for summary judgment of Cross-Complainants Dighton, et al.’s cross-complaint is DENIED.

B. Cross-Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment of Hassen Real Estate Partnership’s Cross-Complaint

            Cross-Defendants move for summary judgment of Hassen’s cross-complaint on the same grounds and with the same evidence as the motion against Dighton. Dighton argues Cross-Defendants are estopped from asserting the claims are time barred and relies on the same evidence as Dighton. As discussed, there is a triable issue of fact.

Cross-Defendants’ motion for summary judgment of Cross-Complainants Hassen, et al.’s cross-complaint is DENIED.