Judge: Maurice A. Leiter, Case: 20STCP00884, Date: 2023-02-10 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCP00884    Hearing Date: February 10, 2023    Dept: 54

Hearing Date: February 10, 2023

Department 54, Judge Maurice A. Leiter

Motion for Summary Adjudication

Moving Party: Defendant Tesla, Inc.

Responding Party: Plaintiff Hannah Hollocks

T/R:     DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION IS DENIED.

            DEFENDANT TO NOTICE.

If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the courtroom at SMCdept54@lacourt.org with notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:00 am on the day of the hearing.

The Court considers the moving papers, opposition, and reply.

BACKGROUND

On March 2, 2020, Plaintiff Hannah Hollocks sued Defendant Tesla, Inc., asserting causes of action for (1) sexual harassment; (2) discrimination; (3) retaliation; (4) failure to prevent sexual harassment; and (5) disability discrimination. Plaintiff alleges she was the only female worker at Tesla’s Pomona Collision Center. Throughout her time there, Plaintiff alleges she was consistently sexually harassed, sexually assaulted twice by two different supervisors and retaliated against for reporting this conduct. Plaintiff alleges Defendant did not fairly investigate these claims, instead choosing to ignore Plaintiff’s treatment.

EVIDENCE OBJECTIONS

“In granting or denying a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, the court need rule only on those objections to evidence that it deems material to its disposition of the motion.” (CCP § 437c(q).) Plaintiff’s objection no. 1 is SUSTAINED. Defendant’s objections to the declaration of Plaintiff are OVERRULED. Plaintiff’s objection to Defendant’s reply evidence is SUSTAINED.

ANALYSIS

“The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Trial judges are required “to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (CCP § 437c(p)(2).) Once the defendant has met that burden, “the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Id.)  To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce “substantial responsive evidence.” (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

            Defendant moves for summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages. California Civil Code section 3294 authorizes the recovery of punitive damages in non-contract cases where “the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice . . . .” (Civ. Code § 3294(a).)

Defendant asserts that the claim for punitive damages fails because Plaintiff cannot show that any of the alleged misconduct was authorized or ratified by a managing agent. When the defendant is a corporation, “the oppression, fraud, or malice must be perpetrated, authorized, or knowingly ratified by an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.” (Wilson v. Southern California Edison Company (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 123, 164; see Civ. Code § 3294(b).)  

The Court of Appeal has held:

“The term ‘managing agent’ includes ‘only those corporate employees who exercise substantial independent authority and judgment in their corporate decision making so that their decisions ultimately determine corporate policy.’ [Citation.] ‘[T]o demonstrate that an employee is a true managing agent ..., a plaintiff seeking punitive damages would have to show that the employee exercised substantial discretionary authority over significant aspects of a corporation's business.’ [Citation.] But the determination of whether certain employees are managing agents ‘ “does not necessarily hinge on their ‘level’ in the corporate hierarchy. Rather, the critical inquiry is the degree of discretion the employees possess in making decisions ....” ’ ” (Powerhouse Motorsports Group, Inc. v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 867, 886, 164 Cal.Rptr.3d 811.) Corporate policy refers to “the general principles which guide a corporation, or rules intended to be followed consistently over time in corporate operations.” (Cruz v. HomeBase (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 160, 167, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 435.)

“The scope of a corporate employee's discretion and authority ... is ... a question of fact for decision on a case-by-case basis.” (White v. Ultramar, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 563, 567, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 19, 981 P.2d 944.)

(King v. U.S. National Bank Association (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 675, 713.)

            Defendant presents the declaration of Regional Collison Manager Jason Stewart. Stewart declares that he made the decision to terminate Plaintiff after receiving complaints that she engaged in inappropriate behavior in the workplace. Stewart also states, “I am not an officer, director, or managing agent of Tesla. I do not have the authority to shape or discretion over Tesla's corporate policy. No one supervised by me, including Associate Collision Managers Joshua Alvarez and Chris Dyer, are officers, directors, or managing agents of Tesla as they do not have the authority to shape or discretion over Tesla's corporate policy.” (Decl. Stewart ¶ 6; UMF ¶¶ 12-16.)

            Plaintiff asserts that this self-serving declaration is insufficient to show Stewart was not a managing agent. Courts have held that declarations that merely provide statements of law, such as “I am not a managing agent,” are not evidence. (See David v. Kiewit Pacific Co. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 358.) The Court agrees that Stewart’s declaration is not evidence; Defendant has failed to meet its initial burden.

Even if this were admissible evidence, Plaintiff has established triable issues of a fact as to Stewart’s status as a managing agent and Plaintiff’s entitlement to punitive damages. Plaintiff disputes that no managing agent ratified or authorized the alleged misconduct. (Opp. UMF ¶¶ 12-16.) Plaintiff provides evidence showing Stewart is in charge of all Tesla Collison Centers in the region, his responsibilities are “pretty much all operations” including setting metrics and goals, and he is allowed discretion to fire Collision Center employees in his region. (Opp. UMF ¶¶ 12-14.) Plaintiff also presents evidence that the investigators of Plaintiff’s complaints of sexual harassment were managing agents of Defendant. The investigators, Whitney Banks and Annalisa Rosney, have responsibility for all investigations of harassment and discrimination, including the methods of investigation and the conclusions of investigations. (AUMF ¶ 33.) Plaintiff argues that this essentially allows them to determine the discrimination and harassment policies of the company. This is sufficient to establish triable issues of fact.

            Defendant also argues that Plaintiff cannot establish malice, oppression, or fraud because Plaintiff was fired for inappropriate conduct. Plaintiff presents evidence showing she was consistently sexually harassed, and was sexually assaulted by two Tesla employees, Defendant failed to fairly investigate these claims and thereafter terminated her employment. This is sufficient to show a triable issue on malice, oppression, or fraud.

            Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication is DENIED.