Judge: Maurice A. Leiter, Case: 20STCV17032, Date: 2022-09-30 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20STCV17032 Hearing Date: September 30, 2022 Dept: 54
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Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles |
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Selah
Chavet, et al., |
Plaintiffs, |
Case No.: |
20STCV17032 |
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vs. |
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Tentative
Ruling |
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Ocwen
Loan Servicing, LLC, et al., |
Defendants. |
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Hearing
Date: September 30, 2022
Department
54, Judge Maurice A. Leiter
Motion
for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative, Motion for Summary Adjudication
Moving
Party: Defendants PHH Mortgage Corp., Western Progressive, LLC,
U.S. Bank National Association, and Newrez LLC
Responding
Party: Plaintiffs Selah Chavet, Esmaily Fuentes, Jim Oberg, and
Beth Oberg
T/R: DEFENDANTS’ MOTION, AS A MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS, IS GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS DENIED.
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION IS DENIED.
PLAINTIFF TO FILE AND SERVE A FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT WITHIN 15
DAYS OF NOTICE OF RULING.
DEFENDANTS TO NOTICE.
If
the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the courtroom
at SMCdept54@lacourt.org with
notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:00 am on the
day of the hearing
The Court considers the moving papers, opposition, and reply.
On May 20, 2020,
Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Defendants, asserting causes of action for
(1) violation of Civ. Code § 2923.6; (2) negligence; (3) wrongful foreclosure;
and (4) UCL violations. Plaintiffs allege Defendants sold real property despite
a conditional approval of Plaintiffs’ short sale application.
ANALYSIS
“The purpose of the law of summary
judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties'
pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in
fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Trial judges are required “to grant summary
judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably
deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or
evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v.
Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)
As to each claim as framed by the
complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial
burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to
establish a defense. (CCP § 437c(p)(2).) Once the defendant has met that burden,
“the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more
material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Id.)
To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the
motion must produce “substantial responsive evidence.” (Sangster v. Paetkau
(1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.) Courts “liberally
construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and
resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v.
Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)
Defendants
move for summary judgment or in the alternative summary adjudication of
Plaintiffs’ causes of action.
A.
Statement of Facts
The
relevant facts are undisputed. Plaintiffs defaulted on their mortgage loan in
2016. Plaintiffs submitted short sale applications in 2018 that ultimately did
not result in a short sale. In 2019, the original loan servicer, Ocwen,
transferred the loan to PHH.
Plaintiffs
submitted another short sale application on August 8, 2019 for $650,000.00. PHH
informed Plaintiffs that that the short sale application had been conditionally
approved by letter dated September 6, 2019.
On September 27, 2019, PHH emailed Plaintiff’s
real estate agent to say the short sale application had ultimately been
rejected.
On
October 2, 2019, Plaintiffs submitted a new short sale offer for $700,000.00.
The same day, PHH advised Plaintiffs in an official letter that the $650,000.00
offer was rejected.
On
October 8, 2019, PHH sent a letter to Plaintiffs rejecting the $700,000.00
offer, stating there was not enough time to consider the offer before the
October 8, 2019 planned foreclosure sale. The property was sold at foreclosure
sale that day.
B.
Merits
Defendants assert that Plaintiffs’
first cause of action for violation of Civil Code § 2923.6 fails because this
section addresses the rules regarding foreclosure if a loan modification
application has been submitted. Defendants emphasize that this action involves
a short sale application and argue that Civil Code § 2923.6 is inapplicable.
In opposition, Plaintiffs cite to
Civil Code § 2924.11,
which prevents a lender from foreclosing on a property if a foreclosure
prevention alternative (that is, a short sale) has been approved in writing by
all parties. Plaintiffs assert the September 6, 2019 conditional approval
precluded foreclosure. In reply, Defendants assert this this provision is
inapplicable because it is not cited in Plaintiffs’ complaint and because
Defendants ultimately denied the application.
The
Court is unpersuaded that Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. The September 6, 2019 letter conditionally approving Plaintiffs’
application states, “…we are offering an opportunity to pursue short sale and
are providing a 45-day conditional Short Sale approval good through 10/25/19.”
(Def. Exh. 23, p. 1, emphasis in original.) In the section titled “FREQUENTLY
ASKED QUESTIONS,” the letter provides, “[i]f the Short Sale is not approved due
to unacceptable sale terms (low sales price, excessive commission,
etc.), a revised purchase contract with a new sales price for review may be
submitted.” (Id. p. 4 emphasis in original.)
It
is unclear why Plaintiffs’ property was sold on October 8, 2019, when
Defendants stated the conditional approval was valid until October 25, 2019.
Similarly, the letter specifically allows Plaintiffs to submit a new offer.
This was plainly done within the 45-day window provided for in the letter but
was not reviewed prior to sale.
Plaintiffs
cited the wrong provision of the Homeowner’s Bill of Rights in the operative
pleading. But the Court will not grant summary judgment on this basis and will
instead treat this motion as a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
The Court of Appeal has discussed this process as follows,
The procedure for
resolving a summary judgment motion presupposes that the
pleadings are adequate to put in issue a cause of action or defense thereto.
(See Coyne v. Krempels (1950) 36 Cal.2d 257, 262, 223 P.2d
244.) However a pleading may be defective in failing to allege an element
of a cause of action or in failing to intelligibly identify a defense thereto.
In such a case, the moving party need not address a missing element nor,
obviously, respond to assertions which are unintelligible or make out no
recognizable legal claim. The summary judgment proceeding is thereby
necessarily transmuted into a test of the pleadings and the summary judgment
motion into a motion for judgment on the pleadings. In these circumstances it
has been said that a defendant's “motion for summary judgment necessarily
includes a test of the sufficiency of the complaint and as such is in legal
effect a motion for judgment on the pleadings.” (Barnett v. Delta
Lines, Inc. (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 674, 682, 187 Cal.Rptr.
219, citations omitted.)
(FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d
367, 382.)
The Court GRANTS this motion as a motion for judgment on the
pleadings. The motion for summary judgment is DENIED.