Judge: Maurice A. Leiter, Case: 20STCV35354, Date: 2023-04-28 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20STCV35354 Hearing Date: April 28, 2023 Dept: 54
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Superior
Court of California County of
Los Angeles |
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Vincent Albano, |
Plaintiff, |
Case No.: |
20STCV35354 |
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vs. |
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Tentative Ruling |
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City of Los Angeles, |
Defendant. |
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Hearing Date: April 28, 2023
Department 54, Judge Maurice A. Leiter
Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Expert
Costs;
Motion to Tax Costs
T/R:
PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES IS GRANTED IN THE REDUCED AMOUNT OF $629,243.75.
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR EXPERT COSTS IS
GRANTED.
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO TAX COSTS IS
DENIED.
PLAINTIFF
to notice.
If the
parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the courtroom at¿SMCdept54@lacourt.org¿with notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party)
before 8:00 am on the day of the hearing.
The Court considers the moving
papers, oppositions, and replies.
On
September 16, 2020, Plaintiff Vincent Albano filed a complaint against City of
Los Angeles, asserting causes of action for disability discrimination, failure
to accommodate, and failure to engage in the interactive process. Plaintiff was
employed by Defendant as a police officer. Plaintiff alleges Defendant
discriminated against him because of his disability.
Following
trial, the jury found in favor of Defendant on the cause of action for failure
to accommodate and in favor of Plaintiff on the cause of action for failure to
engage in the interactive process. The jury awarded Plaintiff $700,000.00 in
past non-economic damages and $300,000.00 in future non-economic damages.
ANALYSIS
I.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Expert Costs
Under
Gov. Code § 12965(b), “a prevailing plaintiff should ordinarily receive his or
her costs and attorney fees unless special circumstances would render such an
award unjust.” (Williams v. Chino Valley
Independent Fire Dist. (2015) 61 Cal.4th 97, 115.)
A. Reasonableness of Fees
“The verified time statements of the
attorneys, as officers of the court, are entitled to credence in the absence of
a clear indication the records are erroneous.” (Horsford v. Board Of Trustees Of California State University
(2005) 132
Cal. App. 4th 359, 396.) If the motion is supported by evidence, the
opposing party must respond with specific evidence showing that the fees are
unreasonable. (Premier Med. Mgmt. Sys. v. California Ins. Guarantee Ass’n (2008) 163 Cal. App. 4th 550, 560–63.) The Court has
discretion to reduce fees that result from inefficient or duplicative use of
time. (Horsford, supra at 395.)
“The determination of what constitutes a
reasonable fee generally ‘begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours
reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate….’” “[T]he
lodestar is the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community; it
may be adjusted by the court based on factors including, as relevant herein,
(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill
displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the
litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature
of the fee award….” (Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc.¿(2006)
144 Cal. App. 4th 140, 154.)
Plaintiff moves for attorney’s fees in the lodestar amount
of $726,106.25. Plaintiff’s counsel declares that 882.10 hours at $175.00 to $1,100.00
per hour were spent prosecuting this action.
1.
Hourly Rate
“The
reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.” (PLCM
Grp. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) “The
‘experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional
services rendered in his court, and while his judgment is of course subject to
review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that
it is clearly wrong’ — meaning that it abused its discretion.” (Id.)
Counsel Matthew S. McNicholas spent 255.75 hours at $1,100.00
per hour prosecuting this action. Counsel Douglas D. Winter spent 390.00 hours
at $950.00 per hour prosecuting this action. Plaintiff presents the
declarations of McNicholas and Winter, who represent that courts have awarded
them hourly rates of up to $850.00 per hour. Plaintiff does not provide any
statistical information to support counsel’s hourly rates nor any declarations
of other similarly situated attorneys. In the Court’s view, rates of $1,100 per
hour and $950.00 per hour are excessive. For attorneys of Plaintiff’s counsel’s
experience and skill, the Court finds $950.00 per hour for McNicholas and $800.00
per hour for Winter appropriate. The Court declines to lower the hourly rates
of the remaining attorneys and paralegal. These rates are not excessive.
2. Number of Hours
Plaintiff asserts that
the number of hours spent is reasonable given the length and complexity of the
action. The Court agrees. This action lasted approximately three years and
proceeded to a jury trial.
Defendant asserts that
counsel should not be compensated for time spent on unsuccessful claims. Plaintiff’s
claims arose out of the same set of facts and required the application of
overlapping legal issues. The Court sees no need to apportion fees in this
instance.
The Court will allow 255.75
hours at $950.00 per hour for the work of McNicholas and 390.00
hours at $800.00 per hour for the work of Winter. The Court will not
reduce the hourly rates for attorneys Kim and Nizinski’s or paralegal McGuire.
The Court awards a total lodestar amount of $629,243.75.
B. Multiplier
The Court is permitted, but not required, to
apply a multiplier to an award for attorney’s fees. (Ketchum v. Moses
(2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1138.) Relevant factors to determine whether an
enhancement is appropriate include (1) the novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent
to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the
attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award. (Id. at 1132.)
Plaintiff requests the Court award a 1.25
multiplier to the fee award. Plaintiff asserts that a multiplier should be
awarded for the preparation, skill, and expertise of counsel. Though counsel
successfully litigated this case, the Court does not find a multiplier
appropriate. The lodestar fees are sufficient to compensate counsel.
C. Expert Fees
Gov.
Code § 12965(b) authorizes the Court to award expert witness fees to the
prevailing party. Plaintiff requests the Court award $10,120.00 in expert fees
for the services of Marianne Inouye. Inouye testified regarding Plaintiff’s
future economic losses. As stated, the jury did not award Plaintiff economic
damages. Plaintiff asserts this does not prevent the recovery of expert costs.
Defendant asserts Plaintiff should not recover expert costs for an unsuccessful
claim.
Neither party provides authority on
point. As the statute allows recovery of expert costs for the prevailing party,
the Court will allow recovery of Inouye’s fees.
II. Defendant’s Motion to Tax Costs
Except as otherwise expressly
provided by statute, a prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover
costs in any action or proceeding. (CCP § 1032(b).) “Allowable costs shall be reasonably
necessary to the conduct of the litigation rather than merely convenient or
beneficial to its preparation.” (CCP §
1033.5(c)(2).) “If the items appearing
in a cost bill appear to be proper charges, the burden is on the party seeking
to tax costs to show that they were not reasonable or necessary.” (Ladas
v. California State Auto. Assn. (1993) 19 Cal. App. 4th 761, 774.) “On the other hand, if the items are properly
objected to, they are put in issue and the burden of proof is on the party
claiming them as costs.” (Ibid.)
Defendant
moves to tax $36,805.04 in
costs for trial technology support services. Defendant asserts these costs were
not reasonably necessary. In opposition, Plaintiff argues that these costs were
reasonably necessary because the technology services greatly aided the jurors,
making the presentation of exhibits and demonstratives at trial efficient and
easy to see and follow for jurors, the Court, and the parties. The Court
agrees. Plaintiff may recover these costs.
Defendant’s
motion to tax costs is DENIED.