Judge: Maurice A. Leiter, Case: 21STCV04275, Date: 2022-12-15 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV04275 Hearing Date: December 15, 2022 Dept: 54
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Superior Court
of California County of Los
Angeles |
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Ebony Williams, |
Plaintiff, |
Case No.: |
21STCV04275 |
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vs. |
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Tentative Ruling |
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Law Offices of Todd M. Friedman, P.C., et al., |
Defendants. |
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Hearing Date: December 15, 2022
Department 54, Judge Maurice Leiter
Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative, Motion
for Summary Adjudication
Moving Party: Defendants
Law Offices of Todd M. Friedman, P.C., Todd Michael Friedman, Esq., and Meghan
Elisabeth George, Esq.,
Responding Party: Plaintiff
Ebony Williams
T/R: DEFENDANTS’ MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS GRANTED.
DEFENDANTS TO
NOTICE.
If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please
email the courtroom at SMCdept54@lacourt.org with notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented
party) before 8:00 am on the day of the hearing.
The Court
considers the moving papers, opposition, and reply.
BACKGROUND
On July 30, 2021, Plaintiff Ebony Williams filed the operative second
amended complaint against Defendants Law Offices of Todd M.
Friedman, P.C., Todd Michael Friedman, Esq., and Meghan Elisabeth George, Esq.,
asserting causes of action for (1) professional negligence;
(2) breach of contract; (3) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing; (4) breach of fiduciary duty; (5) violation of Bus. & Prof.
Code 17200.
This action arises from claims concerning a prior lawsuit: Defendants
represented Plaintiff in an employment discrimination case against her former
employer, Mercury Insurance. That case, Ebony Williams v. Mercury Insurance,
Los Angeles County Superior Court Case No. 19STCV11492, was filed on April 3,
2019 and asserted causes of action for (1) Race Harassment, Discrimination, and
Retaliation in Employment [California Government Code § 12940 et seq.]; and (2)
Retaliation and Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy (the
“Underlying Action”). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s negligence forced
Plaintiff to settle the Underlying Action against Mercury Insurance for
“pennies on the dollar.”
REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
Defendants’ requests for judicial
notice are GRANTED per Evid. Code § 452.
ANALYSIS
“The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide
courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadings in order to
determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to
resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25
Cal.4th 826, 843.) Trial judges are required “to grant summary judgment if all
the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the
evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there
is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp.
(1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)
As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant
moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by
presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense.
(CCP § 437c(p)(2).) Once the defendant has met that burden, “the burden shifts
to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts
exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Id.) To establish a triable
issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce “substantial
responsive evidence.” (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151,
166.) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in
support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning
the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006)
39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)
Defendants move for summary judgment of Plaintiff’s second
amended complaint on the grounds that Plaintiff cannot prove causation or
damages.
In attorney malpractice actions, the plaintiff must “establish
causation by showing either (1) but for the negligence, the
harm would not have occurred, or (2) the negligence was a concurrent
independent cause of the harm.” (Viner v. Sweet (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1232,
1241.) Put another way, the attorney’s negligence must be a substantial factor
in causing the plaintiff’s harm. (Id. at 1240, discussing the
Restatement Second of Torts.)
Defendants began representing Plaintiff in her employment
matter in September 2018. (UMF ¶ 2.) On April 3, 2019, Defendants filed the
lawsuit against Mercury Insurance on Plaintiff’s behalf. (UMF ¶ 3.) Defendants
present evidence showing Defendants filed a motion to be relieved as counsel on
November 13, 2019, which was ultimately granted on February 5, 2020. (UMF ¶ 4.)
Mercury filed a motion for summary judgment on May 13, 2020, with a hearing
date of July 29, 2020. On the date of the hearing, Plaintiff requested a
continuance to file an opposition to the summary judgment motion; the hearing
was continued to October 27, 2020 with Plaintiff’s opposition due on October
13, 2020. On October 6, 2020, Plaintiff retained counsel. Thereafter, Plaintiff
and Mercury settled, and Plaintiff dismissed the Mercury action on October 14,
2020. Plaintiff alleges she settled for “pennies on the dollar” due to
Defendants’ failure to conduct discovery, which would have allowed Plaintiff to
oppose Mercury’s summary judgment motion.
Defendants assert that Plaintiff cannot establish causation
because Defendants withdrew as counsel almost a year before the settlement, due
to Plaintiff’s refusal to participate in discovery. Defendants represent that
Plaintiff has no evidence showing Defendants’ actions caused her to settle the
Mercury action for less than it was worth; Plaintiff refused to answer
questions about the circumstances of the Mercury settlement during her
deposition. (Def. Exh. 10, Pl. Depo pp. 157-159.) Defendant also argues that
Plaintiff could not have prevailed against Mercury in the summary judgment
motion or at trial; Plaintiff refused to answer questions about her decision not
to oppose the motion and what defenses she would have had to the motion. (Def.
Exh. 10, Pl. Depo pp. 149-153.) Defendants have met their initial burden on
each of the causes of action.
In opposition, Plaintiff asserts she would have prevailed on
the summary judgment motion if Defendants had conducted discovery. Plaintiff
testified that she believed Mercury terminated her employment because of her
race. (Def. Exh. 10, Pl. Depo pp. 88-90.) Plaintiff does not explain or present
evidence showing what information or documents would have been discovered in
the Mercury action. Nor does Plaintiff explain how the information or documents
could have been used to defend against Mercury’s motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiff fails to explain or present evidence connecting Defendants’ conduct
to her allegedly undervalued settlement. And Plaintiff does not provide
evidence showing what her damages would have been against Mercury, or the
potential amount of a settlement with Mercury had discovery been conducted.
Plaintiff has not presented evidence showing Defendant’s
actions or inactions caused her damages. That Plaintiff believes a different
result would have occurred if discovery was conducted is insufficient to
establish a prima facie showing of causation or damages for any of
Plaintiff’s causes of action. Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden to
establish a triable issue of fact.
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.