Judge: Maurice A. Leiter, Case: 21STCV04275, Date: 2022-12-15 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV04275    Hearing Date: December 15, 2022    Dept: 54

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

 

Ebony Williams,

 

 

 

Plaintiff,

 

Case No.:

 

 

21STCV04275

 

vs.

 

 

Tentative Ruling

 

Law Offices of Todd M. Friedman, P.C., et al.,

 

 

 

Defendants.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Hearing Date: December 15, 2022

Department 54, Judge Maurice Leiter

Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative, Motion for Summary Adjudication

Moving Party: Defendants Law Offices of Todd M. Friedman, P.C., Todd Michael Friedman, Esq., and Meghan Elisabeth George, Esq.,

Responding Party: Plaintiff Ebony Williams

 

T/R:     DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS GRANTED.

 

DEFENDANTS TO NOTICE.

 

If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the courtroom at SMCdept54@lacourt.org with notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:00 am on the day of the hearing.

 

            The Court considers the moving papers, opposition, and reply.

 

BACKGROUND

 

On July 30, 2021, Plaintiff Ebony Williams filed the operative second amended complaint against Defendants Law Offices of Todd M. Friedman, P.C., Todd Michael Friedman, Esq., and Meghan Elisabeth George, Esq., asserting causes of action for (1) professional negligence; (2) breach of contract; (3) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (4) breach of fiduciary duty; (5) violation of Bus. & Prof. Code 17200.

 

This action arises from claims concerning a prior lawsuit: Defendants represented Plaintiff in an employment discrimination case against her former employer, Mercury Insurance. That case, Ebony Williams v. Mercury Insurance, Los Angeles County Superior Court Case No. 19STCV11492, was filed on April 3, 2019 and asserted causes of action for (1) Race Harassment, Discrimination, and Retaliation in Employment [California Government Code § 12940 et seq.]; and (2) Retaliation and Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy (the “Underlying Action”). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s negligence forced Plaintiff to settle the Underlying Action against Mercury Insurance for “pennies on the dollar.”

 

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

 

 Defendants’ requests for judicial notice are GRANTED per Evid. Code § 452.

 

ANALYSIS

 

“The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Trial judges are required “to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

 

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (CCP § 437c(p)(2).) Once the defendant has met that burden, “the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Id.)  To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce “substantial responsive evidence.” (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

 

Defendants move for summary judgment of Plaintiff’s second amended complaint on the grounds that Plaintiff cannot prove causation or damages.

 

In attorney malpractice actions, the plaintiff must “establish causation by showing either (1) but for the negligence, the harm would not have occurred, or (2) the negligence was a concurrent independent cause of the harm.” (Viner v. Sweet (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1232, 1241.) Put another way, the attorney’s negligence must be a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s harm. (Id. at 1240, discussing the Restatement Second of Torts.)

 

Defendants began representing Plaintiff in her employment matter in September 2018. (UMF ¶ 2.) On April 3, 2019, Defendants filed the lawsuit against Mercury Insurance on Plaintiff’s behalf. (UMF ¶ 3.) Defendants present evidence showing Defendants filed a motion to be relieved as counsel on November 13, 2019, which was ultimately granted on February 5, 2020. (UMF ¶ 4.) Mercury filed a motion for summary judgment on May 13, 2020, with a hearing date of July 29, 2020. On the date of the hearing, Plaintiff requested a continuance to file an opposition to the summary judgment motion; the hearing was continued to October 27, 2020 with Plaintiff’s opposition due on October 13, 2020. On October 6, 2020, Plaintiff retained counsel. Thereafter, Plaintiff and Mercury settled, and Plaintiff dismissed the Mercury action on October 14, 2020. Plaintiff alleges she settled for “pennies on the dollar” due to Defendants’ failure to conduct discovery, which would have allowed Plaintiff to oppose Mercury’s summary judgment motion.

 

Defendants assert that Plaintiff cannot establish causation because Defendants withdrew as counsel almost a year before the settlement, due to Plaintiff’s refusal to participate in discovery. Defendants represent that Plaintiff has no evidence showing Defendants’ actions caused her to settle the Mercury action for less than it was worth; Plaintiff refused to answer questions about the circumstances of the Mercury settlement during her deposition. (Def. Exh. 10, Pl. Depo pp. 157-159.) Defendant also argues that Plaintiff could not have prevailed against Mercury in the summary judgment motion or at trial; Plaintiff refused to answer questions about her decision not to oppose the motion and what defenses she would have had to the motion. (Def. Exh. 10, Pl. Depo pp. 149-153.) Defendants have met their initial burden on each of the causes of action.

 

In opposition, Plaintiff asserts she would have prevailed on the summary judgment motion if Defendants had conducted discovery. Plaintiff testified that she believed Mercury terminated her employment because of her race. (Def. Exh. 10, Pl. Depo pp. 88-90.) Plaintiff does not explain or present evidence showing what information or documents would have been discovered in the Mercury action. Nor does Plaintiff explain how the information or documents could have been used to defend against Mercury’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff fails to explain or present evidence connecting Defendants’ conduct to her allegedly undervalued settlement. And Plaintiff does not provide evidence showing what her damages would have been against Mercury, or the potential amount of a settlement with Mercury had discovery been conducted.

 

Plaintiff has not presented evidence showing Defendant’s actions or inactions caused her damages. That Plaintiff believes a different result would have occurred if discovery was conducted is insufficient to establish a prima facie showing of causation or damages for any of Plaintiff’s causes of action. Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden to establish a triable issue of fact.

 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.