Judge: Maurice A. Leiter, Case: 21STCV08172, Date: 2022-10-19 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV08172    Hearing Date: October 19, 2022    Dept: 54

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

 

Humberto Lepelch, et al.,

 

 

 

Plaintiffs,

 

Case No.:

 

 

21STCV08172

 

vs.

 

 

Tentative Ruling

 

 

RWBP Highland LP, et al.,

 

 

 

Defendants.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Hearing Date: October 19, 2022

Department 54, Judge Maurice A. Leiter

Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative, Motion for Summary Adjudication

Moving Party: Defendant Essex Management Corporation

Responding Party: Plaintiffs Humberto Lepelch and Mark Belanger

T/R:     DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS GRANTED.

            DEFENDANT TO NOTICE.

If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the courtroom at¿SMCdept54@lacourt.org¿with notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:00 am on the day of the hearing. 

The Court considers the moving papers, opposition, and reply.

BACKGROUND

            This is a landlord-tenant action. On April 19, 2021, Plaintiffs filed the operative first amended complaint against Defendants, asserting causes of action for (1) breach of the implied warranty of habitability; (2) nuisance; (3) negligence; (4) constructive eviction; and (5) UCL violations. Plaintiffs allege Defendants failed to properly maintain the building. Plaintiffs also allege Defendants’ AirBnB business in the building interfered with their use of the premises.

ANALYSIS

“The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Trial judges are required “to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (CCP § 437c(p)(2).) Once the defendant has met that burden, “the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Id.)  To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce “substantial responsive evidence.” (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

            Defendant Essex moves for summary judgment or in the alternative summary adjudication of Plaintiffs’ causes of action.

Essex asserts that it was Plaintiffs’ landlord only for the first two months of Plaintiffs’ tenancy, selling the building to Redwood on January 3, 2017. Defendant presents evidence showing Plaintiffs did not complain about any conditions in the building and Plaintiffs do not recall any complaints about the condition of the building while Essex was landlord. (UMF ¶¶ 2-6.)

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that Essex is liable to Plaintiffs because it “created” the problems with the AirBnB guests. Plaintiff relies on evidence showing Essex had rented a quarter of the units to short-term rental companies at the time the building was sold to Redwood. (Opp. UMF ¶ 8.) This is insufficient to create a triable issue of fact. Plaintiffs do not dispute that all issues in this action arose after Essex sold the building. Plaintiffs concede they did not have complaints regarding the maintenance of the building or AirBnB guests while Essex was landlord. That Essex allowed short-term rentals does not make Essex liable for conduct that occurred when it was not in control of the premises. 

Essex’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.