Judge: Maurice A. Leiter, Case: 21STCV10395, Date: 2023-02-24 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV10395    Hearing Date: February 24, 2023    Dept: 54

Hearing Date: February 24, 2023

Department 54, Judge Maurice A. Leiter

Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative, Motion for Summary Adjudication

Moving Party: Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant Wilfred Uy

Responding Party: Defendant/Cross-Complainant Sherry Mehdian

T/R:    CROSS-DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS GRANTED.

            CROSS-DEFENDANT TO NOTICE.

If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the courtroom at SMCdept54@lacourt.org with notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:00 am on the day of the hearing.

The Court considers the moving papers, opposition, and reply.

BACKGROUND

On March 17, 2021, Plaintiff Willfred Uy filed a complaint against Defendant Sherry Mehdian, asserting causes of action for Labor Code violations. Plaintiff alleges Defendant employed him as an in-home care giver for Defendant’s brother and mother.

On August 25, 2022, Mehdian filed a cross-complaint against Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel for fraud and conversion. Mehdian alleges Plaintiff and his counsel “stole” a services logbook documenting the health conditions of Defendant’s brother and mother. Mehdian also alleges Plaintiff misrepresented his qualifications.

ANALYSIS

“The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Trial judges are required “to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (CCP § 437c(p)(2).) Once the defendant has met that burden, “the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Id.)  To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce “substantial responsive evidence.” (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

A. First Cause of Action for Fraudulent Inducement

The elements of fraud are: “(a) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or ‘scienter’); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage.” (Charnay v. Cobert (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 170, 184.) “Fraud in the inducement . . . occurs when ‘the promisor knows what he is signing but his consent is induced by fraud, mutual assent is present and a contract is formed, which, by reason of the fraud is voidable.” (Rosenthal v. Great Western Financial Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 415 (quoting Ford v. Shearson Lehman American Express, Inc. (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 1011, 1028).) 

Uy asserts that the first cause of action for fraud fails because Mehdian cannot establish Uy made any misrepresentations to Mehdian, and Mehdian did not rely on any misrepresentations. Uy presents evidence showing Mehdian was not aware of any conversations between Uy, her mother Mahin Rezvani, and her brother Shahdad Hassid about Uy’s training or qualifications. (UMF ¶¶ 3-5.)

In opposition, Mehdian does not dispute these facts. Mehdian asserts that she has brought this action as personal representative of Rezvani’s and Hassid’s estates and may maintain the fraud cause of action in the shoes of Rezcani and Hassid. Mehdian has not alleged this in the cross-complaint and has not followed the procedures set forth in CCP § 377.20 et. seq.

Alternatively, Mehdian argues that Uy’s misrepresentations to Rezcani and Hassid are imputed to Mehdian as Uy’s joint employer. (See e.g. Garcia v. Pexco (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 782.) Mehdian posits that Uy must have concealed his lack of training and qualifications to Rezcani and Hassid because they hired him. Mehdian represents that Rezcani was severely disabled and Hassid was elderly, which required a caregiver with sufficient training and experience. (Decl. Mehdian ¶ 4.) Uy testified that he did not have previous experience as a caregiver or healthcare provider.

In reply, Uy argues that even if Rezcani and Hassid were Mehdian’s agent, Mehdian still must establish that she personally relied on any misrepresentations. Mehdian concedes that she did not rely on Uy’s purported misrepresentations.

Mehdian has failed to establish a triable issue of fact. Mehdian has never previously represented that this action is brought as personal representative of Rezvani’s and Hassid’s estates and Mehdian admits that she did not rely on any misrepresentations. (Opp. 7:1-4.)

B. Second Cause of Action for Unjust Enrichment

            Uy asserts that the second cause of action for unjust enrichment fails because an employer cannot recover previously paid wages, and because Mehdian did not provide Uy with lodging. Labor Code § 221 provides, “It shall be unlawful for any employer to collect or receive from an employee any part of wages theretofore paid by said employer to said employee.” Mehdian admitted in deposition that she did not own the apartment where Uy, Rezcani and Hassid lived.

            In opposition, Mehdian asserts that she is not seeking previously paid wages, but rather restitution from the recission of the employment contract. Mehdian does not seek recission in the cross-complaint and does not provide authority showing exemption from Labor Code § 221.

C. Third Cause of Action for Conversion

To plead a cause of action for conversion, one must allege (1) the plaintiff’s ownership or right to possession of personal property; (2) defendant’s disposition of the property inconsistent with plaintiff’s rights; and (3) resulting damages. (Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119.)

Uy asserts that the cause of action for conversion fails because Mehdian cannot establish a right of ownership or possession of the logbook. Uy presents evidence showing Mehdian did not purchase the logbook or write in the logbook and evidence showing the logbook did not leave Rezcani and Hassid’s apartment.

Mehdian does not dispute these facts in opposition. Mehdian has failed to establish a triable issue of fact as to conversion.

Uy’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.