Judge: Maurice A. Leiter, Case: 21STCV15317, Date: 2023-04-19 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV15317    Hearing Date: April 19, 2023    Dept: 54

Hearing Date: April 19, 2023

Department 54, Judge Maurice A. Leiter

Motion for Attorney’s Fees

Moving Party: Defendant Tuwanna Thompson

Responding Party: None

T/R:    DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS IS GRANTED.

            DEFENDANT TO NOTICE.

If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the courtroom at¿SMCdept54@lacourt.org¿with notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:00 am on the day of the hearing.

            The Court considers the moving papers. No opposition has been received.

BACKGROUND

On April 22, 2021, Plaintiff Karen Civil sued Defendant Tuwanna Thompson, asserting causes of action for defamation, false light, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, tortious interference with economic relations, and UCL violations. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant falsely stated her employment with Plaintiff was terminated because of Defendant’s opinion about Plaintiff’s client, Nicki Minaj. Plaintiff also alleged “she directly attacked Ms. Civil and her website by insinuating that they were merely on Nicki Minaj’s payroll, and were thus unable to truly provide accurate and unbiased news in the field of entertainment” on Twitter.

Defendant’s anti-SLAPP was to be heard on October 26, 2022. On October 20, 2022, Plaintiff dismissed the action.

ANALYSIS

Pursuant to CCP § 425.16(c), “a prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover his or her attorney’s fees and costs.”  “A prevailing defendant on an anti-SLAPP motion is entitled to seek fees and costs ‘incurred in connection with’ the anti-SLAPP motion itself, but is not entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs incurred for the entire action. . . .  [T]he award of fees is designed to ‘reimburs[e] the prevailing defendant for expenses incurred in extracting herself from a baseless lawsuit’ rather than to reimburse the defendant for all expenses incurred in the baseless lawsuit.”  (569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 433 [citations omitted].) 

“The verified time statements of the attorneys, as officers of the court, are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.”  (Horsford v. Board Of Trustees Of California State University (2005) 132 Cal. App. 4th 359, 396.)  If the motion is supported by evidence, the opposing party must respond with specific evidence showing that the fees are unreasonable.  (Premier Med. Mgmt. Sys. v. California Ins. Guarantee Ass’n (2008) 163 Cal. App. 4th 550, 560–63.)  The Court has discretion to reduce fees that result from inefficient or duplicative use of time.  (Horsford, supra at 395.) 

A. Prevailing Party

“[A] defendant who is voluntarily dismissed, with or without prejudice, after filing a section 425.16 motion to strike, is nevertheless entitled to have the merits of such motion heard as a predicate to a determination of the defendant's motion for attorney's fees and costs under subdivision (c) of that section.” (Moore v. Liu (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 745, 751.)

            Plaintiff alleged that Defendant made defamatory statements on Twitter about Plaintiff and her relationship with Nicki Minaj. (FAC ¶¶ 24-24.) Defendant asserts that this conduct is protected as statements in a public forum in connection with a public interest. The Court agrees. Facebook, Instagram and Twitter are public forums. (See e.g. D.C. v. R.R. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1190, 1226 [“Web sites accessible to the public are public forums for purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute.” (internal quotations omitted.)]) Plaintiff alleged she is a public figure and Nicki Minaj is a celebrity. Defendant represents that the statements at issue here were widely discussed on Twitter, and The New York Times published articles about the statements. The statements are in connection with a matter of public interest. (See e.g. Seelig v. Infinity Broadcasting Corp. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 798, 807-808.)

Defendant has met her burden to establish Plaintiff’s complaint arose from protected activity. Plaintiff did not oppose the motion. Defendant is the prevailing party for the purpose of attorney’s fees.

B. Reasonableness of Fees

Defendant moves for attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $10,190.35. Defendant’s counsel, Andrew Williams, spent 21.10 hours at $450.00 per hour for the anti-SLAPP motion and the instant fee motion. The Court finds that counsel’s fees are reasonable. Anti-SLAPP motions are complex, take significant skill and time, and require investigation, research, and analysis. Plaintiff has not opposed this motion to show otherwise.

Defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs is GRANTED.