Judge Maurice A. Leiter, Case 21STCV34560 2023-03-08 Tentative Ruling

Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative, Motion for Summary Adjudication

Responding Party: Plaintiffs Jarett Jakarr Waddell on behalf of minor R.W., Sarai Waddell, Taylor Thompson, Princess Waddell and Erin Thompson

T/R: DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION IS DENIED.

If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the courtroom at SMCdept54@lacourt.org with notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:00 am on the day of the hearing.

On September 20, 2021, Plaintiffs Jarett Jakarr Waddell on behalf of minor R.W., Sarai Waddell, Taylor Thompson, Princess Waddell, and Erin Thompson sued Defendants City of Burbank, Robert Martinez, and Joseph Moreno, asserting causes of action for (1) unreasonable seizure/excessive use of force (Bane Act); (2) negligence; and (3) negligent infliction of emotional distress. After a petty theft at a Costco, during which a suspect pushed a Costco employee, Officers Martinez and Moreno followed Plaintiffs’ vehicle believing them to be the perpetrators. When Plaintiffs pulled into their residence, the officers pointed their guns and yelled at Plaintiffs. The officers left once they realized Plaintiffs were not the theft suspects.

“The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Trial judges are required “to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (CCP § 437c(p)(2).) Once the defendant has met that burden, “the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Id.) To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce “substantial responsive evidence.” (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

To state a cause of action under Civil Code section 52.1, the plaintiff must allege that “the defendant interfered with or attempted to interfere with the plaintiff’s legal right by threatening or committing violent acts.” (Doe v. State (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 832, 842.)

Defendants assert that Plaintiffs’ cause of action for violation of the Bane Act fails because a police officer is permitted to make an investigatory stop if they have a reasonable suspicion, based on the circumstances, that the person being stopped is engaging in criminal activity. (See McNeary v. Stone (9th Cir. 1973) 482 F.2d 804, 805.) Defendants assert they reasonably believed that Plaintiffs were the theft suspects because Plaintiffs’ vehicle was similar to the description of the suspects’ vehicle; Plaintiffs’ vehicle was traveling on the same street, in the same direction, and at the same time as the suspects were reported to have fled; and Martinez and Moreno were unable to view the occupants of the vehicle, even after they initiated the stop, because the windows of Plaintiffs’ vehicle were heavily tinted. (UMF ¶¶ 25-28.)

Defendants also contend that the officers were justified in using high-risk traffic stop protocols because the robbery was an “Estes robbery.” (UMF ¶¶ 29-31.) Defendants assert this means the suspect committed a violent act during the robbery and suspects who have committed an “Estes robbery” may use violent force to evade arrest, including using the vehicle as a weapon. (UMF ¶¶ 18, 19, 25-31.)

In opposition, Plaintiffs assert Defendants did not have reasonable suspicion to stop Plaintiffs, because Defendants knew the suspects reportedly were driving a vehicle with Montana license plates, and Plaintiffs’ vehicle had California plates. Plaintiffs argue the high-risk traffic stop protocols were not reasonable because there was no indication the suspects were armed. This is sufficient to create a triable issue of fact as to the reasonableness of the officers’ actions.

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED. Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication of the first cause of action is DENIED.

B. Second and Third Causes of action for Negligence and Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

Defendants assert the second and third causes of action fail because the officer’s conduct was reasonable.[1] As discussed, Plaintiff has created a triable issue of fact as to reasonableness.

Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication of the second and third causes of action is DENIED.

[1] Defendants also argue the entire complaint is barred by Gov. Code § 820.4, which provides immunity to public employees who exercise due care in enforcing the law. This argument fails for the same reasons the individual causes of action fail.