Judge: Maurice A. Leiter, Case: 21STLC05004, Date: 2022-08-02 Tentative Ruling



Case Number: 21STLC05004    Hearing Date: August 2, 2022    Dept: 54

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

 

Melissa Marsh,

 

 

 

Plaintiff,

 

Case No.:

 

 

21STLC05004

 

vs.

 

 

Tentative Ruling

 

 

Archstone Oakwood Toluca Hills LLC, et al.,

 

 

 

Defendants.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Hearing Date: August 2, 2022

Department 54, Judge Maurice Leiter

Demurrer to First Amended Complaint and Motion to Strike

Moving Party: Defendants Archstone Oakwood Toluca Hills LLC and Avalonbay Communities, Inc., joined by Defendant Oakwood Worldwide (US) LP

Responding Party: Plaintiff Melissa Marsh

 

T/R:    DEFENDANTs’ demurrer is overruled.

 

defendants’ motion to strike is denied.

 

defendants to file and serve and answer to the first amended complaint within 20 days of notice of ruling.

 

            DEFENDANTs TO NOTICE.

 

If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the courtroom at¿SMCdept54@lacourt.org¿with notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:00 am on the day of the hearing.

            The Court considers the moving papers, opposition, and reply.

 

BACKGROUND

           

            On January 19, 2022, Plaintiff filed the operative first amended complaint against Defendants, asserting causes of action for (1) declaratory relief and injunctive relief; (2) retaliatory eviction/harassment; and (3) breach of contract. Plaintiff, a tenant in a unit owned by Defendant, alleges Defendants wrongfully changed the terms of Plaintiff’s rent, wrongfully removed furniture and household items, refused to accommodate Plaintiff’s disability, and evicted her in retaliation for her requests.

 

 

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

 

            Plaintiff’s requests for judicial notice are GRANTED as to the existence of the documents, but not as to the truth of the matters asserted in them.

 

ANALYSIS

 

A demurrer to a complaint may be taken to the whole complaint or to any of the causes of action stated in it.  (CCP § 430.50(a).)  A demurrer challenges only the legal sufficiency of the complaint, not the truth of its factual allegations or the plaintiff's ability to prove those allegations.  (Picton v. Anderson Union High Sch. Dist. (1996) 50 Cal. App. 4th 726, 732.)  The court must treat as true the complaint's material factual allegations, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.  (Id. at 732-33.)  The complaint is to be construed liberally to determine whether a cause of action has been stated.  (Id. at 733.)

 

A. Uncertainty and Alter Ego

 

Defendants demur to the entire complaint on the ground that it is uncertain and fails to properly allege alter ego. To invoke the alter ego doctrine, the plaintiff must plead unity of interest and ownership and that an inequity will result if the corporate entity is treated as the sole actor. (See Vasey v. California Dance Co. (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 742, 749.) Factors to consider in applying the doctrine include the commingling of funds and other assets, the holding out by one entity that it is liable for the debts of the other, identical equitable ownership in the two entities, inadequate capitalization, and disregard of corporate formalities. (Sonora Diamond Corp. v Superior Court (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 523, 538-39.) 

 

Plaintiff alleges all Defendants are alter egos of each other. Plaintiff alleges Defendants comingle funds, Defendants are undercapitalized, and that the Defendant entities are shells for Defendants’ personal business. (FAC ¶ 7.) This is sufficient to allege alter ego. The complaint is not uncertain.

 

B. Second Cause of Action for Retaliatory Eviction

 

            Civil Code § 1942.5(d) provides, “…it is unlawful for a lessor to increase rent, decrease services, cause a lessee to quit involuntarily, bring an action to recover possession, or threaten to do any of those acts, for the purpose of retaliating against the lessee because the lessee has lawfully organized or participated in a lessees' association or an organization advocating lessees' rights or has lawfully and peaceably exercised any rights under the law. In an action brought by or against the lessee pursuant to this subdivision, the lessee shall bear the burden of producing evidence that the lessor's conduct was, in fact, retaliatory.”

 

            Defendant demurs to the second cause of action on the grounds that Plaintiff did not participate in or organize a tenants’ association and that the City eviction moratorium controls over the County’s moratorium. Civil Code § 1942.5(d) prohibits a landlord from retaliating against a tenant for participating in or organizing a tenant’s association, or for lawfully and peacefully exercising any rights under the law. Plaintiff alleges she was retaliated against for requesting an accommodation for her disability. This is sufficient to state a cause of action for retaliatory eviction. The Court need not address the local ordinances at this time.

 

            The demurrer to the second cause of action is OVERRULED.

 

C. Third Cause of Action for Breach of Contract

 

            Defendant asserts that the third cause of action fails because Plaintiff has not alleged that moving Defendants are parties to the contract. As stated, Plaintiff has alleged that all Defendants are alter egos of each other and may be referred to collectively.

 

            The demurrer to the third cause of action is OVERRULED.

 

D. Motion to Strike

 

“Any party, within the time allowed to response to a pleading, may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part" of that pleading. (CCP § 435(b)(1).) “The Court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false or improper matter asserted in any pleading; (b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the Court." (CCP § 436.)

 

Punitive damages are available in noncontract cases where the defendant is guilty of “oppression, fraud, or malice.”  (Civil Code § 3294(a).)  Conclusory allegations are insufficient to support a claim for punitive damages.  (See, e.g., Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital (1989) 214 Cal. App. 3d 590, 620.)  However, “the stricken language must be read not in isolation, but in the context of the facts alleged in the rest of petitioner's complaint.”  (Perkins v. Superior Court (1981) 117 Cal. App. 3d 1, 6.)

 

            Defendants move to strike Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages on the ground that Plaintiff has failed to allege oppression, fraud, or malice. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants took away her cable, internet, phone, utilities, furnishing, consumables, and parking in retaliation for requesting a disability accommodation. A reasonable jury could find that this constitutes oppression, fraud, or malice.

 

            The motion to strike is DENIED.