Judge: Maurice A. Leiter, Case: 21STLC05004, Date: 2022-12-13 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STLC05004    Hearing Date: December 13, 2022    Dept: 54

Hearing Date: December 13, 2022

Department 54, Judge Maurice Leiter

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Moving Party: Defendants Archstone Oakwood Toluca Hills LLC and Avalonbay Communities, Inc., joined by Defendant Oakwood Worldwide (US) LP

Responding Party: Plaintiff Melissa Marsh

T/R:    DEFENDANTs’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS IS DENIED.

            DEFENDANTs TO NOTICE.

If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the courtroom at¿SMCdept54@lacourt.org¿with notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:00 am on the day of the hearing.

            The Court considers the moving papers, opposition, and reply.

BACKGROUND

            On January 19, 2022, Plaintiff filed the operative first amended complaint against Defendants, asserting causes of action for (1) declaratory relief and injunctive relief; (2) retaliatory eviction/harassment; and (3) breach of contract. Plaintiff, a tenant in a unit owned by Defendant, alleges Defendants wrongfully changed the terms of Plaintiff’s rent, wrongfully removed furniture and household items, refused to accommodate Plaintiff’s disability, and evicted her in retaliation for her requests.

ANALYSIS

A defendant may move for judgment on the pleadings when the “complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant.”  (CCP § §§ 438(b)(1) and (c)(1)(B)(ii).)  The grounds for motion provided for in this section shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice.  (CCP § 438(d).)  Presentation of extrinsic evidence is therefore not proper on a motion for judgment on the pleadings.  (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999.)   

            Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings of Plaintiff’s second cause of action for retaliatory eviction.

            Civil Code § 1942.5(d) provides, “…it is unlawful for a lessor to increase rent, decrease services, cause a lessee to quit involuntarily, bring an action to recover possession, or threaten to do any of those acts, for the purpose of retaliating against the lessee because the lessee has lawfully organized or participated in a lessees' association or an organization advocating lessees' rights or has lawfully and peaceably exercised any rights under the law. In an action brought by or against the lessee pursuant to this subdivision, the lessee shall bear the burden of producing evidence that the lessor's conduct was, in fact, retaliatory.”

            Defendants assert the second cause of action fails because the eviction notice served on Plaintiff in January 2020 is subject to the litigation privilege under Feldman v. 1100 Park Lane Associates (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1467 and Wallace v. McCubbin (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1169. The Court of Appeal has recently held that the litigation privilege does not apply in actions under Civil Code § 1942.5, rejecting the cases cited by Defendants. (See Winslett v. 1811 27th Avenue, LLC (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 239; Banuelos v. LA Investment, LLC (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 323, 328-335; Alfaro v. Waterhouse Management Corp. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 26, 36.)

            Defendants next argue that this claim is barred by the statute of limitations. Defendants assert that Plaintiff had 180 days from the service date of the eviction notice to bring an action under Civil Code § 1942.5. This assertion is based on a misreading on Civil Code § 1942.5(a), which states a landlord may not seek repossession of a dwelling within 180 days of, inter alia, a tenant’s complaint to a government agency.

Defendants also argue that the claim is barred by the one-year statute of limitations of CCP § 340(a). In opposition, Plaintiff asserts that the continuing violations doctrine applies here; Plaintiff has alleged wrongdoing through June 2020. In reply, Defendants state that the continuing violations doctrine does not apply to retaliatory eviction actions. Regardless of whether the continuing violations doctrine applies, Plaintiff alleges violations of Civil Code § 1942.5 for at least six months after the date of the service of the eviction notice. A demurrer lies where the dates alleged in the complaint show “clearly and affirmatively” that the action is barred by a statute of limitations.  It is not enough that the complaint shows a possibility the action may be barred.  (Geneva Towers Ltd. Partnership v. City of San Francisco (2003) 29 Cal.4th 769, 781.) The second cause of action is not clearly and affirmatively barred.

Defendants contend that the cause of action fails because Plaintiff was not actually evicted and that there is no civil claim under Civil Code § 1942.5. Under the plain language of the statute, Civil Code § 1942.5 provides a right to civil action and does not require that a lessee be evicted.

Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is DENIED.