Judge: Maurice A. Leiter, Case: 22STCV07170, Date: 2023-03-16 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV07170    Hearing Date: March 16, 2023    Dept: 54

Hearing Date: March 16, 2023

Department 54, Judge Maurice A. Leiter

Demurrer to First Amended Complaint;

Motion to Compel Further Responses to Discovery

Moving Party: Defendant Kaiser Foundation Hospitals

Responding Party: Plaintiff Sheila Sansano

T/R:     DEFENDANT’S DEMURRER IS OVERRULED.

DEFENDANT TO FILE AND SERVE AN ANSWER TO THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT WITHIN 20 DAYS OF NOTICE OF RULING.

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES IS GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

PLAINTIFF TO SERVE FURTHER RESPONSE TO THE SUBJECT DISCOVERY WITHIN 30 DAYS OF NOTICE OF RULING.

THE PARTIES’ REQUESTS FOR SANCTIONS ARE DENIED.

DEFENDANT TO NOTICE.

If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the courtroom at SMCdept54@lacourt.org with notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:00 am on the day of the hearing.

The Court considers the moving papers, opposition, and reply.

BACKGROUND

            On February 28, 2022, Plaintiff Sheila Sansano sued Defendant Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, asserting causes of action for (1) discrimination; (2) harassment; (3) retaliation; (4) failure to prevent discrimination, harassment and retaliation; (5) wrongful termination in violation of public policy; (6) whistleblower retaliation; (7) breach of oral contract; and (8) breach of implied-in-fact contract.

The Court sustained Defendants’ demurrer to the seventh and eighth causes of action with leave to amend. On September 6, 2022, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint for 1) discrimination; (2) harassment; (3) retaliation; (4) failure to prevent discrimination, harassment, and retaliation; (5) wrongful termination in violation of public policy; (6) whistleblower retaliation; and (7) breach of implied-in-fact contract.

Plaintiff, a Filipino woman, alleges Defendant terminated her employment as the Director of Food and Nutrition Services due to her race, national origin, and gender, and for reporting instances of discrimination and harassment.

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

            Defendant’s requests for judicial notice are DENIED.

ANALYSIS

A. Demurrer to First Amended Complaint

A demurrer to a complaint may be taken to the whole complaint or to any of the causes of action in it.  (CCP § 430.50(a).)  A demurrer challenges only the legal sufficiency of the complaint, not the truth of its factual allegations or the plaintiff's ability to prove those allegations.  (Picton v. Anderson Union High Sch. Dist. (1996) 50 Cal. App. 4th 726, 732.)  The court must treat as true all of the complaint's material factual allegations, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.  (Id. at 732-33.)  The complaint is to be construed liberally to determine whether a cause of action has been stated.  (Id. at 733.)

            Defendant demurs to the seventh cause of action for breach of implied-in-fact contract.

“The standard elements of a claim for breach of contract are: ‘(1) the contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach, and (4) damage to plaintiff therefrom.’” (Wall Street Network, Ltd. v. New York Times Co. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1171, 1178.) “A cause of action for breach of implied contract has the same elements as does a cause of action for breach of contract, except that the promise is not expressed in words but is implied from the promisor’s conduct.” (Yari v. Producers Guild of America, Inc. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 172, 182.) 

Defendant asserts Plaintiff’s breach of an implied-in-fact contract claim fails because Plaintiff has not alleged facts establishing a contract was formed. Plaintiff alleges that Plaintiff and Defendant entered an implied-in-fact contract, agreeing that Plaintiff could only be fired “for cause.”

The California Supreme Court has discussed implied-in-fact employment contracts as follows:

…the employer and employee may enter “ 'an agreement ... that ... the employment relationship will continue indefinitely, pending the occurrence of some event such as the employer's dissatisfaction with the employee's services or the existence of some ”cause“ for termination.' ” (Foley, supra, 47 Cal.3d 654, 680, quoting Pugh, supra, 116 Cal.App.3d 311, 324-325, italics added.) Among the many available options, the parties may agree that the employer's termination rights will vary with the particular circumstances. The parties may define for themselves what cause or causes will permit an employee's termination and may specify the procedures under which termination shall occur. The agreement may restrict the employer's termination rights to a greater degree in some situations, while leaving the employer freer to act as it sees fit in others.

The contractual understanding need not be express, but may be implied in fact, arising from the parties' conduct evidencing their actual mutual intent to create such enforceable limitations. (Foley, supra, 47 Cal.3d 654, 680.) In Foley, we identified several factors, apart from express terms, that may bear upon “the existence and content of an ... [implied-in-fact] agreement” placing limits on the employer's right to discharge an employee. (Ibid., italics added.) These factors might include “ 'the personnel policies or practices of the employer, the employee's longevity of service, actions or communications by the employer reflecting assurances of continued employment, and the practices of the industry in which the employee is engaged.' ” (Ibid., quoting Pugh, supra, 116 Cal.App.3d 311, 327.)

Foley asserted that “the totality of the circumstances” must be examined to determine whether the parties' conduct, considered in the context of surrounding circumstances, gave rise to an implied-in-fact contract limiting the employer's termination rights. (Foley, supra, 47 Cal.3d 654, 681.)

(Guz v. Bechtel Nat. Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 336-7, discussing Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 654.)

Plaintiff alleges an implied-in-fact contract for good cause termination exists because (1) the healthcare industry’s standard practice is to terminate employees only for cause; (2) Defendant’s personnel policies show Defendant only terminates employees for good cause; (3) Plaintiff signed a confidentiality agreement; and (4) Kaiser gave Plaintiff “repeated assurances of job security by giving her salary increases and positive performance evaluations during her eight-year tenure.” (FAC ¶¶ 70-74.) This is sufficient at the pleading stage to establish an implied-in-fact contract.

Defendant’s demurrer is OVERRULED.

B. Motion to Compel Further Responses to Discovery

On receipt of a response to interrogatories, the propounding party may move for an order compelling a further response if the propounding party deems that an objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general. (CCP 2030.300(a)(3).) The responding party has the burden of justifying the objections to the form interrogatories (“FIs”) and special interrogatories (“SIs”).  (Coy v. Sup.Ct. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-221.)

The moving party on a motion to compel further responses to requests for production of documents (“RPDs”) must submit “specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the inspection demand.”  (CCP § 2031.310(b)(1).)  If the moving party has shown good cause for the RPDs, the burden is on the objecting party to justify the objections.  (Kirkland v. Sup.Ct (2002) 95 Cal. App.4th 92, 98.)

Defendant moves to compel further responses to FIs – General, FIs – Employment Law, SIs and RPDs. In opposition, Plaintiff represents supplemental responses have been served to FIs – General nos. 10.1, 10.2, 12.1, 12.2, and 12.3, FIs – Employment Nos. 215.1 and 215.2 and SIs nos. 32 and 41. Defendant asserts the supplemental responses remain deficient and further response necessary. The parties must meet and confer on every supplemental production before the Court will intervene. The motion is DENIED as moot as to the requests to which Plaintiff has provided supplemental response. The Court will address the remaining requests below.

A. SIs Nos. 5, 7, 9, 11, 13-15, 17, 19, 21, 26, 33, 24, 35, and 36

These SIs request that Plaintiff state all facts supporting the allegations made in the complaint. Defendant asserts Plaintiff’s responses are deficient because they consist only of legal conclusions, such as: “Responding party performed her job competently throughout her employment and defendant’s alleged reasons for the adverse employment actions at issue are pretextual and false.” In opposition, Plaintiff argues that there is no specificity requirement for discovery responses.

Plaintiff’s responses to the subject SIs are evasive. They provide almost no information about Plaintiff’s actual factual contentions. Further response is necessary.

B. SI No. 42

            SI no. 42 asks Plaintiff to identify anyone Plaintiff believes is a “me-too” witness. Plaintiff objected on the grounds of attorney work product. Plaintiff has provided further response to SI no. 41, which requests the identity of anyone who was mistreated in the same way as Plaintiff. Plaintiff need not respond to SI no. 42, which could infringe on the attorney work product privilege. No further response is necessary.

C. SI No. 43 and RPD No. 60

            SI no. 43 and RPD no. 60 request that Plaintiff disclose all health care providers Plaintiff has seen and medical records for the last 10 years. Defendant asserts Plaintiff has placed this information at issue by seeking emotional distress damages. In opposition, Plaintiff asserts that the interrogatory is overbroad as to content and time. The Court agrees. Defendant is not entitled to Plaintiff’s entire medical history for the past 10 years because she is seeking emotional distress damages. No further response is necessary.

D. FIs – Employment Nos. 200.2, 200.3, 200.4, 202.1, 202.2, 203.1, 205.1

            These FIs request that Plaintiff state all facts that support Plaintiff’s claims for breach of implied-in-fact contract, discrimination, harassment. and wrongful termination. Defendant asserts Plaintiff has again provided only legal conclusions, such as: “Defendant treated persons outside of responding party’s protected classes in a better manner than it treated responding party.” These responses are evasive. Further response is necessary.

E. FI - Employment No 210.3

            FI no. 210.03 requests that Plaintiff provide the total amount of lost income, etc. and how that amount was calculated. Plaintiff provided only general answers, including: “future losses of wages.” This is not responsive to the interrogatory. Further response is necessary.

            Defendant’s motion to compel further responses is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The Court declines to award sanctions; the motion is neither granted nor denied in its entirety.