Judge: Maurice A. Leiter, Case: 22STCV11471, Date: 2024-03-12 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV11471    Hearing Date: April 2, 2024    Dept: 54

Hearing Date: April 2, 2024

Department 54, Judge Maurice A. Leiter

Motion to Bifurcate

Moving Party: Defendant Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, erroneously sued as Los Angeles Superior Court (“Defendant”)

Responding Party: Plaintiffs Valery Vaca (“Plaintiff Vaca”) and Steffany Noriega (“Plaintiff Noriega”)

T/R:     DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SEPARATE TRIALS FOR EACH PLAINTIFF IS GRANTED.

            DEFENDANT TO NOTICE.

If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the courtroom at¿SMCdept54@lacourt.org¿with notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:00 am on the day of the hearing. 

The Court considers the moving, opposition, and reply papers.

BACKGROUND

This case arises from the employment of Plaintiffs Valery Vaca and Stefanny Noriega with Defendant Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles. Plaintiffs Vaca and Noriega are employees of the Los Angeles Superior Court, serving in the same position (Court Service Assistant II). Noriega is the mother of Vaca. Plaintiffs collectively allege causes of action for: (1) disability discrimination in violation of FEHA; (2) failure to accommodate in violation of FEHA; (3) failure to engage in the interactive process in violation of FEHA; (4) gender discrimination in violation of FEHA; (5) age discrimination in violation of FEHA; (6) race discrimination in violation of FEHA; (7) harassment on the basis of disability, gender, and rack in violation of FEHA; (8) harassment on the basis of age in violation of FEHA; (9) failure to prevent discrimination, harassment, and retaliation in violation of FEHA.

ANALYSIS

 “When parties have been joined under Section 378 or 379, the court may make such orders as may appear just to prevent any party from being embarrassed, delayed, or put to undue expense, and may order separate trials or make such other order as the interests of justice may require.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 379.5.) 

Pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure, Section 1048(b) “[t]he court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any cause of action, including a cause of action asserted in a cross-complaint, or of any separate issue or of any number of causes of action or issues, preserving the right of trial by jury required by the Constitution or a statute of this state or of the United States.”

Defendant seeks separate trials for each Plaintiff. According to Defendant, the claims of each Plaintiff are based on events taking place at different times under different circumstances. Vaca claims she was discriminated against based on her race and gender. Noriega’s claims are based primarily on her age, alleging she was passed over for promotion in favor of younger employees. Defendant contends a joint trial will result in confusion and creates the risk that the jury will impose liability with respect to one Plaintiff based on the claims of the other.

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that a substantial amount of the evidence is relevant to both Plaintiffs, and separate trials would waste judicial resources. Plaintiff points out that both cases involve the same supervisor. Plaintiff points to Pilliod v. Monsanto Co. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 591 to argue that jury instructions can address any possible confusion.

In reply, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ reliance on Pilloid is misplaced because the plaintiffs in Pilloid used the same Roundup herbicide on their property and suffered the same injury. (Pilliod v. Monsanto Co. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 591, 600.)  Unlike Pilliod, evidence of the alleged harassment and discrimination here will be different for each Plaintiff. They never worked together or in the same department, nor were they subjected to the same alleged adverse employment action.

Defendant’s reliance on David v. Medtronic, Inc. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 734, 740, is instructive. In David, the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court did not err in severing the trials because the plaintiffs shared only one factor in common: having an implant of the same medical device. (David v. Medtronic, Inc. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 734, 741.) The principal similarity between the Plaintiffs’ cases here is that they had the same supervisor, Jorge Mancillas. But they reported to him at different times, in different departments. 

Defendant’s reliance on Rubio v. Monsanto Co., (C.D.Cal. 2016) 181 F. Supp. 3d 746, also is instructive.  In Rubio, "both Plaintiffs will need to establish that the Roundup chemical caused their cancer. While this may involve some overlap of experts, proving causation will be a far different task for each. Plaintiffs applied the pesticide under vastly different circumstances, including frequency and duration of exposure. Plaintiffs lived in different parts of the country when using the chemical and therefore were exposed to different, other potential contributors to their health problems. The exposures were also separated by nearly twenty years, encompassing changes to Roundup's formulation, as well as other environmental factors. These differences outweigh any efficiencies in trying the claims together.” (Rubio v. Monsanto Co. (C.D.Cal. 2016) 181 F. Supp. 3d 746, 758.) As noted, Vaca alleges discrimination based on her race and gender; Noriega’s claims are based primarily upon her age.

“Neither Plaintiff[s’] rights will be prejudiced by severance, as each is free to proceed with his or her individual claims.” See Visendi v. Bank of Am., N.A., 733 F.3d 863, 870-71 (9th Cir. 2015) (severance would not prejudice plaintiffs because they remained free to pursue their claims individually).

Defendant’s motion for separate trials is GRANTED.