Judge: Maurice A. Leiter, Case: 22STCV17624, Date: 2023-01-31 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV17624    Hearing Date: January 31, 2023    Dept: 54

Hearing Date: January 31, 2023

Department 54, Judge Maurice A. Leiter

Demurrer to Complaint

Moving Party: Defendants Tamara Wright, Latasha Sheridan, Michael Alexander, Timothy Gregoire-Pierson, Joshua Portilla, and Steve Ramsey

Responding Party: Plaintiff Darveonnah Miller

T/R:     DEFENDANTS’ DEMURRER IS OVERRULED.

DEFENDANTS TO FILE AND SERVE ANSWERS TO THE COMPLAINT WITHIN 30 DAYS OF NOTICE OF RULING.

DEFENDANTS TO NOTICE.

If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the courtroom at¿SMCdept54@lacourt.org¿with notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:00 am on the day of the hearing. 

The Court considers the moving papers, opposition, and reply.

BACKGROUND

On May 27, 2022, Plaintiff Darveonnah Miller sued Defendants Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority, et al., asserting causes of action for race, gender, and disability discrimination, and harassment. Plaintiff is a transgender man and alleges Defendants consistently and deliberately misgendered him and made disparaging comments about trans people in from of him. Plaintiff alleges Defendants failed to adequately train Plaintiff because of his race and gender identity. Plaintiff also alleges his co-worker physically battered him because of his race and gender identity.

ANALYSIS

A demurrer to a complaint may be taken to the whole complaint or to any of the causes of action in it.  (CCP § 430.50(a).)  A demurrer challenges only the legal sufficiency of the complaint, not the truth of its factual allegations or the plaintiff's ability to prove those allegations.  (Picton v. Anderson Union High Sch. Dist. (1996) 50 Cal. App. 4th 726, 732.)  The court must treat as true the complaint's material factual allegations, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.  (Id. at 732-33.)  The complaint is to be construed liberally to determine whether a cause of action has been stated.  (Id. at 733.)

Individual Defendants Tamara Wright, Latasha Sheridan, Michael Alexander, Timothy Gregoire-Pierson, Joshua Portilla, and Steve Ramsey demur to the second, fourth, and sixth causes of action for racial, gender, and disability harassment, and to the twelfth cause of action for IIED.

A. Harassment

Defendants assert that Plaintiff has not alleged the individual Defendants engaged in harassing conduct. Defendants argue the allegations against them amount only to personnel decisions, which cannot form the basis of a harassment claim.

Defendants rely on Reno v. Baird (1998) 18 Cal.4th 640. In Reno, our Supreme Court explained that discrimination and harassment are distinct wrongs under FEHA: discrimination “arising from performance of necessary personnel management duties;” and harassment arising from “conduct outside the scope of necessary job performance, conduct presumably engaged in for personal gratification, because of meanness or bigotry, or for other personal motives.” (Reno, supra, 18 Cal.4th at 645-7, quoting Janken v. GM Hughes Electronics (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 55, 63-65.) Quoting Janken, the Court stated that “commonly necessary personnel management actions such as hiring and firing, job or project assignments, office or work station assignments, promotion or demotion, performance evaluations, the provision of support, the assignment or nonassignment of supervisory functions, deciding who will and who will not attend meetings, deciding who will be laid off, and the like, do not come within the meaning of harassment.” (Id. at 646-7.)

The Court clarified Reno in Roby v. McKesson Corp. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 686. Roby noted that discrimination arises from “official,” “explicit” changes in the “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” by the employer. (Roby, supra 47 Cal.4th at 706, emphasis in original.) Harassment “focuses on situations in which the social environment of the workplace becomes intolerable because the harassment (whether verbal, physical, or visual) communicates an offensive message to the harassed employee.” (Id., emphasis in original.) The Court rejected the argument that official personnel decisions can never form a harassment claim, finding that personnel decisions could be both evidence of discrimination and harassment if the decision communicates a hostile message. (Id. at 707-709.) The Court stated “…[w]e can discern no reason why an employee who is the victim of discrimination based on some official action of the employer cannot also be the victim of harassment by a supervisor for abusive messages that create a hostile working environment, and under the FEHA the employee would have two separate claims of injury.” (Id. at 707.)

Here, Plaintiff alleges these Defendants made no effort to address the harassment Plaintiff endured from his co-workers after Plaintiff reported it to Defendants. Instead, Plaintiff alleges, Defendants micro-managed him and refused to accommodate or engage in the interactive process to allow him to return to work following his medical leave for physical battery by a coworker. These allegations are sufficient to establish that Defendants’ conduct conveys a hostile message to Plaintiff.

Defendants’ demurrer to the second, fourth and sixth causes of action is OVERRULED.

B. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

            Defendant asserts the claim for IIED fails for the same reason as the claims for harassment. As discussed, the Court disagrees.

            Defendants’ demurrer to the twelfth cause of action is OVERRULED.