Judge: Maurice A. Leiter, Case: 22STCV18834, Date: 2023-07-20 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV18834    Hearing Date: July 20, 2023    Dept: 54

Hearing Date: July 20, 2023

Department 54, Judge Maurice Leiter

Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative, Motion for Summary Adjudication

Moving Party: Defendant General Motors LLC

Responding Party: Plaintiff Michelle Earnest

T/R:     DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS GRANTED.

DEFENDANT TO NOTICE.

If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the courtroom at SMCdept54@lacourt.org with notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:00 am on the day of the hearing.

The Court considers the moving papers, opposition and reply.

BACKGROUND

This is a lemon law action arising from Plaintiff’s purchase of a pre-owned 2016 Cadillac ATS, manufactured by Defendant General Motors. At the time of purchase, the express warranty provided by Defendant had not yet expired.

ANALYSIS

“The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Trial judges are required “to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (CCP § 437c(p)(2).) Once the defendant has met that burden, “the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Id.)  To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce “substantial responsive evidence.” (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

A. Used Vehicles

Defendant moves for summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s Song-Beverly claims on the grounds that the Song-Beverly Act applies only to vehicles that are purchased new from a dealer. Defendant asserts that only distributors and retail sellers, not manufacturers, are liable for breach of the implied warranty for used vehicles and that breach of express warranty applies only “new motor vehicles.”

1.    Implied Warranty

Courts have held that only distributors and retail sellers, not manufacturers, are liable for breach of the implied warranty for used vehicles. (See Nunez v. FCA US LLC (2021) 61 Cal.App.5^th 385, 399 [It is evident from [section 1795.5] that only distributors or sellers of used goods—not manufacturers of new goods—have implied warranty obligations in the sale of used goods.”]) In opposition, Plaintiff asserts Defendant is a “distributor” of the vehicle. Plaintiff, however, does not cite evidence showing Defendant is a “distributor” of the vehicle.

2.    Express Warranty

Defendant contends that Rodriguez v. FCA US, LLC (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 209 precludes Plaintiff from recovering under the SBA for violation of the express warranty.

In Rodriguez, the plaintiff purchased a two-year-old vehicle from a third-party retailer. The subject vehicle had over 55,000 miles on its odometer, and though the manufacturer’s basic warranty had expired, the limited powertrain warranty had not. (Rodriguez, 77 Cal.App.5^th at 214.)

The Rodriguez Court held that a previously owned vehicle with some balance remaining on the manufacturer’s express warranty does not qualify as new under the SBA. (Ibid.) The Court stated that the phrase “other motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer’s new car warranty” found in Civ. Code 1793.22(e)(2)  “. . . functions [] as a catchall for sales of essentially new vehicles where the applicable warranty was issued with the sale.” (Ibid; emphasis original.)

The Court distinguished the plaintiff there from the plaintiff in Jensen v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1212. In Jensen, the Court found that a used car with 7,565 miles sold by a manufacturer-affiliated dealership qualified as a new vehicle under the SBA as the salesperson “issued a new car warranty with the lease.” (Rodriguez at 224.) The Rodriguez Court noted that “those facts [in Jensen] included a car leased with a full manufacturer’s warranty issued by the manufacturer’s representative. . .” (Ibid.; emphasis original.)

Plaintiffs argue that the Court should decline to follow Rodriguez and instead follow Jensen because Rodriguez was wrongly decided. Plaintiff also contends that the California Supreme Court has granted review of Rodriguez, making Rodriguez only persuasive, rather than binding, authority.

The Court finds Rodriguez persuasive. The facts at hand mirror those in Rodriguez and the Court agrees with the Court of Appeal’s reasoning.

Defendants have established that Plaintiff cannot recover under the Song-Beverly Act (or the Magnussen Moss Act, because the claims are derivative of the Song-Beverly Act). Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.