Judge: Maurice A. Leiter, Case: 22STCV33378, Date: 2023-03-21 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV33378 Hearing Date: March 21, 2023 Dept: 54
Superior
Court of California County of
Los Angeles |
|||
Jeffrey Hester, |
Plaintiff, |
Case No.: |
22STCV33378 |
vs. |
|
Tentative Ruling |
|
Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, et al., |
Defendants. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Hearing Date: March 21, 2023
Department 54, Judge Maurice A. Leiter
Motion to Compel Arbitration
Moving Party: Defendants Cedars-Sinai Medical
Center and Cedars-Sinai Health System
Responding Party: Plaintiff Jeffrey Hester
T/R: DEFENDANTS’
MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION IS GRANTED. THE ACTION IS STAYED.
DEFENDANTS TO NOTICE.
If the
parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the courtroom at¿SMCdept54@lacourt.org¿with notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party)
before 8:00 am on the day of the hearing.
The
Court considers the moving papers, opposition, and reply.
BACKGROUND
On
October 12, 2022, Plaintiff Jeffrey Hester filed a complaint against Defendants
Cedars-Sinai Medical Center and Cedars-Sinai Health System asserting causes of
action for FEHA violations and wrongful termination.
ANALYSIS
“On petition of a party to an arbitration
agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a
controversy and that a party thereto refuses to arbitrate a controversy, the
court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the
controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy
exists….” (CCP § 1281.2.) The right to compel arbitration exists unless
the court finds that the right has been waived by a party’s conduct, other
grounds exist for revocation of the agreement, or where a pending court action
arising out of the same transaction creates the possibility of conflicting
rulings on a common issue of law or fact.
(CCP § 1281.2(a)-(c).) “The party
seeking arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of an arbitration
agreement, and the party opposing arbitration bears the burden of proving any
defense, such as unconscionability.” (Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle
Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236.)
A. Existence of Arbitration Agreement
Defendants move to compel arbitration based
on the Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims executed by Plaintiff on March 13,
2006. (Decl. Hickey, Exh. A.) The agreement provides, “you and Cedars-Sinai
agree to submit all claims or controversies in away way relating to or
associated with your employment or the termination of employment (‘Claims’), to
the Conflict Resolution Procedure of the Medical Center. If a Claim is not
resolved by the Conflict Resolution Procedure, and if the Claim demands
$25,000.00 or more, you and Cedars-Sinai agree that the Claim will be resolved
exclusively by binding arbitration” (Id.) This action arises from Plaintiff’s
employment with Defendants.
Defendants have met their burden to establish
an agreement to arbitrate. The burden shifts to Plaintiff to establish any
defenses to enforcement.
B. Enforceability of
Agreement
1. Unconscionability
Plaintiff asserts that the arbitration
agreement is procedurally unconscionable as it is an adhesion contract.
Regarding procedural unconscionability, the California Supreme Court has held:
“[T]here are degrees of procedural unconscionability. At one end of the
spectrum are contracts that have been freely negotiated by roughly equal
parties, in which there is no procedural unconscionability . . . . Contracts of
adhesion that involve surprise or other sharp practices lie on the other end of
the spectrum. [Citation.] Ordinary contracts of adhesion, although they are
indispensable facts of modern life that are generally enforced (see Graham v. Scissor–Tail, Inc. (1981)
28 Cal.3d 807, 817–818, 171 Cal.Rptr. 604, 623 P.2d 165), contain a degree of
procedural unconscionability even without any notable surprises, and ‘bear
within them the clear danger of oppression and overreaching.’ (Id. at p. 818 [171 Cal.Rptr. 604, 623
P.2d 165].)” (Gentry v. Superior Court
(2007) 42 Cal.4th 443, 469, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 773, 165 P.3d 556.)
(Baltazar v.
Forever 21, Inc. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1237, 1244.)
Generally, in the employer-employee context,
there is unequal bargaining power. (See
Amendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th
83, 115 [“in the case of preemployment arbitration contracts, the economic
pressure exerted by employers on all but the most sought-after employees may be
particularly acute, for the arbitration agreement stands between the employee
and necessary employment, and few employees are in a position to refuse a job
because of an arbitration requirement.”]
The agreement here is one of adhesion and at
least a low degree of procedural unconscionability is present. But this does
not, in itself, render the arbitration agreement unconscionable; to find the
agreement unenforceable, the degree of substantive unconscionability must be
high. (See Dotson v. Amgen, Inc.
(2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 975, 981.)
Plaintiff asserts that the agreement
is substantively unconscionable because it does not provide for adequate
discovery, and it imposes a minimum amount in controversy. The agreement
provides for discovery under CCP § 1283.05, which incorporates the Civil
Discovery Act. Plaintiff does not provide authority stating a minimum amount in
controversy for arbitration is unconscionable. Plaintiff has not established
substantive unconscionability.
Plaintiff also argues that the
agreement violations Labor Code § 450 because it requires Plaintiff pay half of
the arbitration fees. Section 450 states, “no employer…may compel or coerce any
employee, or applicant for employment, to patronize his or her employer, or any
other person, in the purchase of any thing of value.” Plaintiff does not cite
authority applying this provision to arbitration agreements.
Defendants’ motion to compel
arbitration is GRANTED. The action is STAYED.