Judge: Maurice A. Leiter, Case: 22STCV35760, Date: 2024-01-26 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV35760    Hearing Date: April 4, 2024    Dept: 54

Hearing Date: April 4, 2024

Department 54, Judge Maurice A. Leiter

Motion for Summary Judgment

Moving Party: Defendant Cedars-Sinai Medical Center

Responding Party: Plaintiff Sajith Weerasignhe

T/R:    DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS DENIED. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION AS TO ALL ISSUES ARE DENIED.

            DEFENDANT to notice. 

If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the courtroom at SMCdept54@lacourt.org with notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:30 am on the day of the hearing.

            The Court considers the moving papers, opposition, and reply.

BACKGROUND

On November 10, 2022, Plaintiff Sajith Weerasignhe sued Defendants Cedars-Sinai Medical Center and Cedars-Sinai Health System, asserting causes of action for (1) discrimination on the basis of disability and failure to provide a reasonable accommodation in violation of FEHA; (2) failure to engage in the interactive process in violation of FEHA; (3) age discrimination in violation of FEHA; (4) failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation in violation of FEHA; (5) retaliation in violation of Cal. Labor Code section 1102.5; (6) retaliation in violation of Cal. Health & Safety § 1278.5; (7) interference and retaliation in violation of CFRA; and (8) wrongful termination in violation of public policy.

Plaintiff, a 58 year-old male with diabetes, worked as a Security Officer during his employment with Cedars-Sinai. Plaintiff was diagnosed with diabetes in 2015, which he alleges did not affect his work. On one occasion, he fell asleep at his post as a side effect of a new medication for diabetes. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants wrongfully terminated his employment in violation of the FEHA and discriminated against him on the basis of his disability.

Defendant requests summary judgment, or in the alternative summary adjudication of the following issues:

ISSUE NO. 1: Plaintiff’s “First Cause of Action” for “discrimination on the basis of disability and failure to accommodate disability” under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”) fails as a matter of law because the undisputed material facts show that Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination.

ISSUE NO. 2: Plaintiff’s “First Cause of Action” for “discrimination on the basis of disability and failure to accommodate disability” under FEHA fails as a matter of law because the undisputed material facts show that CSMC terminated Plaintiff for legitimate, nondiscriminatory, and non-pretextual reasons.

ISSUE NO. 3: Plaintiff’s “First Cause of Action” for “discrimination on the basis of disability and failure to accommodate disability” under FEHA fails as a matter of law because the undisputed material facts show that Plaintiff did not request an accommodation for his alleged disability.

ISSUE NO. 4: Plaintiff’s “Second Cause of Action” for “failure to engage in the interactive process” under FEHA fails as a matter of law because the undisputed material facts show that Plaintiff is unable to identify an available reasonable accommodation that the interactive process should have produced.

ISSUE NO. 5: Plaintiff’s “Third Cause of Action” for “age discrimination” under FEHA fails as a matter of law because the undisputed facts show that Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of age discrimination.

ISSUE NO. 6: Plaintiff’s “Third Cause of Action” for “age discrimination” under FEHA fails as a matter of law because the undisputed facts show that CSMC terminated Plaintiff for legitimate, nondiscriminatory, and non-pretextual reasons.

ISSUE NO. 7: Plaintiff’s “Fourth Cause of Action” for “failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation” under FEHA fails as a matter of law because the undisputed material facts show that Plaintiff’s underlying FEHA discrimination and retaliation claims or not cognizable.

ISSUE NO. 8: Plaintiff’s “Fifth Cause of Action” for “retaliation” under California Labor Code section 1102.5 fails as a matter of law because the undisputed material facts show that Plaintiff did not engage in any activity protected under section 1102.5.

ISSUE NO. 9: Plaintiff’s “Fifth Cause of Action” for “retaliation” under California Labor Code section 1102.5 fails as a matter of law because the undisputed material facts show that Plaintiff will be unable to carry his initial burden establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that retaliation was a contributing factor in a challenged employment action.

ISSUE NO. 10: Plaintiff’s “Fifth Cause of Action” for “retaliation” under California Labor Code section 1102.5 fails as a matter of law because CSMC has demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the action in question for legitimate, independent reasons even had Plaintiff not engaged in alleged protected activity.

ISSUE NO. 11: Plaintiff’s “Sixth Cause of Action” for “retaliation” under California Health and Safety Code section 1278.5 fails as a matter of law because the undisputed material facts show that Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliation.

ISSUE NO. 12: Plaintiff’s “Sixth Cause of Action” for “retaliation” under California Health and Safety Code section 1278.5 fails as a matter of law because the undisputed material facts show that CSMC terminated Plaintiff for legitimate, non-retaliatory, and non-pretextual reasons.

ISSUE NO. 13: Plaintiff’s “Seventh Cause of Action” for “retaliation” in violation of the California Family Rights Act (“CFRA”) fails as a matter of law because the undisputed material facts show that Plaintiff did not suffer an adverse employment action because of his exercise of rights under the CFRA.

ISSUE NO. 14: Plaintiff’s “Seventh Cause of Action” for “interference” in violation of the CFRA fails as a matter of law because the undisputed material facts show that CSMC did not interfere with Plaintiff’s rights under the CFRA or deny him rights protected by the CFRA.

ISSUE NO. 15: Plaintiff’s “Eighth Cause of Action” for “wrongful termination in violation of public policy” fails as a matter of law because the undisputed material facts show that Plaintiff’s underlying discrimination claims are not cognizable.

ISSUE NO. 16: Plaintiff’s “Eighth Cause of Action” for “wrongful termination in violation of public policy” fails as a matter of law because the undisputed material facts show that Plaintiff’s underlying retaliation claims are not cognizable.

ISSUE NO. 17: Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages against CSMC fails as a matter of law because the undisputed material facts show that Plaintiff cannot establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that CSMC or one of CSMC’s officers, directors, or managing agents subjected him to malicious, oppressive, or fraudulent behavior or authorized or ratified such conduct.

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

            The Court GRANTS Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice as to Plaintiff’s Complaint filed on November 10, 2022.

ANALYSIS

“The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Trial judges are required “to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (CCP § 437c(p)(2).) Once the defendant has met that burden, “the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Id.) To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce “substantial responsive evidence.” (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

A.        First Cause of Action for Discrimination

To successfully assert a claim for discrimination, Plaintiff must satisfy the requirements of the three-step McDonnell Douglas test. (See Guz v. Bechtel Nat. Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 354- 55.) Generally, a prima facie case requires showing that (1) plaintiff was a member of a protected class; (2) they were qualified for the position they sought or were performing competently in the position they held; (3) plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action, such as termination, demotion, or denial of an available job; and (4) some other circumstance suggests discriminatory motive. (See id. at 355.)

Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case, there is a “rebuttable” but “legally mandatory” presumption of discrimination. (Id. at 355.) The burden then shifts to the defendant to rebut the presumption by producing admissible evidence that the defendant’s “action was taken for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.” (Id. at 355-356.)

If the defendant meets its burden, “the presumption of discrimination disappears.” (Id. at 356.) The plaintiff must then show that the defendant’s legitimate reason is merely pretext. (Id.) “Pretext may be inferred from the timing of the discharge decision, the identity of the decision- maker, or by the discharged employee's job performance before termination.” (Hanson v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 215, 224.) “Pretext may [also] be demonstrated by showing that the proffered reason had no basis in fact, the proffered reason did not actually motivate the discharge, or the proffered reason was insufficient to motivate discharge.” (Id.)

Defendant contends that Plaintiff's claim for discrimination fails because Plaintiff failed to perform the essential functions of his job as a Security Officer, with or without reasonable accommodation. Plaintiff was found sleeping on duty on February 5, 2022, demonstrating an inability to remain alert and observant. Defendant argues that no reasonable accommodation could allow Plaintiff to sleep or be drowsy while performing these necessary functions. Defendant also contends that Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of age discrimination because Plaintiff's performance did not meet satisfactory standards required for the job.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s reasons for termination are pretext. Plaintiff says he was a member of a protected class since 2015 due to his diagnosis with diabetes, meeting the definition of disability under FEHA. Plaintiff states he has demonstrated he could perform the essential functions of his position as a Security Officer. Plaintiff argues that reasonable accommodations would have allowed him to continue his duties effectively, and that Defendant failed to offer any accommodations, such as adjustments in post location, snack breaks, or medical leave for medication adjustments. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant’s refusal to engage in an interactive process to discuss reasonable accommodations also constitutes discrimination. And Plaintiff suggests that his termination was a pretext for discrimination, given the timing relative to his disability disclosure and requests for accommodations, and the absence of a thorough investigation into his work performance issues. This is sufficient to create a triable issue of fact as to discrimination.

            Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED. Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication of issues 1, 2, and 3, regarding the first cause of action is DENIED.

B.        Second Cause of Action for Failure to Engage in the Interactive Process

Government Code section 12940(m) provides that it is an unlawful employment practice “[f]or an employer . . . to fail to make reasonable accommodation for the known physical or mental disability of an applicant or employee.” (Govt. Code, § 12940(m)(1).)

Government Code section 12940(n) provides that it is an unlawful employment practice “[f]or an employer . . . to fail to engage in a timely, good faith, interactive process with the employee or applicant to determine effective reasonable accommodations, if any, in response to a request for reasonable accommodation by an employee or applicant with a known physical or mental disability or known medical condition.” (Govt. Code, § 12940(n).)

As discussed above, Plaintiff has presented evidence that Defendant failed to provide reasonable accommodations and did not engage in a timely, good faith, interactive process.

Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication of issue 4 regarding to the second cause of action is DENIED.

C.        Third Cause of Action for Age Discrimination

            Plaintiff asserts that his third cause of action for age discrimination will be dismissed.

            Therefore, Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication as to issues 5 and 6 regarding the third cause of action are DENIED as MOOT.

D.        Fourth Cause of Action Failure to Prevent Discrimination and Retaliation; Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action for Retaliation; Seventh Cause of Acton for Interference; Eighth Cause of Action for Wrongful Termination

To establish retaliation, a plaintiff must show that “(1) he or she engaged in a ‘protected activity,’ (2) the employer subjected the employee to an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link existed between the protected activity and the employer’s action.” (Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1042.) A retaliation claim can be brought by an employee who has complained of conduct reasonably believed to be discriminatory. (Id. at 1043; see also Kelley v. Conco Companies (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 191, 209-10.)

As discussed above, Plaintiff has presented evidence of a causal link between Plaintiff’s complaints and his termination. The evidence shows that prior to and following his termination, Plaintiff made complaints that he was being discriminated and retaliated against. Plaintiff told Croft that he took a medication for his diabetes that resulted in his drowsiness and thought he was being retaliated against due to a conversation with managers about staffing, pay, and health and safety. (PAMF nos. 139-140. The only action Croft took was forwarding the email to Lee, who did not do anything. (PAMF nos. 157-158]). Plaintiff also protested to Babyan and Newton that his termination was discriminatory and retaliatory, which did not result in any action. (PAMF nos. 143-145.) This is sufficient to create a triable issue of fact as to retaliation.

Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication of issues 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17, regarding the fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth causes of action are DENIED.

E.        Punitive Damages

            Defendant asserts that Plaintiff cannot prove that Newton (Security Department Operations Supervisor) or Parks (Executive Director of Security and Transportation Services) were officers, directors, or managing agents of CSMC, as required by California Civil Code § 3294(a)–(b) for punitive damages. Defendant also argues there is no evidence that Newton or Parks acted with malice, oppression, or fraud towards Plaintiff. Defendant says that the termination decision, prompted by Plaintiff’s second incident of sleeping on duty despite prior written notice of termination risk for such behavior, was a standard procedure applied consistently to other security officers for similar offenses. Defendant contends that the termination was based on an honest belief in the insufficiency of Plaintiff’s job performance, specifically citing Plaintiff's repeated violations of policy against sleeping on duty.

            In opposition, Plaintiff argues that clear and convincing evidence does not require conclusive proof at the summary judgment stage. According to Plaintiff, punitive damages are justified where an employer’s managing agents have participated in or ratified discriminatory or retaliatory conduct. Plaintiff asserts that evidence demonstrates such behavior by Defendant’s managing agents, including specific individuals with significant authority within the company, who exhibited reckless, wanton, and despicable conduct through discriminatory treatment of Plaintiff. Plaintiff identifies Robert Parks, Tom Newton, Bryan Croft, and Clare Lee as responsible for the alleged unlawful conduct. Parks and Newton are implicated directly, while Croft, a Vice President reporting to the CEO, ratified and condoned their actions without protecting Plaintiff.

            The Court finds that Plaintiff has presented triable issues of fact as to these claims.

            Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication of the claim for punitive damages is DENIED.