Judge: Maurice A. Leiter, Case: 22STCV35760, Date: 2024-11-19 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV35760 Hearing Date: November 19, 2024 Dept: 54
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Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles |
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Sajith Weerasinghe, |
Plaintiff, |
Case No.: |
22STCV35760 |
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vs. |
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Tentative Ruling |
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Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, et al., |
Defendants. |
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Hearing Date: November 19, 2024
Department 54, Judge Maurice A. Leiter
Motion for New Trial;
Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the
Verdict
Moving Party: Defendant Cedars-Sinai Medical Center
Responding Party: Plaintiff Sajith Weerasinghe
T/R: DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL IS CONDITIONALLY
GRANTED AS TO AMOUNT OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES ONLY, UNLESS PLAINTIFF CONSENTS WITHIN
30 DAYS TO THE REDUCTION OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES FROM $2,500,000.00 TO $588,000.00.
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT IS DENIED.
DEFENDANT TO NOTICE.
If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the
courtroom at SMCdept54@lacourt.org with notice to opposing
counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:00 am on the day of the
hearing.
The Court considers the moving papers,
oppositions and replies.
BACKGROUND
On November 10, 2022, Plaintiff Sajith
Weerasignhe sued Defendants Cedars-Sinai Medical Center and Cedars-Sinai Health
System, asserting causes of action for (1) discrimination on the basis of
disability and failure to provide a reasonable accommodation in violation of
FEHA; (2) failure to engage in the interactive process in violation of FEHA;
(3) age discrimination in violation of FEHA; (4) failure to prevent
discrimination and retaliation in violation of FEHA; (5) retaliation in
violation of Cal. Labor Code section 1102.5; (6) retaliation in violation of
Cal. Health & Safety § 1278.5; (7) interference and retaliation in
violation of CFRA; and (8) wrongful termination in violation of public policy.
Plaintiff, a 58-year-old male with
diabetes, worked as a Security Officer during his employment with Cedars-Sinai.
Plaintiff was diagnosed with diabetes in 2015, which he alleges did not affect
his work. On one occasion, he fell asleep at his post as a side effect of a new
medication for diabetes. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants wrongfully
terminated his employment in violation of the FEHA and discriminated against
him on the basis of his disability.
Following trial, the jury found in
favor of Plaintiff on his claims for failure to engage in the interactive
process and whistleblower retaliation. The jury awarded $84,000.00 in
non-economic damages and $2,500,000.00 in punitive damages.
ANALYSIS
A. Motion for New Trial
“The principal statutory authority for
new trial motions is CCP § 657. “The right to a new trial is purely
statutory, and a motion for a new trial can be granted only on one of the
grounds enumerated in the statute.” (Fomco, Inc. v. Joe Maggio, Inc. (1961)
55 Cal.2d 162, 166.) The grounds
enumerated in CCP § 657 include:
1. Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party,
or any order of the court or abuse of discretion by which either party was
prevented from having a fair trial.
2. Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a finding
on any question submitted to them by the court, by a resort to the
determination of chance, such misconduct may be proved by the affidavit of any
one of the jurors.
3. Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded
against.
4. Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the
application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and
produced at the trial.
5. Excessive or inadequate damages.
6. Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other
decision, or the verdict or other decision is against law.
7. Error in law, occurring at the trial and excepted to by the party
making the application.
(CCP § 657.)
Defendant moves for new trial on the
grounds that the punitive damage award is excessive, the Court admitted
improper comparator evidence, Plaintiff’s counsel made prejudicial comments
during closing, the Court allowed improper jury instructions, and there was
insufficient evidence to support the finding that Defendant failed to engage in
the interactive process.
1. Punitive Damages
“To determine the constitutional limits of a
punitive damages award in any given case, we look to three ‘guideposts’
articulated by the United States Supreme Court: ‘(1) the degree of
reprehensibility of the defendant's misconduct; (2) the disparity between the
actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages
award; and (3) the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury
and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.’ ” (Gober
v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 204, 215, as modified on
denial of reh'g (Mar. 22, 2006), quoting State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418 (2003).)
Defendant asserts that the $2,500,000.00 punitive damage award, which is
a 29:1 ratio of punitive to compensatory damages, exceeds the constitutional
limits of punitive damages. Defendant argues that its conduct was not highly reprehensible,
the ratio far exceeds the ratio of up to10:1 generally allowed by courts, and
that the award is 250 times the $10,000.00 civil penalty allowed for
whistleblower retaliation under Labor Code section 1102.5.
At trial, Plaintiff, who worked for
Defendant for more than 20 years prior to termination, presented evidence
showing Defendant failed to engage in the interactive process and retaliated
against him for reporting what he believed to be violations of labor law.
Plaintiff presented evidence that managing agents of Defendant, including Thomas
Newton, Clare Lee, and Bryan Croft, knew of and ratified this misconduct.
Plaintiff presented evidence that similarly situated individuals did not
experience the same treatment. The parties stipulated to Defendant’s
$7,000,000,000 net worth.
The evidence supports an award of
punitive damages. The jury reasonably could find from this evidence that
Defendant failed to engage in the interactive process with a disabled employee
who had worked for them for more than 20 years. The evidence also suggests that
Defendant and Defendant’s executives terminated Plaintiff’s employment over
Plaintiff’s concerns that Defendant would no longer pay for uniform laundering.
The power disparity between the parties is enormous, and the jury determined
that a high ratio of punitive damages was necessary to punish the Defendant.
The Court agrees, however, that a 29:1
ratio is excessive. Courts rarely allow punitive damage awards above a 10:1
ratio of punitive to compensatory damages. As the California
Supreme Court explained, “ratios between the punitive damages award and the
plaintiff’s actual or potential compensatory damages significantly greater than
9 or 10 to 1 are suspect and, absent special justification (by, for example,
extreme reprehensibility or unusually small, hard-to-detect or hard-to-measure
compensatory damages), cannot survive appellate scrutiny under the due process
clause.” (Simon v. San Paolo U.S. Holding Co., Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th
1159, 1182.)
The Court finds that a 7:1 ratio of punitive to compensatory damages is appropriate
for the harm caused by Defendant. The Court finds no justification in the facts
for a higher ratio. This results in a punitive damage award of $588,000.00.
This is sufficient to punish Defendant and protect Defendant’s due process
rights.
To remedy the discrepancy in damages,
the Court applies CCP § 662.5, which provides, “In any civil action where after
trial by jury an order granting a new trial limited to the issue of damages
would be proper, the trial court may in its discretion... If the ground for
granting a new trial is excessive damages, issue a conditional order granting
the new trial unless the party in whose favor the verdict has been rendered
consents to the reduction of so much thereof as the court in its independent
judgment determines from the evidence to be fair and reasonable.”
The Court CONDITIONALLY GRANTS the
motion for new trial as to amount of punitive damages only unless Plaintiff
consents to the reduction of punitive damages from $2,500,000.00 to $588,000.00
within 30 days.
2. Remaining Arguments
As stated, Defendant also seeks new
trial on the grounds Court admitted improper comparator evidence, Plaintiff’s
counsel made prejudicial comments during closing, the Court allowed improper
jury instructions, and there was insufficient evidence to support the finding
that Defendant failed to engage in the interactive process.
The parties extensively briefed the issues related to comparator evidence prior to trial and the Court found the evidence admissible. The comparators had the same management as Plaintiff and were disciplined under the same policy. The jury was properly instructed not to use counsel’s closing arguments as evidence. There was substantial evidence that Defendant failed to engage in the interactive process following disclosure of his diabetes-related need for accommodation and note from his doctor. Defendant presents no evidence showing the “cat’s paw” jury instruction was prejudicial or confusing for the jury. New trial cannot be granted on these grounds.
B. Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding
the Verdict
The trial court has limited discretion to
grant a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict; it may grant it only
when there is no substantial evidence to support the verdict. (Teitel v.
First Los Angeles Bank (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1593, 1603. Campbell v.
Cal-Gard Surety Services, Inc. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 563, 570.) A judgment
notwithstanding the verdict can be sustained only when it can be said as a
matter of law that no other reasonable conclusion is legally deducible from the
evidence, and that any other holding would be so lacking in evidentiary support
that the reviewing court would be compelled to reverse it, or the trial court
would be compelled to set it aside as a matter of law. (Moore v. City and
County of San Francisco (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 728, 733–734.)
Defendant argues for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict on the same grounds as the motion for new trial. For the reasons
stated, these arguments fail.
Defendant’s motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict is DENIED.