Judge: Maurice A. Leiter, Case: 22STCV35760, Date: 2024-11-19 Tentative Ruling



Case Number: 22STCV35760    Hearing Date: November 19, 2024    Dept: 54

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

 

Sajith Weerasinghe,

 

 

 

Plaintiff,

 

Case No.:

 

 

22STCV35760

 

vs.

 

 

Tentative Ruling

 

 

Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, et al.,

 

 

 

Defendants.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Hearing Date: November 19, 2024

Department 54, Judge Maurice A. Leiter

Motion for New Trial;

Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict

Moving Party: Defendant Cedars-Sinai Medical Center

Responding Party: Plaintiff Sajith Weerasinghe

 

T/R:      DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL IS CONDITIONALLY GRANTED AS TO AMOUNT OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES ONLY, UNLESS PLAINTIFF CONSENTS WITHIN 30 DAYS TO THE REDUCTION OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES FROM $2,500,000.00 TO $588,000.00.

 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT IS DENIED.

 

DEFENDANT TO NOTICE.

If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the courtroom at SMCdept54@lacourt.org with notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:00 am on the day of the hearing. 

The Court considers the moving papers, oppositions and replies.

BACKGROUND

On November 10, 2022, Plaintiff Sajith Weerasignhe sued Defendants Cedars-Sinai Medical Center and Cedars-Sinai Health System, asserting causes of action for (1) discrimination on the basis of disability and failure to provide a reasonable accommodation in violation of FEHA; (2) failure to engage in the interactive process in violation of FEHA; (3) age discrimination in violation of FEHA; (4) failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation in violation of FEHA; (5) retaliation in violation of Cal. Labor Code section 1102.5; (6) retaliation in violation of Cal. Health & Safety § 1278.5; (7) interference and retaliation in violation of CFRA; and (8) wrongful termination in violation of public policy.

 

Plaintiff, a 58-year-old male with diabetes, worked as a Security Officer during his employment with Cedars-Sinai. Plaintiff was diagnosed with diabetes in 2015, which he alleges did not affect his work. On one occasion, he fell asleep at his post as a side effect of a new medication for diabetes. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants wrongfully terminated his employment in violation of the FEHA and discriminated against him on the basis of his disability.

 

Following trial, the jury found in favor of Plaintiff on his claims for failure to engage in the interactive process and whistleblower retaliation. The jury awarded $84,000.00 in non-economic damages and $2,500,000.00 in punitive damages.

 

ANALYSIS

 

A. Motion for New Trial

 

“The principal statutory authority for new trial motions is CCP § 657. “The right to a new trial is purely statutory, and a motion for a new trial can be granted only on one of the grounds enumerated in the statute.” (Fomco, Inc. v. Joe Maggio, Inc. (1961) 55 Cal.2d 162, 166.)  The grounds enumerated in CCP § 657 include:

 

1. Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or any order of the court or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having a fair trial.

 

2. Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by a resort to the determination of chance, such misconduct may be proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors.

 

3. Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against.

 

4. Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial.

 

5. Excessive or inadequate damages.

 

6. Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or the verdict or other decision is against law.

 

7. Error in law, occurring at the trial and excepted to by the party making the application.

 

(CCP § 657.)

 

Defendant moves for new trial on the grounds that the punitive damage award is excessive, the Court admitted improper comparator evidence, Plaintiff’s counsel made prejudicial comments during closing, the Court allowed improper jury instructions, and there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that Defendant failed to engage in the interactive process.

 

1.    Punitive Damages

 

 “To determine the constitutional limits of a punitive damages award in any given case, we look to three ‘guideposts’ articulated by the United States Supreme Court: ‘(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's misconduct; (2) the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3) the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.’ ” (Gober v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 204, 215, as modified on denial of reh'g (Mar. 22, 2006), quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418 (2003).)

 

Defendant asserts that the $2,500,000.00 punitive damage award, which is a 29:1 ratio of punitive to compensatory damages, exceeds the constitutional limits of punitive damages. Defendant argues that its conduct was not highly reprehensible, the ratio far exceeds the ratio of up to10:1 generally allowed by courts, and that the award is 250 times the $10,000.00 civil penalty allowed for whistleblower retaliation under Labor Code section 1102.5.

 

At trial, Plaintiff, who worked for Defendant for more than 20 years prior to termination, presented evidence showing Defendant failed to engage in the interactive process and retaliated against him for reporting what he believed to be violations of labor law. Plaintiff presented evidence that managing agents of Defendant, including Thomas Newton, Clare Lee, and Bryan Croft, knew of and ratified this misconduct. Plaintiff presented evidence that similarly situated individuals did not experience the same treatment. The parties stipulated to Defendant’s $7,000,000,000 net worth.

 

The evidence supports an award of punitive damages. The jury reasonably could find from this evidence that Defendant failed to engage in the interactive process with a disabled employee who had worked for them for more than 20 years. The evidence also suggests that Defendant and Defendant’s executives terminated Plaintiff’s employment over Plaintiff’s concerns that Defendant would no longer pay for uniform laundering. The power disparity between the parties is enormous, and the jury determined that a high ratio of punitive damages was necessary to punish the Defendant.

 

The Court agrees, however, that a 29:1 ratio is excessive. Courts rarely allow punitive damage awards above a 10:1 ratio of punitive to compensatory damages. As the California Supreme Court explained, “ratios between the punitive damages award and the plaintiff’s actual or potential compensatory damages significantly greater than 9 or 10 to 1 are suspect and, absent special justification (by, for example, extreme reprehensibility or unusually small, hard-to-detect or hard-to-measure compensatory damages), cannot survive appellate scrutiny under the due process clause.” (Simon v. San Paolo U.S. Holding Co., Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1159, 1182.)

 

The Court finds that a 7:1 ratio of punitive to compensatory damages is appropriate for the harm caused by Defendant. The Court finds no justification in the facts for a higher ratio. This results in a punitive damage award of $588,000.00. This is sufficient to punish Defendant and protect Defendant’s due process rights.

 

To remedy the discrepancy in damages, the Court applies CCP § 662.5, which provides, “In any civil action where after trial by jury an order granting a new trial limited to the issue of damages would be proper, the trial court may in its discretion... If the ground for granting a new trial is excessive damages, issue a conditional order granting the new trial unless the party in whose favor the verdict has been rendered consents to the reduction of so much thereof as the court in its independent judgment determines from the evidence to be fair and reasonable.”

 

The Court CONDITIONALLY GRANTS the motion for new trial as to amount of punitive damages only unless Plaintiff consents to the reduction of punitive damages from $2,500,000.00 to $588,000.00 within 30 days.

 

2.    Remaining Arguments

 

As stated, Defendant also seeks new trial on the grounds Court admitted improper comparator evidence, Plaintiff’s counsel made prejudicial comments during closing, the Court allowed improper jury instructions, and there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that Defendant failed to engage in the interactive process.

 

The parties extensively briefed the issues related to comparator evidence prior to trial and the Court found the evidence admissible. The comparators had the same management as Plaintiff and were disciplined under the same policy. The jury was properly instructed not to use counsel’s closing arguments as evidence. There was substantial evidence that Defendant failed to engage in the interactive process following disclosure of his diabetes-related need for accommodation and note from his doctor. Defendant presents no evidence showing the “cat’s paw” jury instruction was prejudicial or confusing for the jury. New trial cannot be granted on these grounds. 

 

B. Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict

 

The trial court has limited discretion to grant a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict; it may grant it only when there is no substantial evidence to support the verdict. (Teitel v. First Los Angeles Bank (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1593, 1603. Campbell v. Cal-Gard Surety Services, Inc. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 563, 570.) A judgment notwithstanding the verdict can be sustained only when it can be said as a matter of law that no other reasonable conclusion is legally deducible from the evidence, and that any other holding would be so lacking in evidentiary support that the reviewing court would be compelled to reverse it, or the trial court would be compelled to set it aside as a matter of law. (Moore v. City and County of San Francisco (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 728, 733–734.)

Defendant argues for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the same grounds as the motion for new trial. For the reasons stated, these arguments fail.

Defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is DENIED.