Judge: Maurice A. Leiter, Case: 22STCV39640, Date: 2023-05-09 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV39640 Hearing Date: May 9, 2023 Dept: 54
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Superior
Court of California County of
Los Angeles |
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Silvia Aguayo, |
Plaintiff, |
Case No.: |
22STCV39640 |
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vs. |
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Tentative Ruling |
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FCA US, LLC, et al., |
Defendants. |
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Hearing Date: May 9, 2023
Department 54, Judge Maurice A. Leiter
Motion to Compel Arbitration
Moving Party: Defendant FCA US, LLC
Responding Party: Plaintiff Silvia Aguayo
T/R: DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION IS
DENIED.
DEFENDANT TO NOTICE.
If the
parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the courtroom at¿SMCdept54@lacourt.org¿with notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party)
before 8:00 am on the day of the hearing.
The Court
considers the moving papers, opposition, and reply.
BACKGROUND
This is a lemon law action arising
out of Plaintiff’s purchase
of a 2017 Chrysler Pacifica manufactured
and distributed by Defendant FCA US, LLC.
ANALYSIS
“On petition of a party to an arbitration
agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a
controversy and that a party thereto refuses to arbitrate a controversy, the
court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the
controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy
exists….” (CCP § 1281.2.) The right to compel arbitration exists unless
the court finds that the right has been waived by a party’s conduct, other
grounds exist for revocation of the agreement, or where a pending court action
arising out of the same transaction creates the possibility of conflicting
rulings on a common issue of law or fact.
(CCP § 1281.2(a)-(c).) “The party
seeking arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of an arbitration
agreement, and the party opposing arbitration bears the burden of proving any
defense, such as unconscionability.” (Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle
Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236.)
A. Existence of
Arbitration Agreement
Defendant
moves to compel arbitration based on the arbitration provision in the Retail
Installment Sale Contract (“RISC”) executed by Plaintiff on June 2, 2017.
(Decl. Gruzman, Exh. A.) The agreement provides, in pertinent part, “[a]ny
claim or dispute, whether in contract, tort, statute or otherwise ..., between
you and us or our employees, agents, successors or assigns, which arises out of
or relates to your... purchase or condition of this vehicle, this contract or
any resulting transaction or relationship (including any such relationship with
third parties who do not sign this contract) shall, at your or our election, be
resolved by neutral, binding arbitration and not by a court action.” (Id.) This
action arises out the purchase and condition of the subject vehicle. Defendant,
however, is a non-signatory to the agreement.
B. Non-Signatory
Defendant
moves to compel arbitration under
the doctrine of equitable estoppel, relying on the Third District Court of
Appeal opinion in Felisilda v. FCA US LLC (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 486, 489. In Felisilda,
the plaintiffs purchased a vehicle and signed a sales contract, which
provided in pertinent part, “Any
claim or dispute, whether in contract, tort, statute or otherwise (including
the interpretation and scope of this Arbitration Provision, and the
arbitrability of the claim or dispute), between you and us or our employees,
agents, successors or assigns, which arises out of or relates to ... condition
of this vehicle, this contract or any resulting transaction or relationship
(including any such relationship with third parties who do not sign this
contract) shall, at your or our election, be resolved by neutral, binding
arbitration and not by a court action.” (Id. at 490, emphasis in
original.)
The plaintiffs sued FCA and the dealership; the dealership moved to
compel all parties to arbitration based on the sales agreement. The plaintiffs
argued that they could not be compelled to arbitrate their claims against
non-signatory FCA. The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, finding that FCA
could compel arbitration under equitable estoppel, which allows a non-signatory
to enforce an arbitration agreement when “the causes of action against the non-signatory
are ‘intimately founded in and intertwined’ with the underlying contract
obligations.” (Id. at 495; quoting JSM Tuscany, LLC v. Superior Court
(2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1222, 1236-1237.) Citing the arbitration provisions
above, the Court explained, “[t]he Felisildas’ claim against FCA directly
relates to the condition of the vehicle that they allege to have violated
warranties they received as a consequence of the sales contract. Because the
Felisildas expressly agreed to arbitrate claims arising out of the condition of
the vehicle – even against third party nonsignatories to the sales contract –
they are estopped from refusing to arbitrate their claim against FCA.” (Id.
at 497.)
On
April 4, 2023, the Second District Court of Appeal issued an opinion in five
actions titled Ford Motor Warranty Cases (Ochoa v. Ford) 2023 WL 2768484.
The facts in Ford mirror those in this action and those in Felisilda.
The Second District declined to follow Felisilda, instead finding that equitable
estoppel does not apply because the plaintiffs’ claims are not founded on or
intertwined with the RISC, and because Ford is not a third-party beneficiary of
the RISC. (Id.)
This
Court will follow Ford. Defendant is not entitled to compel arbitration
under the RISC.
Defendant’s
motion to compel arbitration is DENIED.