Judge: Maurice A. Leiter, Case: 22STCV40507, Date: 2023-03-17 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV40507    Hearing Date: March 17, 2023    Dept: 54

Hearing Date: March 17, 2023

Department 54, Judge Maurice A. Leiter

Motion to Compel Arbitration

Moving Party: Defendant Vinyl Technology, Inc.

Responding Party: Plaintiff Catalina Rodriguez

T/R:    DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION IS GRANTED. THE ACTION IS STAYED.

DEFENDANT TO NOTICE.

If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the courtroom at¿SMCdept54@lacourt.org¿with notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:00 am on the day of the hearing.

            The Court considers the moving papers, opposition, and reply.

BACKGROUND

            On December 28, 2022, Plaintiff Catalina Rodriguez filed a complaint against Defendant Vinyl Technology, Inc., for FEHA violations and wrongful termination.

ANALYSIS

“On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party thereto refuses to arbitrate a controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists….”  (CCP § 1281.2.)  The right to compel arbitration exists unless the court finds that the right has been waived by a party’s conduct, other grounds exist for revocation of the agreement, or where a pending court action arising out of the same transaction creates the possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact.   (CCP § 1281.2(a)-(c).)  “The party seeking arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of an arbitration agreement, and the party opposing arbitration bears the burden of proving any defense, such as unconscionability.”  (Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236.)

A.        Existence of Arbitration Agreement and Applicable Law

Defendant moves to compel arbitration based on the Mutual Arbitration Policy executed by Plaintiff on June 3, 2019. (Decl. Sanchez, Exh. A.) The agreement provides, “The MAP applies to all Company employees, regardless of length of service or status, and covers all disputes relating to or arising out of or in connection with employment at the Company or the termination of that employment…” (Id.) This action arises from Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant. The agreement states that it is governed by the FAA.

Defendant has met their burden to establish an agreement to arbitrate. The burden shifts to Plaintiff to establish any defenses to enforcement.

B. Enforceability of Agreement

1. Unconscionability

Plaintiff asserts that the arbitration agreement is procedurally unconscionable as it is an adhesion contract. Regarding procedural unconscionability, the California Supreme Court has held:

“[T]here are degrees of procedural unconscionability. At one end of the spectrum are contracts that have been freely negotiated by roughly equal parties, in which there is no procedural unconscionability . . . . Contracts of adhesion that involve surprise or other sharp practices lie on the other end of the spectrum. [Citation.] Ordinary contracts of adhesion, although they are indispensable facts of modern life that are generally enforced (see Graham v. Scissor–Tail, Inc. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 807, 817–818, 171 Cal.Rptr. 604, 623 P.2d 165), contain a degree of procedural unconscionability even without any notable surprises, and ‘bear within them the clear danger of oppression and overreaching.’ (Id. at p. 818 [171 Cal.Rptr. 604, 623 P.2d 165].)” (Gentry v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443, 469, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 773, 165 P.3d 556.)

(Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1237, 1244.)

Generally, in the employer-employee context, there is unequal bargaining power. (See Amendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 115 [“in the case of preemployment arbitration contracts, the economic pressure exerted by employers on all but the most sought-after employees may be particularly acute, for the arbitration agreement stands between the employee and necessary employment, and few employees are in a position to refuse a job because of an arbitration requirement.”] The agreement here is one of adhesion and thus at least a low degree of procedural unconscionability is present. But this does not, in itself, render the arbitration agreement unconscionable; to find the agreement unenforceable, the degree of substantive unconscionability must be high. (See Dotson v. Amgen, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 975, 981.)

            Plaintiff asserts that the agreement is substantively unconscionable because it does not define minimum discovery procedures and does not provide for a neutral arbitrator. Nothing in the agreement limits discovery, and it specifically states that a neutral arbitrator will be chosen with the consent of both parties. The agreement is not substantively unconscionable. It is enforceable.

            Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration is GRANTED.