Judge: Maurice A. Leiter, Case: 23STCP02375, Date: 2025-03-27 Tentative Ruling



Case Number: 23STCP02375    Hearing Date: March 27, 2025    Dept: 54

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

 

Crane Boulevard Safety Coalition,

 

 

 

Petitioner,

 

Case No.:

 

 

23STCP02375

 

vs.

 

 

Tentative Ruling

 

City of Los Angeles,

 

 

 

Respondent.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Hearing Date: March 27, 2025

Department 54, Judge Maurice Leiter

Motion for Leave to Amend

Moving Party: Petitioner Crane Boulevard Safety Coalition

Responding Party: Respondent City of Los Angeles

 

T/R: PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND IS DENIED.

 

PETITIONER TO NOTICE.

 

If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the courtroom at SMCdept54@lacourt.org with notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:00 am on the day of the hearing.

 

The Court considers the moving papers, opposition and reply.

 

BACKGROUND

 

This is an action arising under the California Environment Quality Act (CEQA). On August 7, 2023, Petitioner Crane Boulevard Safety Coalition filed the First Amended Petition for Writ of Mandate against Respondent City of Los Angeles and Real Parties in Interest Rachel Foullon and Ian Cooper. On July 15, 2024, the Court granted Respondent’s motion for judgment of the pleadings on the third and fourth causes of action. On August 2, 2024, Petitioner filed a second amended petition.

 

Petitioner challenges certain patterns and practices of Respondent relating to the Mount Washington/Glassell Park Specific Plan (Specific Plan) and proposed development housing project located at 464-466 Crane Boulevard, Los Angeles, CA (Project).

 

ANALYSIS

 

The Court may allow, in furtherance of justice, and “upon any terms as may be just, an amendment to any pleading or proceeding in other particulars….”  (CCP § 473(a)(1).)  A motion to amend a pleading before trial must be accompanied by a separate declaration that specifies (1) the effect of the amendment; (2) why the amendment is necessary and proper; (3) when the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered; and (4) the reasons why the request for amendment was not made earlier.  (CRC Rule 3.1324(b).)

It is not an abuse of discretion of the court to grant the motion unless there is a “showing that actual unfairness or obvious prejudice has resulted from the allowance of such an amendment”.  (Posz v. Burchell (1962) 209 Cal.App.2d 324, 334.)  “Counsel on the firing line in an actual trial must be prepared for surprises, including requests for amendments of pleading.”  (Ibid.)  Absent a showing of prejudice, delay alone is insufficient grounds for denial.  (See Higgins v. Del Faro (1981) 123 Cal. App. 3d 558, 564–65.)

Petitioner moves for leave to file third amended petition to add claims to the fifth cause of action that Respondent purposefully uses disappearing google chats to transmit the opinions and positions of council members. Petitioner asserts that this violates evidence retention laws. In opposition, Respondent argues that the motion should be denied because Petitioner has delayed in seeking amendment and because the amendment does not state a ripe or cognizable cause of action.

The Court agrees that the proposed amendment does not state a cognizable cause of action. The proposed amendment alleges that Respondent violated evidence retention policies under state and local laws. None of these statutes, however, provide for private rights of action for their violation. Petitioner does not allege that the violations of these statutes give rise to any other causes of action, instead merely stating that they are an unlawful “pattern and practice.” Amendment is not in the interests of justice.

Petitioner’s motion for leave to amend is DENIED.


 

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

 

Crane Boulevard Safety Coalition,

 

 

 

Petitioner,

 

Case No.:

 

 

23STCP02375

 

vs.

 

 

Tentative Ruling

 

City of Los Angeles,

 

 

 

Respondent.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Hearing Date: March 27, 2025

Department 54, Judge Maurice Leiter

(4) Discovery Motions

Moving Party: Petitioner Crane Boulevard Safety Coalition

Responding Party: Respondent City of Los Angeles

 

T/R: PETITIONER'S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO RPDS, SET ONE, AND MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER DEPOSITION RESPONSES ARE GRANTED.

 

PETITIONER'S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO SIS AND MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO RPDS, SET TWO ARE DENIED.

 

RESPONDENT TO SERVE FURTHER RESPONSES TO THE SUBJECT DISCOVERY WITHIN 30 DAYS OF NOTICE OF RULING.

 

PETITIONER TO NOTICE.

 

If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the courtroom at SMCdept54@lacourt.org with notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:00 am on the day of the hearing.

 

The Court considers the moving papers, opposition, and reply.

 

BACKGROUND

 

This is an action arising under the California Environment Quality Act (CEQA). On August 7, 2023, Petitioner Crane Boulevard Safety Coalition filed the First Amended Petition for Writ of Mandate against Respondent City of Los Angeles and Real Parties in Interest Rachel Foullon and Ian Cooper. On July 15, 2024, the Court granted Respondent’s motion for judgment of the pleadings on the third and fourth causes of action. On August 2, 2024, Petitioner filed a second amended petition.

 

Petitioner challenges certain patterns and practices of Respondent relating to the Mount Washington/Glassell Park Specific Plan (Specific Plan) and proposed development housing project located at 464-466 Crane Boulevard, Los Angeles, CA (Project).

 

ANALYSIS

 

A. Petitioner's Motion to Compel Further Responses to RPDs, Set One, and Motion to Compel Further Deposition Responses

 

The moving party on a motion to compel further responses to requests for production of documents (“RPDs”) must submit “specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the inspection demand.”  (CCP § 2031.310(b)(1).)  If the moving party has shown good cause for the RPDs, the burden is on the objecting party to justify the objections.  (Kirkland v. Sup.Ct (2002) 95 Cal. App.4th 92, 98.) 

 

“If a deponent fails to answer any question or to produce any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing under the deponent's control that is specified in the deposition notice or a deposition subpoena, the party seeking discovery may move the court for an order compelling that answer or production.” (CCP § 2025.480(a); see Stewart v. Colonial Western Agency, Inc. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1015 n. 3 [the only proper basis to instruct a deponent to not answer a question is an objection based upon a privilege or manifestly irrelevant questions or questions designed only to harass.]) “If the court determines that the answer or production sought is subject to discovery, it shall order that the answer be given or the production be made on the resumption of the deposition.” (CCP § 2025.480(i).) “This motion shall be made no later than 60 days after the completion of the record of the deposition, and shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration.” (CCP § 2025.480(b).) 

 

Petitioner requests "an order requiring the City produce each of the emails identified as containing acts prohibited under Government Code section 54952.2, wholly redacted except unredacted as to the (a) email header, (b) item number and agenda description, (c) each full sentence where the comments or position of a City Councilmember is sought or discussed, and (d) each full sentence where a recommendation based upon the shared information is discussed."

 

Petitioner seeks production of emails that purportedly violate Government Code § 54952.2. Section 54952.2(b)(1) prohibits a majority of members of a legislative body from using "a series of communications of any kind, directly or through intermediaries, to discuss, deliberate, or take action on any item of business that is within the subject matter jurisdiction of the legislative body." Subsection (b)(2) states, "Paragraph (1) shall not be construed as preventing an employee or official of a local agency, from engaging in separate conversations or communications outside of a meeting authorized by this chapter with members of a legislative body in order to answer questions or provide information regarding a matter that is within the subject matter jurisdiction of the local agency, if that person does not communicate to members of the legislative body the comments or position of any other member or members of the legislative body."

 

These statutes were enacted to ensure that legislative meetings are conducted in public, and to prevent the majority of members from deliberating in private regarding topics under consideration by the legislative body. Respondent produced a privilege log identifying emails that purportedly are protected by the official information privilege and deliberative process privilege. These emails contain communications between Council staff and members that state certain members' comments or positions on the project approval at issue in this action.

 

Petitioner asserts that Respondent should be required to produce these documents because they show that members and members' staff violated Government Code § 54952.2(b)(2) by communicating individual members' comments or position to other members and staff. Respondent disputes Petitioner's interpretation of this section, arguing that the section does not completely prohibit staff or members from communicating their comments and positions to other staff or members. Respondent suggests that the section prohibits the communication of a member's comments or position only to the majority of the members at once.

 

The Court is unaware of any case law addressing the parties’ conflicting interpretations of Government Code § 54952.2; the Court will construe the statute by employing the long-accepted rules for statutory interpretation. On its face, subsection (b)(1) prohibits the majority of members from using private communications to discuss, directly or indirectly, matters the body is deliberating. But it does not state that the statute is violated only if a particular communication is directed to a majority of members. Indeed, the statute prohibits the use of a “series” of communications. One can easily envision a series of communications, each one directed to an individual member, collectively conveying to the majority information about a member’s views or planned vote.

 

And subsection (b)(2) underscores the Legislature’s particular concern with using private communications to convey the views or vote of one or more members: it allows members to solicit and receive information about matters before the body, but specifically does not allow private communications concerning “the comments or position of any other member…”

 

The Court finds that Petitioner’s interpretation of Government Code § 54952.2(b)(2) is reasonable, and the requested information is relevant. The Court turns to whether the information is privileged.

 

The official information privilege and deliberative process privilege are conditional privileges that apply when "disclosure of the information is against the public interest because there is a necessity for preserving the confidentiality of the information that outweighs the necessity for disclosure in the interest of justice." (Evid. Code 1040(b)(2); see also Marylander v. Superior Court (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1124-1128 ["Only if the public interest in nondisclosure clearly outweighs the public interest in disclosure does the deliberative process privilege spring into existence."])

 

Respondent argues that the emails should not be disclosed because "they are part of confidential advice made available by Council Deputies to Councilmembers concerning land use determinations.” Respondent asserts that “the public interest in nondisclosure is to maintain the independence and ability of less-than-a majority of Councilmembers to communicate candidly among themselves on land use matters and change their minds; maintain the independence and ability of Council Deputies to provide candid advice; and ensure that Council Deputies themselves receive candid information.” Petitioner asserts that the evidence will show that the council members do not fairly conduct public hearings and instead improperly defer to the local councilmember on project approvals.

 

The Court has balanced the respective interests here and finds that the public interest in disclosure in discovery outweighs Respondent’s interest in preserving confidentiality. Petitioner requires these emails to establish whether Respondent has violated Government Code § 54952.2. Generally, the conduct of legislative bodies is available for discovery by individual citizens. That legislative members might be apprehensive to state privately their comments or positions for fear of public disclosure does not necessarily serve the public’s interest where such private sharing may violate the law. Petitioner’s interest in showing a possible statutory violation is in the public interest.  

 

Petitioner’s motions to compel further responses to RPDs, set one, and to compel further deposition answers are GRANTED.

 

B. Petitioner's Motion to Compel Further Responses to SIs

 

On receipt of a response to interrogatories, the propounding party may move for an order compelling a further response if the propounding party deems that an objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general. (CCP 2030.300(a)(3).) The responding party has the burden of justifying the objections to the form interrogatories (“FIs”) and special interrogatories (“SIs”).  (Coy v. Sup.Ct. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-221.)

 

Petitioner moves to compel further responses to certain SIs relating to PLUM Notes Chief Legislative Analyst, Roberto Mejia, prepared and transmitted to the Council Deputies over the 3.5 year-period under investigation related to the pattern and practice claims. In opposition, Respondent represents that further responses have been served to the subject interrogatories. Accordingly, the motion is DENIED as MOOT.

 

C. Petitioner's Motion to Compel Further Responses to RPDs, Set Two

 

Petitioner moves to compel further responses to various RPDs relating to Respondent’s employees’ use of disappearing Google chats. Respondents have produced extensive documentation of their Google contracts and produced existing google chats relating to the subject project approval. Respondents refuse to produce documents going back to 2010 and refuse to produce documents showing the City Attorney’s advice for evidence retention as protected by attorney client privilege.

 

The Court finds Respondent’s production sufficient. The City has produced the relevant, non-privileged documents responsive to the requests.

 

The motion to compel further responses to RPDs, Set Two, is DENIED.

 

 

 

 

 

B. Petitioner's Motion to Compel Further Responses to SIs

 

On receipt of a response to interrogatories, the propounding party may move for an order compelling a further response if the propounding party deems that an objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general. (CCP 2030.300(a)(3).) The responding party has the burden of justifying the objections to the form interrogatories (“FIs”) and special interrogatories (“SIs”).  (Coy v. Sup.Ct. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 220-221.)

 

Petitioner moves to compel further responses to certain SIs relating to PLUM Notes Chief Legislative Analyst, Roberto Mejia, prepared and transmitted to the Council Deputies over the 3.5 year-period under investigation related to the pattern and practice claims. In opposition, Respondent represents that further responses have been served to the subject interrogatories. The motion is DENIED as MOOT.

 

C. Petitioner's Motion to Compel Further Responses to RPDs, Set Two

 

Petitioner moves to compel further responses to various RPDs relating to Respondent’s employees’ use of disappearing Google chats. Respondents have produced extensive documentation of their Google contracts and produced existing google chats relating to the subject project approval. Respondents refuse to produce documents going back to 2010 and refuse to produce documents showing the City Attorney’s advice for evidence retention as protected by attorney client privilege.

 

The Court finds that Respondent’s production are sufficient. The City has produced the relevant, non-privileged documents responsive to the requests.

 

The motion to compel further responses to RPDs, Set Two, is DENIED.