Judge Maurice A. Leiter, Case Number: 23STCP03581, Date: 2025-01-13 Tentative Ruling

Responding Parties: Respondent City of Long Beach, Long Beach City Council, California State Lands Commission; and Real Parties California Resources Corporation, THUMS Long Beach Company.

T/R: THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE BY CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY IS GRANTED.

The 2023-2028 Program Plan for the oil and gas wells in the Long Beach Unit (LBU) calls for expanded oil and natural gas extraction and a new practice for enhanced oil recovery. The central issue in this lawsuit is whether an environmental review of that Plan is required under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The Court finds that environmental review is required. The Plan is a “project” subject to CEQA. It does not qualify for CEQA’s “ministerial” exemption; it is discretionary because it requires deliberation and judgments by the City of Long Beach and the California State Lands Commission (SLC), including decisions on drilling volumes and schedules, and environmental safeguards.

The Court also finds that the 2023-2028 Program Plan does not qualify for the ongoing project exemption from CEQA because it involves expanded activities beyond prior approvals, including new drilling and advanced recovery techniques. These changes constitute significant modifications introducing new environmental impacts. Nor does the existing facilities exemption apply, as the Plan authorizes substantial expansions, including more than 100 drilling activities and increased production levels. These activities exceed negligible changes and create the potential for significant environmental impacts.

The Court will enjoin new activities included in the 2023-2028 Program Plan until CEQA compliance is achieved. Operations under the previous 2021-2026 Program Plan – a Plan which was not challenged in this lawsuit – remain unaffected.

In 1911, California granted control of the Long Beach Unit (LBU) lands to the City of Long Beach, later establishing it as the operator of oil and gas activities in the Wilmington Oil Field. In 1962, Long Beach adopted an ordinance which permitted the construction of offshore islands, subject to safety measures, and required repressuring operations to prevent land subsidence.

In 1964, with the passage of an act known as “Chapter 138,” California mandated oil and gas production at the LBU through contracts between Long Beach, the State Lands Commission (SLC), and private contractors. Chapter 138 required Long Beach and SLC to prepare a “contractors’ agreement” to develop oil and gas “for the benefit and profit” of California, as well as other agreements necessary “for the production of oil, gas and other hydrocarbons . . . in accordance with good oil field practice and prevention of land surface subsidence.”

Under Chapter 138, Long Beach, SLC, oil companies (THUMS)[1], and mineral estate owners entered into contracts governing development of the LBU and revenue sharing, which require the ongoing production of oil and gas from the LBU. The Unit Operating Agreement requires maximizing oil recovery through repressuring operations and required Long Beach to operate the LBU. These contracts remain in force for the economic life of the LBU. Long Beach’s ability to curtail production is limited to two scenarios: (1) to prevent land subsidence or (2) when oil prices become uneconomical. Outside of these conditions, state law and the contracts prohibit halting production.

Since 1991, the Optimized Waterflood Program Agreement (OWPA) under Chapter 941 has governed LBU operations, requiring five-year program plans to replace annual plans. These plans forecast oil production, well maintenance, expenditures, and strategies for maximizing recovery while maintaining safety and environmental standards. The program plans ensure transparency for stakeholders, including Long Beach, SLC, and THUMS. SLC's oversight role under Chapter 941 is limited to reviewing plans for consistency with good oil field practices, safety, and existing agreements, without controlling day-to-day operations. SLC shares in LBU profits but does not operate the unit.

The California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) had not yet been enacted when Chapter 138 became law. CEQA was in effect when the Legislature passed Chapter 941, in 1991. Chapter 941 clarified that five-year plans must comply with contemporary environmental laws. It states that “nothing in this act shall limit the application of any law or regulation which is intended to protect or may protect the environment.” (Chapter 941, sec. 4(a); Chapter 941, sec. 7.)

At issue in this lawsuit is the 2023-2028 Program Plan for the LBU. The 2023-2028 Plan became effective after revisions ordered by SLC. Petitioner states that the Plan authorizes the extraction of 26.2 million barrels of oil and 12 billion cubic feet of natural gas – an increase in production volume from previous program plans. The Plan anticipates drilling additional development wells, including re-drilling of 102 wells. It would permit the use of a new, intensive practice of enhanced oil recovery. No environmental review or analysis of this Plan under CEQA was conducted.

Petitioner contends that the Program Plan would result in physical changes to the environment. It cites the Commission’s staff report, stating that the oil and gas operations of the LBU are a source of air pollution affecting public health, safety, and the environment. Neighbors and other stakeholders expressed concerns about public health impacts, greenhouse gas emissions, and the possibility of oil spills.

Petitioner filed a writ of petition for mandate and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief on September 29, 2023.

Respondents and Real Parties’ Request for Judicial Notice is GRANTED as to Exhibits A pursuant to Evidence Code § 452(d).

A party may seek to set aside an agency decision by petitioning for a writ of administrative mandamus (Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5) or traditional mandamus (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085). A petition for administrative mandamus is appropriate when the party seeks review of a “determination, finding, or decision of a public agency, made as a result of a proceeding in which by law a hearing is required to be given, evidence is required to be taken and discretion in the determination of facts is vested in a public agency, on the grounds of noncompliance with [CEQA].” (Pub. Resources Code § 21168.)

In an action challenging an agency’s decision under CEQA, the trial court reviews the agency’s decision for a prejudicial abuse of discretion. (PRC § 21168.5.) “Abuse of discretion is established if the agency has not proceeded in a manner required by law or if the determination or decision is not supported by substantial evidence.” (Ibid.; see also Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cordova (2007) 40 Cal.4th 412, 435.) “The standard of review in administrative mandate proceedings is well-settled: whether the agency acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, whether there was a fair hearing, and whether there was a prejudicial abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs when the agency did not proceed in the manner required by law, its order or decision is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (b).)” (Hubbard v. California Coastal Com. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 119, 135.) The court reviews “the administrative record to determine whether the Agency’s findings are supported by substantial evidence. (Id.)

Whether the Program Plan is a project subject to CEQA, and whether a CEQA exemption applies, are reviewed de novo. “While judicial review of CEQA decisions extends only to whether there was a prejudicial abuse of discretion, ‘an agency may abuse its discretion under CEQA either by failing to proceed in the manner CEQA provides or by reaching factual conclusions unsupported by substantial evidence. (§ 21168.5.) Judicial review of these two types of error differs significantly: while we determine de novo whether the agency has employed the correct procedures, ‘scrupulously enforc[ing] all legislatively mandated CEQA requirements' (Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors (1990) 52 Cal.3d 553, 564, 276 Cal.Rptr. 410, 801 P.2d 1161), we accord greater deference to the agency's substantive factual conclusions.’ (Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cordova, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 435, 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 821, 150 P.3d 709.)” (Save Tara v. City of West Hollywood (2008) 45 Cal.4th 116, 131.)

“When a public agency is asked to grant regulatory approval of a private activity or proposes to fund or undertake an activity on its own, the agency must first decide whether the proposed activity is subject to CEQA. (Guidelines, § 15060, subd. (c).)” (Union of Medical Marijuana Patients, Inc. v. City of San Diego (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1171, 1185.) Under CEQA, a “project” is defined as an activity that may cause either a direct physical change in the environment or a reasonably foreseeable indirect physical change in the environment. (Pub. Res. Code § 21065.) A “project” includes (1) an activity directly undertaken by any public agency, (2) an activity undertaken by a private party but supported in whole or in part by public agency assistance such as contracts, grants, or loans, and (3) an activity that involves the issuance of a lease, permit, license, certificate, or other entitlement for use by a public agency. (Rominger v. County of Colusa (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 690, 701 [overruled in part but not the portion cited]; Pub. Res. Code § 21065.) “If the proposed activity is found not to be a project, the agency may proceed without further regard to CEQA. (Muzzy Ranch, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 380, 60 Cal.Rptr.3d 247, 160 P.3d 116; Guidelines, § 15060, subd. (c)(3) [if a proposed activity does not qualify as a project, it ‘is not subject to CEQA’].)” (Union of Medical Marijuana Patients, supra, 7 Cal.5th at 1186.)

The Court finds that the 2023-2028 Program Plan is a “project” under CEQA; it governs and directs oil and gas activities in the LBU, including new and expanded operations that have may cause direct or reasonably foreseeable indirect physical changes to the environment. Contrary to Respondents’ and Real Parties’ arguments, the Plan is not a mere description of ongoing operations. Rather, Petitioner shows that it shapes the trajectory of LBU activities. Section 5 of Chapter 138, later incorporated into Chapter 941, mandates that all oil and gas exploration, development, and operations in the Long Beach tidelands must occur “in accordance with plans of development and operation.” This statutory language demonstrates that the Program Plan dictates future operational activities, including well drilling, production rates, and technologies used, which have foreseeable environmental impacts.

As noted, CEQA defines a project broadly to include actions that may cause direct or indirect physical changes to the environment. Courts consistently have held that plans guiding future activities—such as timber harvesting plans or general plans—are projects under CEQA because they influence physical changes in the environment. (Sierra Club v. State Bd. of Forestry (1994) 7 Cal. 4th 1215, 1237.) By authorizing activities such as new drilling and advanced extraction methods, the Plan introduces foreseeable environmental risks, including greenhouse gas emissions and public health concerns.

CEQA guidelines clarify that a project refers to the “whole of an action” that is subject to discretionary governmental approvals. (North Coast Rivers Alliance v. Westlands Water Dist. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 832, 858.) The term “project” does not refer to each separate governmental approval but to the overall activity being approved. (Id.) A discretionary project is one that requires the exercise of judgment or deliberation by a public agency when deciding to approve or disapprove an activity, unlike ministerial projects where the agency simply determines conformity with statutes or regulations. (Sierra Club v. County of Sonoma (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 11, 20.) The key test for discretion is whether the agency can use subjective judgment to decide whether and how to approve or modify the project. (Protecting Our Water and Environmental Resources v. County of Stanislaus (2020) 10 Cal.5th 479, 493.) A project containing both discretionary and ministerial elements is considered discretionary and subject to CEQA review. (Sierra Club, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at 21.) CEQA applies broadly to discretionary projects approved or carried out by public agencies, including activities like zoning ordinance enactments, zoning variances, and tentative subdivision map approvals. (Pub. Res. Code § 21080.)

The Court finds that the Program Plan is discretionary under CEQA. Respondents and Real Parties characterize the Program Plan as akin to a “shareholder disclosure,” describing revenue and operational projections. They argue that all the activities described in the plan were “approved” decades ago. But Long Beach and SLC exercised deliberation, discretion, and judgment in creating, reviewing, and approving the Plan. Long Beach made decisions about adding production wells, drilling schedules, production rates, infrastructure investments, and enhanced oil recovery techniques. Under Chapter 138, decisions must be made “in accordance with good oil field practice and prevention of land surface subsidence.” The Court finds that these decisions require subjective analysis, discretion, and judgment. For example, Respondents and Real Parties do not contend, nor could they, that “good oil field practices” have remained frozen since the 1960s, or that no discretion or analysis is needed to determine what constitutes good oil field practices for a new Program Plan. Similarly, SLC exercised discretion by ordering eleven revisions to the Plan, including assessments of sea-level rise, public health impacts, environmental justice concerns, and risks posed by idle wells. These revisions reflect the Commission’s ability to shape the Plan to address environmental and safety risks.

The ongoing project exemption under CEQA applies to projects approved before November 23, 1970. (14 Cal. Code Reg. § 15261.) The key issue in applying this exemption is whether the challenged action is a “normal, intrinsic part” of the pre-CEQA-approved project, rather than an expansion or significant modification. (North Coast Rivers Alliance v. Westlands Water Dist. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 832, 857.) Routine operations are exempt, but significant changes may fall outside this exemption. A project remains exempt unless: (1) a substantial portion of public funds remains unspent, and it is still feasible to modify or halt the project to mitigate environmental effects, or (2) the agency proposes modifications that could result in a new significant environmental impact. (14 Cal. Code Reg. § 15261.)

Petitioner argues that the Program Plan does not qualify for the ongoing project exemption because it is a new, forward-looking document that authorizes activities beyond those approved pre-CEQA, including the use of enhanced oil recovery techniques and the drilling of new wells, which will have significant environmental impacts. Petitioner highlights that the Program Plan expands the scope and intensity of drilling, with new wells and an increase in oil production. Petitioner also states the Plan represents new decisions about public expenditures (including $58.3 million for development drilling in 2024).

Petitioner relies on County of Inyo v. Yorty (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 795 and County of Amador v. El Dorado County Water Agency (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 931, to argue that adding new project components or shifting project goals—such as increased extraction—disqualifies an activity from the ongoing project exemption. In County of Inyo, adding four new wells disqualified an activity from the ongoing project exemption. (32 Cal. App. 3d at 814 [new pumps and water extraction might have a new significant impact on the environment and disqualified the project from ongoing project exemption].) In County of Amador, the court found that a shift in project focus and goals since the pre-CEQA era might lead to new significant impacts on the environment, and the ongoing projects exemption did not apply. Petitioner emphasizes that the Program Plan will have significant environmental effects, including air pollution, climate impacts, and expanded oil extraction operations.

In opposition, Respondents and Real Parties argue that the Program Plan is exempt under the ongoing project exemption because the LBU was fully approved prior to CEQA’s enactment in 1970. They argue that the Program Plan merely represents a normal, intrinsic part of ongoing operations, which have continued for decades without expansion. It forecasts production, expenditures, and maintenance rather than authorizing new activities. Respondents compare this to Nacimiento Regional Water Management Advisory Committee, et al. v. Monterey County Water Resource Agency, et al. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 200, 205, where the annual water release schedule for a dam which was originally constructed before CEQA was exempt because it reflected routine operations. They note that production in the LBU remains within the originally approved scope, currently operating at only 10% of pre-CEQA peak levels. In Nacimiento, the court held that the release schedule was a “normal, intrinsic part” of the dam’s ongoing operations and therefore exempt from CEQA review. To determine whether an activity qualifies as “normal” and “intrinsic,” the court assesses whether the activity expands or enlarges project facilities or merely adjusts operations to accommodate fluctuating conditions. (Nacimiento, supra, 15 Cal.App.4th at 205.)

The Court finds that the ongoing project exemption does not apply. Petitioner correctly points out that this exemption is narrow and applies only to projects approved before CEQA’s enactment in 1970. Respondents’ and Real Parties’ claim that all LBU activities in the 2023-2028 Program Plan were fully approved in the 1960s is misplaced; as discussed, the 2023-2028 Plan authorizes new operations, including the drilling of new production wells, updated injection strategies, and the use of enhanced oil recovery to develop unproven reserves. The Court finds that these activities extend beyond prior approvals and represent an expansion or shift in operations.

Similarly, it is of no moment that overall oil field production has decreased since the 1960s, and the number of wells remains within the number originally approved. Respondents and Real Parties have not shown that Chapter 138 or the ordinance that contemplates drilling in the LBU specifies how many wells may be drilled and when, and what technologies may be used. As discussed, the 2023-2028 Program Plan prescribes drilling and extraction for future years, including new activities and new extraction practices to develop unproven reserves.

Respondents and Real Parties correctly note that Chapter 138 mandates oil and gas development at the site; they suggest that granting the petition here would violate that law. This overstates the issue. Petitioner does not seek to halt all oil and gas development at the LBU; the petition asks whether environmental review under CEQA is necessary for a new Program Plan that authorizes new operations. Respondents and Real Parties do not show that Chapter 138 can be read to exempt all oil and gas drilling in the LBU from environmental review. And their argument also fails to consider Chapter 941, which clarified that five-year plans must comply with contemporary environmental laws.

This case is distinguishable from Nacimiento, where the dam’s water release schedule was deemed a “normal, intrinsic part” of its operations because it merely adjusted flows to accommodate changing conditions without expanding the project. The Program Plan here involves new operational decisions that go beyond routine adjustments; as discussed, it authorizes the drilling of new production wells, introduces updated injection strategies, and uses enhanced oil recovery techniques to develop unproven reserves. The Court finds that these actions constitute an expansion of operations which were not part of the original LBU scope approved prior to CEQA.

The facts here are more analogous to County of Inyo and County of Amador, where, as discussed, the projects involved significant modifications that introduced new environmental impacts, disqualifying them from the ongoing project exemption. In County of Inyo, the addition of new wells and pumps introduced new components with potential environmental impacts. Similarly, in County of Amador, a shift in project focus to include enhanced recovery methods was deemed a substantial change requiring CEQA review. Here, the Program Plan incorporates new operational decisions, including additional drilling and expanded extraction methods, which carry new environmental impacts, beyond those contemplated in the pre-CEQA approvals.

CEQA mandates review when: (1) the project may result in a new significant environmental effect, or (2) a substantial portion of public funds remain unspent, and mitigation is still feasible (14 Cal. Code Reg. § 15261). The Court finds that both conditions apply. The Plan proposes new drilling activities and enhanced technologies, which create foreseeable environmental effects such as air pollution and climate impacts. The Plan projects over $1.5 billion in public expenditures, and since these activities are still modifiable, it remains feasible to implement mitigation measures to reduce adverse impacts.

The existing facilities exemption under CEQA is a categorical exemption that applies to projects involving the operation, repair, maintenance, permitting, licensing, or minor alteration of existing structures, facilities, or features, where the project results in negligible or no expansion of use beyond what existed at the time of the agency’s determination. (14 Cal. Code Reg., § 15301; World Business Academy v. California State Lands Commission (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 476, 493; North Coast Rivers Alliance v. Westlands Water Dist. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 832, 851.) The key consideration is whether the project involves only minor changes without significantly expanding the existing use. Examples include interior/exterior alterations, maintenance of landscaping, and minor repairs to existing structures. (14 Cal. Code Reg., § 15301.) This exemption is based on the presumption that such projects do not have significant environmental effects. However, categorical exemptions are subject to exceptions, such as significant cumulative impacts, impacts in sensitive environments, or potential harm to scenic or historical resources. (World Business Academy, supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at 476.)

Petitioner argues that the existing facilities exemption does not apply to the Program Plan because it involves significant expansions beyond existing operations. As noted, the Program Plan authorizes the drilling or re-drilling of more than 100 wells, leading to a significant increase in oil and gas production. The Plan prescribes the production of 26.2 million barrels of oil and 12 billion cubic feet of natural gas, representing an increase of 730,000 barrels of oil and 949 million cubic feet of gas over the previous five-year plan. Petitioner also contends the Program Plan directs increased investment in development drilling and enhanced oil recovery technologies. Petitioner states these expansions create a reasonable possibility of significant environmental effects.

In opposition, Respondents and Real Parties argue that the Program Plan involves only routine operations and maintenance without any expansion of the LBU’s scope or capacity. They point out that courts consistently have applied the existing facilities exemption to large-scale facilities, such as nuclear power plants, water systems, and wastewater treatment plants, where ongoing operations continue without material changes. Respondents and Real Parties assert that the LBU meets these criteria because it is an existing facility operating within its originally approved scope. The Program Plan describes routine activities, including redrilling and well maintenance, which are longstanding components of LBU operations. Respondents emphasize that the Plan does not authorize new wells or significant expansions, as any drilling approvals fall under the jurisdiction of CalGEM, not the City of Long Beach or the SLC. Respondents maintain there is no expansion beyond the historical scope of operations. The Plan describes declining production, emissions, and well counts, demonstrating that activities remain well within the original expectations established when the LBU first was approved. Respondents distinguish this case from the precedents cited by Petitioners. Unlike County of Amador, where operations expanded to include new water sources and quantities, the LBU’s operations remain unchanged in nature and scale. (County of Amador, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at 947.) And they state that cases like World Business Academy, supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at pp. 496-497, and Progressive Gilroy v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 847, 864-865), affirm the applicability of the exemption to facilities maintaining their original scope.

In reply, Petitioner argues that the Program Plan increases investment in development drilling and enhanced oil recovery to develop unproven reserves. It authorizes additional drilling at various locations, reflecting an operational expansion beyond previously established activities. Petitioner emphasizes that the statutes governing the LBU did not preordain a fixed number of wells or their specific locations. Instead, they delegated decisionmaking to agencies through program plans, which are inherently discretionary documents that determine operational scope. Petitioner states the Program Plan’s expanded drilling activities and increased production investments go far beyond minor alterations.

The Court finds that the existing facilities exemption does not apply here. While Respondents and Real Parties argue that the LBU operates within its historical scope, the 2023-2028 Program Plan involves significant expansions outside the scope of this exemption. These activities, as described in the record, represent an operational expansion rather than routine maintenance. As discussed, the statutes governing the LBU did not preordain a fixed number of wells or production methods, delegating these decisions to the program plans, which are inherently discretionary. By directing expanded drilling and new technologies, the Program Plan goes beyond negligible changes and constitutes a substantial operational shift.

County of Inyo and Azusa Land Reclamation support Petitioner’s position that projects with the reasonable possibility of significant environmental effects are ineligible for categorical exemptions. The increased production forecasts—26.2 million barrels of oil and 12 billion cubic feet of gas, reflecting significant increases over prior plans—demonstrate foreseeable environmental impacts. Respondents and Real Parties’ reliance on declining production and emissions figures is unpersuasive considering the Plan’s explicit authorization of additional drilling activities and investment in expanded operations. Comparisons to World Business Academy and County of Amador highlight the key distinction here: the Program Plan involves forward-looking decisions that expand operations, rather than maintaining the status quo. The exemption does not apply where there is evidence of significant changes or new environmental impacts.

Respondents and Real Parties argue that Petitioner’s claims are time-barred under CEQA’s statute of limitations, providing independent grounds for dismissal. Under CEQA, strict statutes of limitations ranging from 30 to 180 days are imposed to ensure stability, prevent stale claims, and reduce litigation. (Guidelines § 15112, subd. (c).) Respondents contend that Petitioner’s challenge comes decades too late because the LBU was fully approved and operational long before CEQA’s enactment in 1970. Operations were approved under the 1962 Ordinance, with additional statutory and contractual frameworks established by Chapter 138 (1964) and Chapter 941 (1991). Oil production at the LBU peaked in 1969, and they assert that the current 2023-2028 Program Plan merely implements previously approved and ongoing operations.

Respondents also invoke the equitable doctrine of laches, arguing that Petitioner’s unreasonable delay in filing this challenge causes significant prejudice. They argue that Petitioner waited more than 60 years after the original approvals and more than 32 years since the first Program Plan to raise this claim. Courts have found much shorter delays unreasonable in similar environmental cases. (People v. Dept. of Housing and Community Development (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 185, 198 [finding a five-and-a-half-month delay between the issuance of a construction permit and commencement of legal action unreasonable].) Respondents and Real Parties claim that the delay has prejudiced Respondents, particularly THUMS, which relied on decades of unchallenged approvals to invest heavily in the LBU. Respondents and Real Parties note that approximately $1.7 billion (in today’s dollars) was spent on constructing and maintaining facilities, with hundreds of millions invested in ongoing operations and infrastructure. Invalidating the LBU’s operations now would unfairly undermine decades of reliance and investments, creating substantial harm for THUMS, Long Beach, and the State.

Under CEQA, the 30-day statute of limitations applies when a public agency files a Notice of Determination (NOD), which alerts the public that any CEQA challenge to the decision announced in the notice must be filed promptly. (Committee for Green Foothills v. Santa Clara County Bd. of Supervisors (2010) 48 Cal.4th 32, 42-45.) This period applies regardless of the nature of the alleged CEQA violation, including challenges to the adequacy of an Environmental Impact Report (EIR). (Citizens for a Green San Mateo v. San Mateo County Community College Dist. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1572, 1590.) If a Notice of Exemption (NOE) is filed, the 35-day statute of limitations applies, starting from the date the notice is filed. (May v. City of Milpitas (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1307, 1322-1333; 14 CCR § 15112.) In cases where no NOD or NOE is filed, CEQA imposes a 180-day statute of limitations. This period begins either from the date the public agency decides to approve or carry out the project, or from the commencement of the project if no formal decision is made. (14 Cal. Code Reg., § 15112; Pub. Res. Code, § 21167.)

These short limitations periods are intended to provide finality and predictability in public land use planning decisions. They allow project sponsors to proceed without prolonged uncertainty and litigation, while ensuring diligence in mounting environmental challenges. (Stockton Citizens for Sensible Planning v. City of Stockton (2010) 48 Cal.4th 481, 488). Courts emphasize that these strict deadlines prevent stale claims, stabilize transactions, protect settled expectations, and reduce litigation volume. (Coalition for an Equitable Westlake/Macarthur Park v. City of Los Angeles (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 368, 378; Committee to Relocate Marilyn v. City of Palm Springs (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 607, 631.)

The Court finds that Petitioner’s challenge to the 2023-2028 Program Plan is timely, and that Respondents’ statute of limitations argument is without merit. Petitioner has shown that the Program Plan is a separate, independent project that directs new resources and operational decisions, distinguishing it from past activities. As discussed above, the five-year program plans are not mere continuations of pre-existing approvals but instead represent new discretionary decisions that trigger CEQA review. Respondents’ contention that the statute of limitations expired decades ago is misplaced because each new program plan constitutes a distinct CEQA project requiring its own environmental analysis.

This case is distinguishable from Guerrero v. City of Los Angeles (2024) 89 Cal.App.5th 1087, where the statute of limitations did not restart because a mitigated negative declaration and Notice of Determination already had been issued. There, the court found that the City's March 25, 2020 NOD triggered CEQA’s 30-day statute of limitations for challenging the validity of the MND. (Guerrero, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at 1104.) “‘For purposes of the CEQA statutes of limitation, the question is not the substance of the agency's decision, but whether the public was notified of that decision.’ [Citation.] ‘[T]he posting of an NOD “alerts the public that any lawsuit to attack the noticed action or decision on grounds it did not comply with CEQA must be mounted immediately.”’ [Citation.]” (Id.) Objectors argued that the March 25, 2020 NOD was ineffective because it was filed before project approval, but the court rejected this argument, concluding that the March 2020 approval of the vesting tentative tract map constituted a valid project approval under CEQA. (Id.)

Here, no CEQA review has been conducted for the 2023-2028 Program Plan or any prior program plans; there is no prior environmental review on which to rely. The Court finds that Petitioner timely filed the lawsuit within 180 days of the City of Long Beach’s approval of the Plan, satisfying CEQA’s statutory requirements.

The Court finds that the doctrine of laches does not apply. There was no unreasonable delay, and Respondents face no legitimate prejudice. Petitioner’s challenge is timely, narrowly focused, and validly seeks compliance with CEQA for the 2023-2028 Program Plan. Petitioner has demonstrated that the lawsuit specifically targets the 2023-2028 Program Plan, not earlier approvals or prior program plans. Petitioner filed its challenge within 180 days of the City of Long Beach’s approval of the Plan, complying with CEQA’s statutory requirements and demonstrating no unreasonable delay.

The Court also finds that there was no appreciable delay in filing the lawsuit. Here, Petitioner filed on September 14, 2023, well within CEQA’s allowable timeline, which satisfies all statutory obligations. Respondents’ claims of prejudice due to the potential invalidation of decades-old investments are unfounded. Petitioner does not seek to invalidate existing investments or prior approvals, but requests only proper CEQA review of the 2023-2028 Program Plan. Since CEQA does not retroactively impact prior activities, Respondents’ arguments regarding prejudice lack merit.

Respondents and Real Parties contend that the injunction sought by Petitioner would shut down the LBU’s operations. They argue that oil production at the LBU is mandated by state law. Shutting down operations would directly conflict with this statutory obligation. Respondents say that Petitioner fails to cite any law or legal justification supporting its extreme request to halt LBU operations. CEQA remedies are explicitly limited to what is “necessary to achieve compliance” (14 Cal. Code Reg., § 21168.9(b)); Respondents and Real Parties argue that the relief sought far exceeds this standard. They emphasize that an unchallenged program plan (2021-2026) remains in place, which would continue to govern operations for the next two years, undermining any claim of urgency or justification for immediate injunctive relief. Halting LBU operations, they argue, would have severe economic and practical consequences, including the loss of jobs, the elimination of local oil production relied upon by millions of Californians, and the disappearance of nearly $100 million in annual state revenue and $20 million for Long Beach.

In Nat. Res. Def. Council v. City of Los Angeles (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 1176, 1237, the court held that CEQA allows courts to suspend project activities that could result in adverse changes to the environment or prejudice future implementation of mitigation measures while agencies work to correct CEQA violations. (Id. at 1238.) The court explained that under CEQA, when violations are found, a trial court has broad discretion to craft remedies using one or more of the options provided in section 21168.9, including voiding approvals, suspending project activities, or directing agencies to take specific actions necessary to comply with CEQA (§ 21168.9(a)(1)-(3)). (Id. at 1237-1238.) Additionally, section 21168.9(c) preserves the court’s traditional equitable powers, allowing flexibility to ensure compliance with CEQA while balancing environmental protection. (Id.)

As discussed above, the Petition in this case challenges only the 2023-2028 Program Plan. It seeks to set aside approval of that Plan, and to enjoin activities described in it until the requirements of CEQA have been satisfied. The Court will set aside that approval and enjoin only new activities described in the 2023-2028 Program Plan. The injunction will not extend to operations authorized under the unchallenged 2021-2026 Program Plan. The 2021-2026 Plan will continue to govern LBU operations until a CEQA-compliant new Program Plan is adopted.

Suspending new activities described in the 2023-2028 Program Plan until CEQA compliance is achieved is narrowly tailored and consistent with CEQA’s environmental protection goals. Operations under the 2021-2026 Program Plan – a Plan not challenged in this lawsuit – remain unaffected.

[1] The original “THUMS” consisted of Texaco, Humble, Union Oil, Mobil, and Shell. Real Party in Interest THUMS adopted this acronym for the entity that now operates the LBU.

*Superior Court of California* *County of Los Angeles*
Center for Biological Diversity,	Petitioner,	Case No.:	23STCP03581
v.		Tentative Ruling
City of Long Beach, Long Beach City Council, California State Lands Commission, et al.,	Respondents.
California Resources Corporation, THUMS Long Beach Company, et al.,	Real Parties in Interest